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Chapter VI
THE TANKER WAR AND THE MARITIME
ENVIRONMENT

P

ersian Gulf armed conflicts during 1980-88 (the Tanker War) and 1990-91
(the Gulf War between Iraq and the Coalition after Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait) resulted in environmental degradations of Gulf waters and the
land and airspace over States party to the conflicts. Perhaps the worst of these was
what a Time writer called a "Man-Made Hell on Earth"! when Iraq dynamited over
550 of684 producing Kuwaiti oil wells in early 1991 during the GulfWar. 2
This Chapter does not address the oil well destruction and other environmental
issues related to land warfare and conflict in the skies over the lands of countries
involved during either conflict, nor does it analyze the 1990-91 Gulf War's maritime aspects. Rather, this Chapter explores conflict at sea during the 1980-88
Iran-Iraq conflict, the Tanker War, in its environmental contexts.3 In some instances the same issues arose in both conflicts, but the facts may point to different
analyses for the overland air and land battles of both wars or the 1990-91 sea war.
In 1983 Iraqi rocket attacks hit Iran's Nowruz offshore drilling facilities, causing a 20-million barrel oil spill into the Gulf. Although early reports that the slick
had equalled the size of Belgium and had caused permanent ecological damage
were later discounted, it was big enough to threaten Bahraini, Qatari and Saudi desalination plants before strong winds blew it offshore and partially dispersed it.
Fish imports into the UAE were stopped because of oil contamination in fishing
grounds. Iraq rejected Iran's request for a partial truce so that oil cappers could try
to stop the 2000-5000 barrels per day flow. The result was that the leakage lasted for
nine months. US diplomacy may have been behind eventual capping of the flow. 4
The Nowruz attack may have been in response to Iran's attack on Iraqi oil terminals and ports early in the war, which resulted in their closure. There are no reports
of significant pollution of the Gulf resulting from these attacks. S In 1986 Iraq
bombed Iran's Sirri, Lavan and Larak oil terminals, and Iran attacked the neutral
UAE's Abu al-Bakoush oil installations. There were also reports of attacks on Kuwai ti terri tory. There were no reports of significant spillage in to the Gulf in any of
these cases. Nor was there any report of oil slicks resulting from the 1984 Red Sea
mining episode.6 In 1987 US naval forces attacked Iranian offshore oil rigs used as
an Iranian gunboat base in response to Iran's Silkworm missile strike on a
reflagged tanker, S.S. Sea Isle City, in Kuwaiti waters. There is no report of petroleum spillage on the high seas resulting from these responses?
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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Tanker War shipping losses from attacks by both belligerents were another
source of marine pollution during that conflict. Although most tankers traveled in
ballast to the Gulf, they and incoming cargo vessels had bunkers aboard. All outbound ships had bunkers aboard, and nearly all tankers leaving the Gulf departed
with a full load. These vessels as well as inbound and outbound cargo ships were attacked by the belligerents. Iraq and Iran laid mines, either initially set adrift or
which came loose from moorings. Several merchantmen, some of them neutral
flagged, were mined. Iraq attacked tankers escorted by Iranian warships, and both
countries conducted land-based air attacks on neutral-flag merchant ships, primarily tankers, some of which were convoyed by neutral warships. Iran's navy attacked these vessels as well. Iran saw its attacks as justified because of aid afforded
Iraq. The UN Security Council twice condemned the attacks and the result on the
environment. An Iraqi aircraft mistakenly launched two missiles at and seriously
damaged another US warship, the frigate U.S.S. Stark. An Iranian-laid mine seriously damaged U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts, also a US frigate. Another marine pollution source came from losses of naval vessels, principally Iran's, hit as self-defense
measures following attacks on US naval vessels or after being caught laying mines,
e.g. thelranAjr. Iran saw the US attacks as aggression. Undoubtedly there was contamination of the Gulf from petroleum cargoes and bunkers, although there is no
report ofsuch. The conflict was a major war, not a small one, particularly when the
commitments oflran and Iraq were measured. For the only time since World War
II, deliberate, sustained operations were carried out against merchant ships. 8 Iran
and Iraq attacked more than 400 merchantmen, sinking 31 with 50 more declared
total losses. Write-off losses stood at nearly half the World War II tonnage sunk.
Over 200 merchant mariners died. 9 (World War II lasted for just under six years
for all combatants except the United States and other States entering the war in
1941 or later, e.g., the USSR, and China, which had been Japan's object of aggression before 1939. The Iran-Iraq war ground on eight years. The reason for the disparity between the relatively small number of ships lost and huge tonnage losses is
merchant vessels' relatively larger displacement in the Eighties.) The possible result when a tanker was attacked during 1980-88 was the risk of a considerably
larger oil spill for each ship attacked than during World War II. There were also
aircraft losses over the Gulf, notably the Airbus tragedy;lO however, there are no
reports of aviation fuel pollution.
If the belligerents who initiated tactics resulting in environmental degradation
hoped to improve their fortunes by these tactics, they were mistaken. The IranIraq war wore on for five more years after the 1983 Nowruz attack before ending in
mid-1988. The Iraqi attack on Nowruz was not a war-stopper; leakage from
stricken merchantmen did not even receive media attention, except what viewers
could observe in occasional videos of burning vessels.
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This survey does not include oil sent overboard in deballasting or from
land-based sources not connected with armed conflict in the Gul£ Worldwide figures for this pollution rose from about a million metric tons annually in the 1960s
to nearly 7 million tons in 1973, with over half from land-based sources and 35 percent from ships. Two-thirds of the latter have been said to be from "routine tanker
operations."Il

Part A. Not a New Phenomenon
Environmental degradation during war, or international armed conflict as the
use of force by one State against another is commonly styled today, is not a new
phenomenon. Pollution of the sea on a measurable scale during war at sea has
largely been an aspect of Twentieth Century conflicts, particularly after oil replaced coal as a primary source of energy for steam-powered ships, and the world
began to consume petroleum as a primary fuel for transportation, a major source
for heating and an ingredient for plastics and other products. The Persian Gulfhas
been a particularly busy highway for transporting petroleum; a high percentage of
the Earth's proven reserves are within States bordering the Gulf. The ocean pollution problem is not new12 or confined to the Gulf, however; the Tanker War
merely underscored issues that have arisen on a world-scale basis, usually in the
context ofaccidents through tanker collisions or groundings. These accidents, like
loss ofR.M.S. Titanic in 1912 and the resulting 1914 Convention for Safety of Life
at Sea,13 have been catalysts for treaties or other action to prevent recurrences. 14
The world little noted warnings of the potential for environmental degradation
of the seas before, during and afterthe Tanker War. IS After the 1990-91 Gulf War,
when the world focused attention on Iraqi actions that many claimed violated
international environmental norms,16 there were calls for action in the United Nations and other quarters for more treaties, e.g., a Fifth or "Green" Geneva Convention to protect the environment during armed conflictP These efforts largely
came to naught, primarily because most participants concluded no new agreements were necessary if existing ones were enforced. IS The qu~stion ofbelligerent
culpability for environmental damage during international armed conflict at sea
remains as a possible source of rhetoric, if not law, in future wars. Publication of
the International Committee of the Red Cross Guidelines (1994), the San Remo
Manual (1995) andNWP I-14M (1997)19 demonstrates that the issue remains alive
within governments and in commentators' minds. 20
This Chapter limits its coverage to the LOS, the oceans environment and how
these sometimes overlapping bodies oflaw relate to the LOAC and self-defense at
sea. Except as concepts spill over physically or legally, land-based aspects of environmental issues (e.g., transborder air pollution), problems related exclusively to
land warfare or war in the air or space above the land, are not discussed. Thus the
air war from the sea, i.e., air strikes from land-based Iranian or Iraqi aircraft flown
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over the sea, or from neutrals' warships in the Gulf, are analyzed, but principles of
air-to-air combat over land or attacks on land targets from the land without flight
over the Gulf are outside the parameters.
Part B.1 attempts to place the law of the maritime environment in the context of
the UN Charter; the law of the Charter was analyzed in more depth in Chapter III,
to which reference will be made. Part B.2 reviews the LOS, particularly the 1982
LOS Convention and its and other conventions' relationship with the law of the
maritime environment and the LOAC; this was explored in more depth in Chapter
IV, to which reference will be made. Part B.3 discusses the LOAC, discussed in the
general context of the war in Chapter V, as it relates to Tanker War environmental
issues. Part BA, drawing on current thinking in the Restatement (Third), Foreign
Relations Law ofthe United States, US conflict oflaws and recent pUblications on the
LOAC appearing since the Tanker War, offers an analytical method for the complex relationship among these bodies oflaw.

Part B. Charter Law, the Law of the Sea, the Law of the Maritime
Environment, and the Law of Armed Conflict
There is an enormous volume oflaw related to the maritime environment, most
of it in treaties appearing since the 1958 LOS conventions. If international agreements related to marine resources conservation 21 or maritime safeti2 are considered, insofar as observing these standards would promote\a better oceans
environment, there were scattered efforts at protection of the oceans well before
1958. The same is true with respectto the LOAC, where treaties negotiated to regulate aspects of warfare or humanitarian principles to be observed during war derivatively benefit the environment. Agreements of thisl nature include the 1907
Hague Conventions dealing with shore bombardment and mine warfare;23 the
1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, whose prohibitions on gas and bacteriological warfare
affect human and nonhuman inhabitants of the environment;24 the 1935 Roerich
25
Pact protecting monuments, etc., ashore; parts of the 1949 Geneva Conventions;26 and the 1954 Cultural Property Convention,27 which provides inter alia for
safe sealift of protected objects during war. More recently the ENMOD Convention and Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions have included provisions that
are protective of the environment.
The 1996 International Court of Justice Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons advisory opinion ruled 8-7 that threat or use ofnuclear weapons would be
contrary to international law except in self-defense situations where a State's survival is at stake.28 In so deciding the Court said environmental considerations are
an element to be taken into account in implementing the LOAC 29 and considered
the impact of some of the foregoing international agreements in the nuclear warfare context.30
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There is thus as deep a legacy of what today are called environmental concerns
in the law of armed conflict as those agreements dealing with pollution or species
protection, which today might be lumped under the same rubric.

1. The UN Charter and the Environment
Not surprisingly, given the era when it was drafted, negotiated and signed, the
UN Charter has no direct reference to protection of the environment. Environmental protection might be subsumed under Articles 1(3)-1(4) and 55-56, particularly if the environment is considered a human right or if protection of health is
involved. Article 55 has been the linchpin for the UN Environmental Programme,
established through UN General Assembly Resolution 2994 (1972).31 Like all
General Assembly resolutions, Resolution 2994 as a recommendation is not lawmaking in and ofitself, although it can restate existing law and thereby strengthen
it, or contribute to development of custom.32 However, if the UN Security Council
resolution is a decision, that resolution binds UN Members; if the Council passes
other resolutions, e.g., recommendations, those are not binding on Members. The
latter resolutions may also contribute to development oflaw, like General Assembly resolutions. 33
During the Tanker War no Security Council resolution directly addressed environmental issues. The Council did pass resolutions, nonbinding like decisions,
calling on the belligerents to observe international humanitarian law and condemning gas warfare,34 the latter a feature of the land campaigns. As will be noted
in the LOAC analysis, implementing these resolutions would have promoted a
better environment.35 Council Resolution 552 (1984), condemning attacks on
ships exercising freedom of navigation and reaffirming the right offree navigation
in international waters and shipping lanes en route to and from States not party to
the conflict, likewise could have promoted a better environment. The resolution
did decide to revisit the problem, but no further Council action on the freedom of
navigation issue was taken. 36 Ifbelligerents' attacks on ships had ceased, there
would not have been the oil pollution problem associated with leakage after
attacks. 37
The inherent right to self-defense and the respect due States' territorial integrity38 was also implicated in Tanker War environmental issues. Neutrals exercised
the right to self-defense of their warships and aircraft in responding to belligerent
attacks by sea (e.g., mines, speedboat attacks) and the air (e.g., missiles, aircraft attacks), including belligerent attacks on neutral convoys. Articles 2(4) and 5 1 of the
Charter, like the rest of the Charter, do not speak to environmental protection in
affirming the entitlement ofStates to respect for their territorial integrity or the inherent right to self-defense.39 However, parties are obliged, under general principles of necessity and proportionality and admitting of no other alternative in the
context of anticipatory self-defense, to have due regard for the potential for
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environmental degradation in self-defense responses.40 Observance of States' entitlement to their territorial integrity necessarily involves respect for what is on that
territory, i.e., its environment.
Iran's attack on neutrals' coastal facilities was an Article 2(4) violation, unless it
was somehow excused, e.g., by mistake as in the case of the Airbus tragedy.
Whether States observed due regard for the maritime environment in self-defense
responses is less than clear from the war's history, which has no record of spills incident to these situations. However, in the absence of binding Charter law, i.e., Security Council decisions, States responding in self-defense should have had due
regard for the environment in those decisions, such due regard being conditioned
on information available at the time of decision.41

2. The 1982 LOS Convention and Environmental Protection
The 1982 LOS Convention is the first worldwide multilateral agreement attempting to deal comprehensively with maritime environmental problems. For
those countries that are or become parties,42 the 1982 LOS Convention will replace
the 1958 LOS conventions.43 With respect to countries involved in the Tanker
War, Bahrain and Iraq ratified it in 1985, and Kuwait in 1986; others, e.g., France
and the UAB, were signatories. However, other countries with prominent roles in
the war were not signatories or parties, e.g., the United Kingdom and the United
States.44 Thus some States were obligated not to defeat the Convention's object
and purpose during the war;45 others were bound by custom the Convention restated.46
The LOS Convention has different provisions dealing with the welter of custom and treaties affecting the maritime environment; it continues 1958 convention provisions stating the relationship between the LOS and the LOAC and its
component, the law of naval warfare. Part B.2.a analyzes the relationship among
the 1982 Convention, other LOS conventions and other treaties related to protecting the maritime environment. Part B.2.b discusses exceptions to applying the
Convention during armed conflict. Part B.2.c analyzes the Convention's provisions governing environmental protection. Part B.2.d offers general comments on
these relationships.
a. The Relationship Between the 1982 LOS Convention and Other Environmental Treaties. The LOS Convention will be an effective if mild trumping device
much as UN Charter, Article 103 declares that the Charter supersedes other treaties,47 for agreements related to environmental protection, whether already in
force or to come into force, which may have special terms but which "should be
carried out in a manner consistent with the general principles and objectives of
[the] Convention.,,48 This is slightly different from art. 311(2), the Convention's
tr'!neral supersession provision, which declares it does not alter existing rights
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"which arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention" and which
do not affect enjoyment of other parties' rights or performance of their obligations.49 The upshot is that all agreements in place or to be negotiated, if related to
Convention environmental norms, must conform generally to these norms. 50
Reading of Part XII of the LOS Convention,51 as well as environmental standards scattered elsewhere throughout the Convention,52 demonstrates that specifics are more often found in other agreements, perhaps bilateral but frequendy
regional in recent years. The latter have been often sponsored by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), which developed after the Stockholm 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment.53 Examples of these include two particularly
relevant to this analysis, the Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol (1978)54
and the Red Sea Convention and Protocol (1982).55 (Although the Persian Gulf
was the theater of maritime military operations during the Tanker War, Libyan
mines were discovered in the Red Sea in 1984. US and other States cooperated in
removing them. 56) In many instances administrative bodies established by the
treaties develop detailed regulations. 57 The LOS Convention contemplates this
procedure.58
There is the possibility that a parallel but contradictory custom or other source
oflaw may develop alongside Convention-based norms. 59 The developing customary norm might be the same as, and thereby strengthen, the Convention
norm. 60 If in opposition, the custom will weaken the treaty norm. 61 However, no
treaty, and probably no custom, can supersede the UN Charter, mandatory norms
developed under it,62 or jus cogens norms. 63

b. ((Other Rules" Clauses in the Conventions. The 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions include clauses, sometimes over:looked in analysis or commentary, stating
that rights under these agreements are subject to "other rules ofinternationallaw"
as well as terms in the particular convention.64 For example, LOS Convention, article 87(1), declaring high seas freedoms, also says that "Freedom ofthe high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of
international law." Four conclusions can be stated.65
First, the ovenvhelming majority of commentators including the International
Law Commission (ILC), a UN General Assembly agency of international law experts, have said the "other rules" clauses in the 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions
refer to the LOAC,66 a component of which is the law of naval warfare. Therefore,
provisions such as 1982 Convention Article 88 state a truism, i.e., the high seas are
reserved for peaceful purposes,67 but high seas usage can be subject to the law ofnaval warfare when Article 87(1)'s other rules clause is read with Article 88. As in the
case ofthe 1958 conventions,
That provision does not preclude ... use of the high seas by naval forces. Their use for
aggressive purposes, which would ... violat[e) ... Article 2(4) of the [UN] Charter ... ,
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is forbidden as well by Article 88 [of the LOS Convention]. See also LOS Convention,
Article 301, requiring parties, in exercising their rights and p[er]forming their duties
under the Convention, to refrain from any threat or use of force in violation of the
Charter.68

This analysis is buttressed by the Charter's trumping clause; no treaty can supersede the Charter.69 Thus the peaceful purposes language in Article 88 and other
LOS Convention provisions70 cannot override Charter norms, e.g., those in Article 2(4), but also those in Article 51, i.e., the inherent rightofindividual and collective self-defense.71 Naval forces of neutral and belligerent States may use the high
seas for military purposes (e.g., for formation steaming) as part of the freedom of
the seas, although these forces may be restricted in other maritime zones, e.g., the
territorial sea. Belligerents may also restrict high seas usage in the immediate vicinity ofnaval operations and establish other kinds ofzones, e.g., war zones, on and
over the high seas.72 The other rules clauses come into force for States engaged in
armed conflict.
Second, there is no indication that the LOS Convention drafters thought that
the other rules clauses referred to anything else, and particularly to a customary
law of the environment. International environ'mentallaw was a gleam in academics' and futurists' eyes when the 1958 LOS Conventions were signed, with only a
patchwork of treaties on the subject,73 and there is no indication the International
Law Commission considered the environment issue. By contrast, there was established law dealing with armed conflict situations, including naval warfare, at the
time.
Third, other agreements dealing with protecting the maritime environment include clauses exempting, or partially exempting, their application during armed
conflict or similar situations. Some speak of war,74 others armed conflict or the
need to protect vital national interests?S This includes the North Atlantic Free
Trade Agreement?6 This tends to confirm the view ofapplying the LOAC as a separate body oflaw in appropriate situations. To the extent that treaties dealing with
the maritime environment do not have such clauses,77 such agreements must be
read in the light of the LOS conventions, which include such provisions. To the
extent the 1958 LOS conventions today recite customary norms, e.g., the High
Seas Convention,78 applying the LOAC as a separate body oflaw in appropriate situations as a customary norm must also be considered with LOAC treaties and
other sources79 when analyzing environmental issues in this context.
Fourth, principles of the law of treaties, e.g., impossibility of performance;80
fundamental change of circumstances;81 desuetude, or lack of use of a treaty for a
considerable time;82 or war, the last applying only to parties to a conflict;83 may
suspend operation of international agreements during a conflict or other emergency situation, or may terminate them. Armed conflict does not suspend or terminate humanitarian law conventions or treaties governing conduct of hostilities,
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including rules for neutrals. 84 The other side of the coin is pacta sunt servanda, i.e.,
treaties should be observed;85 manifestation of this principle is that States signing
treaties should not behave so as to defeat their object and purpose. 86 The often-amorphous law of treaty succession87 must be considered, particularly for
older agreements, including those stating the LOAC, to the extent that such treaties are not customary law today. If treaties restate custom, and are subject to succession principles as to a particular country, that State is doubly bound. 88
The conclusion is inescapable that the 1958 Conventions' other rules clauses,
conventions carried forward into the 1982 LOS Convention, mean that these treaties' terms are subject to the LOAC, of which the law of naval warfare is a part.
Since the High Seas Convention is generally regarded as restating custom,89 its
other rules clause is part of the customary norms governing oceans law during
armed conflict.

c. The LOS Convention and Provisions Governing the Maritime Environment.
Although the LOS Convention is prolix on the subject of the environment, the
changes it proposes are neither great nor radical; it takes a holistic approach. 90 The
core of marine environmental standards are in Part XII, which establishes for the
first time a comprehensive legal framework for protecting and preserving the marine environment under the law ofthe sea.91 Part II.B.3.c.i summarizes these rules.
Other parts of the Convention state environmental principles for ocean areas;92
Part II.B.3.c.ii discusses these. Part II.B.3.c.iii explores the relationship among
two regional treaties, the Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol and the Red
Sea Convention and Protocol, the 1982 Convention and the LOAC. Part II.B.3.c.iv
gives general observations, and Part II.B.3.c.v discusses the Tanker War and the
environment.
i. Part XII of the Convention. Part XII begins by declaring that "States have the
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.,,93 The Convention
does not define "marine environment," but the drafters generally understood that
the atmosphere is included where relevant. 94 It also includes living resources, marine ecosystems and sea water quality.95 The Convention defines "pollution of the
marine environment;" it
... means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy
into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result
in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate
uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of
amenities. 96
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The Convention also declares that States' "sovereign right to exploit their natural
resources" pursuant to national environmental policies in, e.g., the EEZ, is subject
to a "duty to preserve and protect the marine environment,,97 against significant98
damage.
States must act individually and jointly to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any source, using the best practicable means
at their disposal, in accordance with their capabilities. They must harmonize national policies, i.e., national laws, with this requirement. 99 In doing so, they must
ensure that they do not damage other States or their environment by pollution, or
that pollution does not spread beyond their areas of sovereignty or control,lOO e.g.,
the EEZ or the territorial sea. lOl Required measures include those designed to
minimize to the greatest possible extent releasing toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially those that are persistent, from land-based sources, from or
through the atmosphere or by dumping;lOZ pollution from vessels, including accident prevention measures, dealing with emergencies, safety at sea, preventing
discharges, and regulating the design, construction, equipping, operating and
crewing of vessels; pollution from installations for exploring or exploiting natural
resources of the seabed and subsoil; and pollution from other installations operating in the marine environment. l03 In so acting States must refrain from unjustifiable interference with other States' exercising their Convention rights and
duties. l04 Measures taken must include those necessary to protect and preserve
rare or fragile ecosystems and habitats of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other marine life. !OS In combatting pollution, States must not act to transfer damage or hazards from one area to another, or to transfer one type of pollution
into another. l06 Technologies that alter or harm the environment, or introduce
new or alien species that would significantly harm the environment must be
avoided. l07 There are two distinct duties: avoiding use of harmful technologies,
and "maintain[ing] the natural state of the marine environment," the latter an innovation in internationallaw. 108
The Convention requires environmental cooperation on global and regional
bases. l09 Other provisions require cooperation in scientific research and in establishing scientific criteria for rules for pollution prevention, reduction and contro1. 110 States also must monitor, publish and assess the marine environment and
provide scientific and technical assistance, with preference for developing States. lll
A State must notify other countries and competent international organizations
(e.g., IMO) of actual or imminent pollution damage to the environment. 11Z Notification is a rule of customary internationallaw. 113 Notice "also envisages that a notified State may wish to take preventive action to avert damage to itself ....,,114
States must jointly develop and promote contingency plans to combat pollution,
cooperating with international organizations within limits oftheir capabilities. 1IS
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The Convention establishes standards for international rules and national laws
to combat pollution. 1I6 States must adopt measures at least as effective as international rules and standards to prevent, reduce and control pollution from
land-based sources; seabed activities, artificial islands and installations subject to
"national jurisdiction;" the Area; and vessels of their registry or flag. 1I7 The
phrase "national jurisdiction" includes internal waters, the territorial sea, the
EEZ, the continental shelf and archipelagic waters. lIS
Similar principles govern ocean dumping. 1I9 Dumping in another State's territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf waters requires the coastal State's express prior
approval; it may regulate such dumping after consulting with other affected countries. I20
Although some drafters thought that emergency fuel discharge from aircraft
might not be an exception to prohibitions on ocean dumping without prior express
approval, eventually the drafters concluded that general international law allows
such onforce majeure or distress theories as an exception to Convention compliance. I21 What is true for aircraft is also true for ships; distress andforce majeure theories are recognized for innocent passage and straits transit passage regimes.
Distress andforce majeure can be valid claims during armed conflict situations,
with different rules applying in relationships among States not party to a conflict,
relationships between belligerents and States not party to a conflict, and relationships between Qelligerents. 122
States must harmonize national policies at regionallevels l23 and must work at
the global level to establish rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures. 124

ii. Controlling Pollution and Protecting the Ocean Environment in Specific
Areas. The 1982 Convention, Part XII, recites standards related to specific ocean
areas, e.g., the territorial sea. In some instances, e.g., the contiguous zone, there is
no reference in Part XII.
The Convention has special rules for controlling pollution from vessels in the
territorial sea. States may publish rules for foreign-flag ships' entry into port or internal waters after due notice. These can be cooperative arrangements. States may
adopt rules for foreign-flag vessels in their territorial sea, including ships in innocent passage. No rule can hamper innocent passage.l25
These provisions are consistent with the Convention's navigational articles,
which declare that passage is considered prejudicial to the coastal State's peace,
good order or security ifa foreign-flagship "engages in ... any act ofwilful andserious pollution contrary to [the] Convention[,]" and which allows the coastal State
to adopt regulations, "in conformity with ... this Convention and other rules ofinternationallaw, relating to innocent passage ... in respect of ... conservation of the
living resources of the sea [and] ... preservation of the environment of the coastal
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State and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof ... " with due
notice of the rules. Foreign ships must comply with these rules. 126 Tankers, nuclear-powered ships and vessels carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or
noxious substances or materials may be required to confine their passage to sea
lanes established by the littoral State. These ships must also observe special precautions stated in international agreements. 127 As in other circumstances, coastal
States cannot hamper innocent passage except pursuant to the Convention; in applying regulations adopted in accordance with it, the practical effect cannot be to
deny or impair innocent passage. There can be no discrimination in form or fact
against any State's ships or against vessels carrying cargo to, from or for any
State. 128 However, coastal States may act to prevent breach of conditions attached
to port calls or passage to internal waters, and some countries already have
anti-pollution regulations. 129 Moreover, States may temporarily suspend innocen t passage in specific areas of their territorial sea if essen tial for protecting their
security after duly published notice of a suspension. 130 While this might arguably
allow suspension for "environmental security" reasons, such is not the case. Repetition from the Territorial Sea Convention B1 and the LOS Convention drafting
historyB2 point to a different view. The right of temporary suspension balances
between a coastal State's right to protect its territorial integrity through legitimate
self-defense measures 133 and rights of navigation, etc., under the territorial sea innocent passage regime. How protecting a coastal State's environment fits into the
analysis is a different issue.
The same territorial sea rules for criminal and civil jurisdiction, and for immunity of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes, also apply to environment-related claims. For example, warships not
complying with valid coastal State environmental regulations can only be asked to
leave the territorial sea immediately. Flag States are responsible under international
law for loss or damage caused by their warships or other noncommercial vessels. 134
The Convention innocent passage rules, insofar as they concern environmental
protection, are also subject to "other rules of international law," i.e., the law of naval warfare. 135
Straits passage or innocent passage through straits is nonsuspendable. 136 Although coastal States may take appropriate enforcement measures against vessels
"causing or threatening major damage" to the straits environment because they
have violated navigational safety, maritime traffic or environmental laws while in
transit passage (the regime for most straits), this does not apply to warships or
other vessels entitled to sovereign immunity.B7 "Heavily used sea lines of approach, such as the Straits ofHormuz or the Malacca Straits are likely candidates
for onerous environmental restrictions."B8 However onerous these restrictions
may be, they are subject to LOS Convention rules on nonsuspendable transit or
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innocent passage, sovereign immunity and other rules ofinternational law, i.e., the
LOAC,139 and the inherent right of self-defense. 140
Convention Article 33, permitting a contiguous zone, does not mention environmental protection. It allows declaring a contiguous zone, which, if no EEZ has
been claimed, is a high seas area contiguous to a territorial sea but no wider than 24
miles from territorial sea baselines. A coastal State may exercise control in the zone
to prevent infringement ofits customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary (i.e., health
or quarantine) laws and to punish violations committed within the territorial
sea. 141 Environmental protection claims might be made in connection with health
law enforcement, but this has not been a traditional view ofthe zone's purpose. 142
Article 33 is tied to Article 303, which sets standards for archeological and historical objects found at sea. 143 "Found at sea" seems to have a more comprehensive
scope than "found in the marine environment." Another problem with Article 303
is that there is no agreed definition of the terms "archaeological" and "historical." 144 Article 303 says that its terms are also "without prejudice to other international agreements and rules of international law regarding the protection of objects of an archaeological and historical nature,,,14S a variant on the other rules
clauses that make the Convention subject to the LOAC in appropriate situations. 146 In internal waters, the territorial sea and archipelagic waters, coastal State
law governs for artifacts found there; beyond, out to the Area,147 Article 303 controls but does not accord sovereign rights. 148 Objects found in the Area must be
preserved or disposed of for humankind's benefit, with "particular regard" for a
State of origin, 149 if it can be determined. As noted above, the latter principle does
not apply to the Persian Gulf, which because of its depth has no Area. 1SO
As in the case of the territorial sea, coastal States may adopt special laws for their
EEZs;ISI this is consistent with the LOS Convention's navigational articles. IS2
Although there is no explicit cross-reference to Convention continental shelfprinciples in this Part XII provision, a coastal State has the same environmental rights
and responsibilities for its continental shelf activities where shelf sovereignty has
been declared but there is no EEZ claim. 1S3 States often declare common EEZ and
continental shelfboundaries; there can be a continental shelfwithout an EEZ, but
there can be no EEZ without a corresponding continental shelf. IS4 However, for
the EEZ and the continental shelf, coastal States must have due regard for other
oceans users' high seas rights, including navigation and overflight. ISS Both are
subject to sovereign immunity exceptions for, e.g., warships and the other rules
principle in connection with environmental regulation. IS6
Provisions allowing coastal State regulation of pollution from vessels in the territorial sea, the EEZ and above the continental shelf are considered "innovati[ve]
for the general law of the sea," which usually has looked to flag or registry States to
control pollution from ships.IS7 Whether considered established law or progressive development, these provisions are subject to qualifications. There must be a
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balance of due regard for others' high seas rights, e.g., freedoms of navigation or
overflight; warships and other noncommercial vessels retain sovereign immunity;
and any attempt at environmental regulation of these areas is subject to LOAC
principles in appropriate situations through other rules clauses.
The 1982 Convention also provides for enforcing environmental standards.
Countries must adopt laws implementing international norms for land-based pollution, pollution from seabed activities, ocean dumping and pollution through or
from the atmosphere. ISS A pollution hazard must be significant. lS9
States in whose port a ship suspected ofpolluting that State's internal or territorial waters or EEZ in violation of international standards may investigate, detain
or begin enforcement against that ship. These rights are subject to, e.g., notice to a
flag or registry State, nondiscriminatory enforcement and enforcement only
through State vessels, e.g., warships or vessels on authorized government service. 160 Enforcing States may not endanger navigational safety, create a hazard to
an accused ship, bring it to an unsafe port or anchorage, or expose the marine environment to "unreasonable risk.,,161 A detaining State is liable for unlawful enforcement measures, excessive "in the light of available information" at the
time. 162 LOS Convention Article 221 also provides:
1. Nothing ... prejudice[sJ the right of States, pursuantto internationallaw, both
customary and conventional, to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea
proportionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related
interests, including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution following upon a
maritime casualty or acts relating to such a casualty, which may reasonably be
expected to result in major harmful consequences.
2.... "[MJaritime casualty" means a collision of vessels, stranding or other
incident ofnavigation, or other occurrence on board a vessel or external to it resulting
in material damage or imminent threat of material damage to a vessel or cargo.

Measures that may be taken under Art. 221(1) include destruction of the vessel.
These provisions, also in other widely-accepted pollution prevention conventions,163 may be close to acceptance as customary international law, if such is not
already so.l64 Such an intervention right would have justified Gulf countries' acting to prevent oil pollution damage from attacks on oil terminal facilities or vessels
during the Tanker War, 16S if there was a threat within the LOS Convention definition and leakage resulting from the attacks was a "casualty" within Article 221 (2)'s
meaning, i.e., an "occurrence on board a vessel or external to it resulting in, or imminent threat of, material damage to a vessel or cargo." The provisions may not
have applied to Iran and Iraq in 1980-88 because of the LOS conventions' other
rules clauses, applicable at least as customary law, 166 but as between Gulf States not
party to the conflict and either belligerent, or as among other neutral States and the
belligerents, the LOS applied in this context. Neutrals would have been justified
in using LOS intervention standards to deal with vessel spillages and, if"maritime
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casualty" is construed to include the platforms, action to deal with situations like
Nowruz.
In the context of the Convention's enforcement provisions, here too warships,
naval auxiliaries and other vessels or aircraft on government noncommercial service may not be detained. They have sovereign immunity; this is qualified by requiring flag States to ensure, by adopting "appropriate measures" not impairing
operations or operational capabilities of such ships or aircraft, that they operate
consistently, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with the Convention. This policy repeats other Convention immunity rules except for the "appropriate measures" qualification. I67 It
... acknowledges that military vessels and aircraft are unique platforms not always
adaptable to conventional environmental technologies and equipment because of
weight and space limitations, harsh operating conditions, the requirements of
long-term sustainability, or other security considerations.... [S]ecurity needs may
limit compliance with disclosure requirements,168

Some regional environmental protection agreements either omitI69 a declaration
of the customary immunity rule or do not append LOS Convention limitations
and requirements for appropriate measures. The Kuwait and Red Sea Conventions are examples of the latter. 170 To the extent the Convention binds parties in a
given context, those treaties must be considered modified to that extent. I7l Since
the LOS Convention's navigational articles restate custom, the longstanding customary rule of warship and naval auxiliary immunityI72 is a powerful factor for its
application in these contexts as well.
Other LOS Convention divisions providing for environmental protection independently of Part XII include those dealing with vessel accidents on the high
seas, high seas fishing, and the Area, also a part of the high seas, and marine scientific research. The Convention's high seas fishing provisions follow in part the
1958 conventions, but Area rules are unique to the 1982 Convention. Because there
has been little technology capable of exploiting that part of the ocean, and because
the Convention has only recently come into force, these provisions are largely theoretical in nature. Nevertheless, they may have impact in the 21st Century; many
restate concepts in other ocean areas the LOS Convention regulates.
The LOS Convention requires more offlag States as to ships under their registry and operating on the high seas. Flag States must ensure "that the master, officers and, to the extent appropriate, the crew are fully conversant with and required
to observe the applicable international regulations concerning ..• prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution ....,,173 The Convention also requires
States to "cause an inquiry to be held ... into every marine casualty or incident of
navigation on the high seas involving a ship flying its flag and causing [inter
alia] .•• serious damage ... to the marine environment. The flag State and the other

496

The Tanker War

State shall co-operate in the conduct of any inquiry ... into any such marine casualty or incident of navigation.,,174
States bordering semi-enclosed areas) i.e., a gulf or other body surrounded by
two or more States and connected to another sea or ocean by a narrow outlet, e.g.,
the Persian Gulf and the Strait ofHormuz, must coordinate managing, conserving,
exploring and exploiting oceanic living resources and coordinate implementing
their rights and duties for protecting and preserving the marine environment. 175
The 1982 LOS Convention recognizes marine scientific research as a high seas
right;176 these operations must comply with relevant regulations adopted in conformity with the Convention, including those protecting and preserving the marine environment. l77
Although high seas fisherfolk retain the traditional freedom to seek their
catch,178 the LOS Convention seines in that right to a certain extent, as it has been
under earlier treaties and practice. It has never been an unfettered right. 179 The
LOS Convention subjects high seas fishing rights to treaties limiting the right,
and to cooperation in achieving agreements, as well as rules it sets for certain fish
stocks and conserving high seas living resources. 180 To the extent these treaties
impose environmental controls, the high seas freedom to fish is curtailed. The
same is true for conservation measures coastal States or agreements impose.
The LOS Convention declares the Area, the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil beyond national jurisdictional limits, 181 and its resources are declared the common
heritage of humankind. 182 There is no Area in the Persian Gulf as stated in the
Convention; its waters are relatively shallow. 183 Area environmental issues are
therefore nonexistent for Tanker War analysis. 184

iii. Regional Treaties, the LOS Convention and the LOAC. The Kuwait Regional Convention, to which all Gulf countries are party including Iran and Iraq,
covers the entire Gulf except bordering State internal waters. Similarly, the Red
Sea Convention's geographic sweep includes the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden,
again excepting bordering State internal waters. 18S Both define "marine pollution" in nearly identical terms:
introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine
environment resulting or likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living
resources, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities including fishing,
impairment of [the] quality ofuse for use of [the] sea and reduction of amenities[.]186

Parties pledge cooperation to prevent, abate and combat pollution of the marine
environment in the Gulf or the Red Sea, whether caused by ships, dumping from
ships or aircraft, from exploring and exploiting the territorial sea and its subsoil
and the continental shelf, or land reclamation activities. 187 The Convention
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Protocols amplify this pledge. 188 The latter broadly define "marine emergency" to
trigger application; it means
... any casualty, incident, occurrence or situation, however caused, resulting in
substantial pollution or imminent threat of substantial pollution to the marine
environment by oil or other harmful substances and includes, inter alia, collisions,
strandings and other incidents involving ships, including tankers, blow-outs arising
from petroleum drilling and production activities, and the presence of oil or other
harmful substances arising from the failure of industrial installations[.]189
These Conventions and Protocols do not provide for anticipatory self-defense
against imminent pollution threats, as the LOS Convention does. 190 The Protocols appear to contemplate such by allowing "every appropriate measure to combat
pollution and/or to rectify the situation," provided that other countries are
notified 191 of emergency responses, defined as "any activity intended to prevent,
mitigate or eliminate pollution by oil or other harmful substances or threat of such
pollution resulting from marine emergencies.,,192 This broad authority must be
tempered by the limitations of proportionality, etc., in the LOS Convention. 193
This Convention language further justifies, subject to notice and proportionality
principles, anticipatory reaction to imminent threat. And if this be so, might this
support anticipatory self-defense in the Charter context?194
These regional treaties applied during the Tanker War. The Red Sea Convention and Protocol did not apply to the 1980-88 war, except to support common
principles in the Kuwait Convention and Protocol, which did pertain, geographically,195 to the Persian Gulf. It had direct application to the 1984 Red Sea mining
incident, in which Libya laid mines. 196 The Conventions and LOS Convention
principles, which are common with the Intervention Convention and Protocol,
were justification for actions coastal States, perhaps in cooperation with other neutrals, took to clear mines from the Gulf and the Red Sea if they threatened coastal
EEZs or States' shores. They supported self-defense actions States took to rid the
Gulf of ships that laid mines, e.g., Iran Ajr. 197
There were two belligerents in the Tanker War, Iran and Iraq. The Kuwait
Convention and its Protocol may not have applied as between them, either because
of the LOS other rules principles,198 or because of law of treaties principles, e.g.,
impossibility of performance, fundamental change of circumstances or armed
conflict between them, may have been grounds for suspending international
agreements. These treaty rules did apply if the treaties were part of customary law,
however. 199 Except as these grounds applied as between belligerents and other Gulf
States party to the Convention and its Protocol, their pledges to prevent, abate and
combat pollution200 of the marine environment remained in force. Undoubtedly it
was in this context that Iran claimed that the 1983 Nowruz attack violated the Convention. 20l To the extent that the agreements' terms restated customary norms,
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these too remained in force. Iraq's claim that the Convention and its Protocol did
not apply during the war202 may have been correct as to Iran, but it was not the case
as to other States party.
Given drafting of the LOS Convention with its clauses paramount and terms
virtually identical with the Kuwait Convention and Protocol, together with terms
of other treaties around the world virtually identical with the Convention and the
Protocol by 1983, there was at least a developing customary norm, and perhaps a
customary rule, alongside treaty principles stated in the Kuwait Convention and
its Protocol, by 1983.203 If this is so, the belligerents were obliged not to act so as to
pollute, or act to cause an imminent threat, to other Gulf States' interests, and to
interests of countries using Gulfwaters for freedom of navigation, through actions
such as attacks on the Nowruz and other terminal facilities when the result at the
time of decision was likely to be a substantial spill. 204 Under the Kuwait Convention Iran was arguably within its rights to ask for an opportunity to stop the outflow. 20S For the same reasons, there may have been Convention and Protocol
violations with respect to spillage resulting from Iraqi and Iranian attacks on shipping during the war, if such could have been foreseen to have resulted in substantial risk to other States' environmental interests, and such risks occurred. The
record is less than clear on this point. 206
iv. The LOS Convention and the Law of the Maritime Environment. This
summary of Convention terms for protecting the marine environment demonstrates that Part XII and those in other parts of the treaty are indeed prolix and
comprehensive; there is little that is new law or unanticipated. Indeed, provisions
related to the environment often repeat principles seen in other contexts: the due
regard concept where there are two or more oceans uses at stake; confirming sovereign immunity of warships, naval auxiliaries and other government vessels on
non-commercial service and State aircraft; confirming application of the LOAC in
the context ofenvironmental protection through the other rules clauses, which do
not include customary law of the environment as part of "other rules;,,207 the same
"peaceful purposes" language for the Area as on the high seas generally.20S Approval of the use of anticipatory self-defense against an environmental threat, previously stated in earlier treaties, is some precedent for applying anticipatory
self-defense in the context of the inherent right to self-defense mentioned in the
Charter. 209
v. The Tanker War and the Environment. Other Gulf States might have asserted EEZ or continental shelf claims during the Tanker War if belligerents' attacks on Gulfshipping caused slicks that threatened their interests, or if attacks on
oil terminals, including that on Nowruz in 1983, raised the same threat. 210 A similar analysis obtains for the Kuwait Convention and Protoco1.211 Similarly, neutrals
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could have raised these claims in connection with other neutrals' self-defense responses, and the belligerents could have raised the issue with the responding neutral
as well. No environmental deprivation claims appear to have been raised in connection with self-defense responses; if they had, the law of self-defense and its necessity and proportionality standards, or the law of anticipatory self-defense with
its similar qualifying factors,2l2 and not LOAC necessity and proportionality
principles,213 would have been at issue. Any issues relating to neutrals' conduct toward other neutrals, not covered by the law of self-defense or the LOAC, would
have been resolved under the LOS.
As more States ratify the LOS Convention, or it is accepted as custom, these
claims may be raised in the future, particularly if the Convention is buttressed by
similar terms in regional and bilateral agreements, although LOS Convention
norms trump any to the contrary in these treaties. 214 To the extent LOS Convention rules are customary norms, however, the customary rules will apply without
the encumbrance of treaty interpretation principles. Custom, however, has its own
set of derogation principles, e.g., the persistent objector rule. 21S
This review ofa complex body oflaw raises the two issues ofthe relationship between the law of the maritime environment and the general LOS, perhaps under a
"due regard" analysis, and the relationship between the law of the environment
and the LOAC, perhaps also on a "due regard" basis. (The Convention carries forward and solves a third side of the problem by incorporating the other rules clauses
of the 1958 LOS conventions.216) The response to the two remaining issues is complicated by the Convention's publishing some environmental norms in Part XII,
the general standards, and sprinkling others throughout the treaty.217 How do
these bodies oflaw, the law of the maritime environment, the LOS and the LOAC,
interrelate? The LOS Convention gives no clear answer.

d. General Conclusions on the Law of the Sea, the Law of the Marine Environment, and the Law ofNaval Warfare. If the LOS Convention is a "constitution"
for the LOS where the LOAC is not involved, its provisions for protecting the marine environment could be said to be a seagoing "bill of rights" for the environment. Treaties varying from Convention environmental protection provisions are
subject to its terms for States party to it.218 Custom may compete with the Convention in the future, andjus cogens and UN Charter norms may supersede part ofit as
well. 219
Customary norms, first codified in the 1958 LOS conventions, confirming sovereign immunity for warships, naval auxiliaries and other vessels on government
non-commercial service and State aircraft, are affirmed in the LOS Convention
and have been repeated in regional agreements. Similarly, recognition of the
LOAC and its component, the law of naval warfare, as applicable in certain situations, is confirmed in the Convention's navigational articles and its
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environmental provisions. The due regard principle for competing oceans uses,
particularly on the high seas, has been carried forward into the LOS Convention.
What is new is a complex, prolix protection for the maritime environment. The
fundamental issue has become the relationship of this relatively new body of law
with the general law of the sea and the law of armed conflict.

3. Environmental Standards During Armed Conflict at Sea
Although the 1990-91 Gulf War raised media attention and advocacy for protecting the oceans environment, the LOAC has dealt with aspects of the problem
for years. Treaties first stated these norms, and they have become customary law, if
they were not already thus, in many instances. Decolonization, countries' breakup
during the Charter era, and the resultant effect of the law of treaty succession,220
may bind many new States. Analysis begins with the 1907 Hague Conventions and
runs through the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 ENMOD Convention and
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, to more recent treaties. Lately the UN Security Council, with its authority to make binding decisions, has been active. 221 Recent compilations of the LOAC may be influential in the future.

a. The Law o/Naval Warfare as Part o/the LOAC; Protection o/the Environment. Earlier treaties (e.g., the 1899 Hague Conventions) dealt with environment-related issues; the 1907 Hague and other conventions have superseded
them. This sub-Part examines the 1907 Conventions, later treaties and customary
norms surrounding them, in the Tanker War context.
i. The Hague Conventions of1907 and the Oxford Naval Manual. Two among
the 1907 Hague Conventions deal with environmental problems in the maritime
context; others arguably have rules that could raise these issues in particular
situations.
(l) Hague VIII and Mine Waifare. Hague Convention VIII (1907) on automatic
contact mines reflects customary law222 and could affect environmental quality, in
that mines improperly laid under the treaty might have implications for the oceans
environment. Mines cannot discriminate between ships and the environment
when they explode, although "smart" mines can differentiate among types and sequences of vessels. 223 Countries laying mines can try to determine the effect on the
environment, howeverP4 If a State publishes where it has placed mines as required by international law,225 other States are on notice of their location, etc., and
may therefore be obliged to undertake protecting the environment by rerouting,

etc.
Iran, Iraq and some States involved in the Tanker War were not parties to
Hague VIII. Its terms applied as custom 226 and under principles ofthe law of treaty
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succession for some States.227 Iran and Iraq used moored mines that broke from
their moorings, drifted down the Persian Gulf; and damaged neutral shipping
when they detonated during the 1980-88 war, and Iraq deployed them and bottom
mines, with the same result in 1990. In some cases Iraq may have deliberately set
some mines adrift to damage Coalition ships or to disrupt naval operations. Some
mines laid during the Tanker War also may have been set adrift.228 Drifting
mines, unless deactivated within an hour ofloss of control over them, and moored
mines that do not deactivate when they become unmoored, violate the Convention
and customary law. IfIran and Iraq laid automatic mines off enemy coasts with a
sole object ofintercepting commercial shipping, or extensively mined high seas areas and thereby interrupted freedom of navigation, there were Convention and
customary law violations. 229
Although Iran and Iraq deployed many mines during the war, there were no accusations of environmental damage attributable to them, even though there must
have been spillage from mined vessels; there is no record ofenvironmental damage
claims from this source. The same is true for the 1984 Libyan mining of the Red
Sea. This is notto say that environmental damage did not occur; no reports seem to
have surfaced. However, as Levie has perceptively observed,230 there is always the
possibility of damage, maybe significant damage, given modern tankers' size and
their huge cargoes, or the size of ships and their large bunker capacity.

(II) Hague IX and Bombardment. Although Hague IX, stating rules for naval bombardment of undefended shores ide ports and facilities,231 does not recite environmental protection principles as such, if Convention rules cover sensitive areas, the
treaty will contribute indirectly to preserving the environment.232 Among other
things, Hague IX says:
... In bombardments ... necessary measures must be taken by the commander to
spare as far as possible sacred edifices, buildings used for artistic, scientific, or
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and
wounded are collected, on the understanding that they are not used at the same time
for military purposes. 233
The naval commander must "do his utmost" to warn local authorities of the area
before beginning bombardment if the military situation permits. In no case maya
town or place be pillaged, even if taken by storm. 234 Thus if shore parties or marines follow up on a naval bombardment, they are subject to the same rules on pillage as forces approaching from the land. 235 The 1946 Nuremberg Judgment held
Hague IV, dealing with pillage during land warfare, had become customary
norms. 236 Where Hague IX's provisions parallel Hague IV's, they can be considered customary law also on this account. 237 Most importantly, Hague IX articulates general principles of military objective, necessity and proportionality,238
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which when observed should take into account the environment in which bombardment occurs.
Iran, Iraq and some neutrals in the Tanker War were not Hague IX parties;239
the treaty bound all in both wars as custom 240 or perhaps through treaty succession
principles. 241 Iran and Iraq did not conduct shore bombardments from naval vessels during the Tanker War. However, Iraq struck Iranian coastal oil facilities
from the air, notably Nowruz, and Iran bombed neutrals' coastal facilities. Apart
from attacks on Nowruz, there is little evidence of environmental damage. However, given the Nowruz spill's magnitude, Iraq did not take into account proportionality and necessity that would have afforded protection to the environment.
Iranian attacks on neutral facilities violated those States' territorial integrity; Iranian observance of Charter norms would have protected the environment.242
(Ill) Exempted Vessels and Cargoes. The Paris Declaration (1856), Hague XI and
rules stated in the 1909 London Declaration also offer the potential for incidental
environmental protection. If an environmentally valuable object sent in postal
correspondence as Hague XI provides 243 is within contraband exemptions stated
in the 1909 London Declaration or other agreements, e.g., the Paris Declaration or
practice governing contraband,244 or is in a neutral ship's hold in a neutral warship
convoy as provided in the London Declaration,24S they would have been protected. Coastal fishing boats and their catch, and coastal traders, are exempt from
capture ifpursuing those occupations and not contributing to an enemy war effort
under Hague XI;246 there is no protection for offshore areas where they fish. 247 If
environmental study vessels could be characterized as ships on scientific or philanthropic missions under Hague XI, they too would be exempt from capture unless collecting data of military application. (The San Remo Manual proposes that
protection be extended to environmental cleanup vessels when engaged in pollution control.i48 The Manual and current military manuals list other ships, e.g.,
hospital ships, exempt from capture or possible destruction as long as they do not
contribute to the enemy war effort. 249
Iran, Iraq and some other countries involved in the Tanker War were not parties to the Paris Declaration or Hague XI; they were bound, insofar as these treaties
state customary norms, by custom developed independently of treaties, and perhaps by the law oftreatysuccession.2SO Claims arising during theTankerWarconcerned Iraq's declaration of contraband; mining of neutral flag vessels while under
neutral flag warship convoy; destruction ofIran Ajr, an Iranian ship laying mines
on the high seas, a vessel that might be characterized as a coastal trader but which
was not engaged in its usual occupation; and occasional mistaken attacks on fishing vessels. Although there was some oil and perhaps other pollution from ships
damaged during the Tanker War, no environmental deprivation claims have been
reported. 2SI However, to the extent these rules, whether as treaty or customary
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norms, would have been observed, observance would have benefited the maritime
environment through minimization of oil spillage from attacked ships or loss of
environmentally valuable objects.
(IV) Hague IV and Other Protections for the Environment. Besides rules common
with the law of naval warfare on bombardment and pillage,252 the law ofland warfare in Hague IV offers protections for an enemy State's occupied territory; these
have an environmental component today. The right ofbelligerents to adopt means
of land warfare is not unlimited. Private property except for transportation systems cannot be destroyed or confiscated, pillage is forbidden, and the occupying
State is regarded as only administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real
estate, forests and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, if "situated in
the occupied country." An occupier must "safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them [under] the rules of usufruct." Properties of municipalities; religious, charitable and educational institutions; and institutions of the arts
and science, even if State property, must be treated as private property. "Seizure of,
and destruction [of], or intentional damage done tor,] such institutions, to historical monuments, works of art or science, is prohibited[.]"253 Some Hague IV provisions, e.g., those exempting monuments, are directly related to environmental
protection; attacks on a country's cultural heritage are forbidden, unless they are
used for military purposes. Others, such as the rules on private property or
usufruct, may give incidental protection to the environment if these properties
would be considered environmentally sensitive.
There were no Hague IV issues on these points, insofar as maritime warfare is
concerned, during the Tanker War, although Hague IV's provisions on protecting
cultural, etc., monuments would have supported the sea warfare rules on the same
subject if that issue had arisen during 1980_88.254
(V) Martens Clauses; Other Possible Rules for Environmental Protection. The conventions' Martens clauses, i.e., for cases not covered by the treaties, parties consider
themselves bound by international law principles resulting from usages established among civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of
the public conscience, can operate to carry forward customary norms related to environmental protection during war. A commentator has suggested that humanity
and the public conscience could include environmental concerns. 255 There is no
suggestion of claims under these clauses related to environmental protection during the Tanker War, however.
(VI) The Oxford Naval Manual (1913). Besides restating rules, mostly those in
Hague IX, that can afford environmental protection if they are observed, the Oxford Naval Manual would apply this rule to naval warfare:
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Occupation of maritime territory, that is of gulfs, bays, roadsteads, ports and
territorial waters, exists only when there is at the same time an occupation of a
continental territory, by either a naval or a military force. The occupation, in that
case, is subject to the laws and usages of war on land. 256

Verri says that this applies Hague land warfare rules to a hostile coastal waters area
only if there is simultaneous occupation of adjacent land territory; he cites no authority on whether this is a customary norm. 257 If a customary norm, the result is
that protections for occupied land territory, e.g., apply to coastal waters such as the
territorial sea.258
The Manual did not restate a customary rule for that era. The 1899 and 1907 negotiators were careful to separate principles applicable to land and sea warfare into
different treaties in most cases.259 Land warfare rules for occupied territories carefully specify naval warfare rules where they intersect with the law of land warfare. 260 Moreover, the status of the territorial sea during peacetime as part of a
coastal State's sovereign territory was not certain when the Hague Conventions
were negotiated, being finally resolved, according to some, only by the 1958 LOS
Conventions. 261 If such was the situation during peacetime, such a requirement is
also illogical for armed conflict. These treaties went into force decades after the
Hague Conventions, and thus Hague law could not applyper se to these waters, unless a contrary custom could be argued, and that may be the case today for this
Manual provision, at least in terms ofgeneral protections, e.g., for cultural objects.
Although Iran and Iraq occupied their opponents' land territory and perforce
territorial sea areas adjacent to it during 1980-88, there is no record ofenvironmental deprivation claims related to this Manual provision.

(VII) Conclusions. The record of claims of environmental deprivations during the
Tanker War is scanty, the Nowruz attack being the only exception. However,
Hague norms, and those recited in customary law flowing from other sources, e.g.,
the London Declaration and the Oxford Naval Manual, show that observance of
these rules, and general principles of the military objective, necessity and proportionality, would have enhanced protection of the maritime environment. Invocation ofthese principles in future wars should afford protection to the environment.

ii. Between the Wars. After World War I and before World War II's outbreak, reflecting the Great War experience, commentators prepared draft rules, and treaties
were negotiated, that have direct or tangential impact on protecting the maritime
environment during war.

(I) Rules for Aerial Warfare. Rules for air warfare, reflecting Hague principles (now
also customary law) for bombardment from land and sea, were published in
1923.262 Whether these rules articulate customary law today is debatable. 263 States
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have, however, declared that some of the Rules will be followed in practice. 264
Thus, the Rules are analogous to the London Declaration;265 some restate custom,
particularly if they parallel Hague provisions, and others may not. Perhaps it is
time to give the Rules a decent burial and rely on general LOAC principles, i.e.,
military objective, necessity and proportionality, as Robertson recommended for
Hague IX.266
Neither Iran nor Iraq had the capability to launch air attacks from the sea; they
attacked land targets after overflying the Gulf, including Iran's attack on UAE installations. There is no record of environmental damage from these attacks, except
for the N owruz facility. Since the applicable Air Rules restate general principles of
necessity and proportionality incident to any modality ofattack, the same result in
terms oflegal analysis, whether from a general LOAC perspective or environmental law, applies here. Iran's attack on facilities in neutral territory raised the issue of
a UN Charter, Article 2(4) violation. 267

(II) The Geneva Gas Protocol; the RoerichPact. Two treaties of the interwar era have
implications for the maritime environment.
The 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol,268 while banning gas and bacteriological warfare affecting humans, has environmental implications. Anthrax, for example,
kills other mammals besides humans. The same is true for some gases; gases lethal
to the environment can afflict humans. 269 The Protocol has no territoriallimitations. 270 While Iraq used gas during the land campaigns of the 1980-88 war and
was condemned for it by the Security Council,271 there was no apparent use of gas
or bacteriological weapons during the sea war. Wanton use of gas in the land campaigns, and a possibility of use of these outlawed indiscriminate weapons in new
forms, suggests the Protocol may be invoked in naval warfare in the future. Any
use of toxic gas may degrade the maritime environment as well.
The Western Hemisphere Roerich Pact, which includes the United States
among its parties, declares protections for historic monuments, museums and scientific, artistic, educational and cultural institutions and their personnel. The
Pact's "neutrality" for these facilities must be recognized "in the entire expanse of
the territories of parties.,,272 The Pact might be implicated in inshore operations
involving naval bombardment or air operations if such sites are close to the coast.
However, because of the territorial sea's uncertain status in 1935, it is not clear
whether the Pact covers objects in it.273 Unless contrary custom obtains, its principles could not apply to archipelagic waters, the continental shelf or EEZs, whose
delimitations came with the 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions, concluded years after the Pact. 274 The Pact is effective in peace and war,275 and therefore applies in
military operations other than war.
As a regional agreement among Western Hemisphere countries, the Pact could
not apply of its own force to the 1980-88 war except to reinforce treaty and
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customary norms in conventions of worldwide application, e.g., Hague IX or the
later Cultural Property Convention.276 As analyzed under Hague IX bombardment principles, there do not appear to have been any issues related to destruction
of cultural objects or sites during the Tanker War. 277
iii. The 1949 Geneva Conventions; Cultural Property Convention; Other Cultural Property Conventions. After World War II treaty negotiators sought to proscribe excesses of that conflict through four new humanitarian law treaties, the
Geneva Conventions ofl949; the nearly contemporaneous Genocide Convention,
which did not present any issues during the Tanker War;278 and the 1954 Cultural
Property Convention. The 1972 World Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention 279 may also raise issues related to environmental protection during war.
(l) The Geneva Conventions of1949. The 1949 Geneva Conventions, although primarily directed toward humanitarian law, have provisions protecting the environment directly or indirectly. The Conventions were in force for all States during the
Tanker War. 280
The Fourth Convention, supplementing the 1899 Hague II and 1907 Hague IV
Conventions,281 restates other customary rules and declares new standards in
some cases, enlarging protections for civilians and property in occupied territory
or an occupied country. "Territory" or "country" is not defined. 282 To the extent
that it would include the territorial sea, which by 1949 was moving toward recognition under the LOS as subject to coastal State sovereignty,283 there is a strong possibility the Convention applies to naval warfare in the territorial sea. On the other
hand, since continental shelf sovereignty rights were in a state of flux in 1949 and
not resolved until the 1958 LOS Conventions, and EEZ law was not established
until the 1982 LOS Convention and thereafter,284 the Fourth Convention could
not apply to those sea areas except through custom; there is no record of such a
claim. States cannot derogate from humanitarian treaties during armed conflict,
but questions ofterritorial application of such law may arise. 285
To the extent that Fourth Convention hospital and safety zones and localities
for protecting the wounded, sick, aged, children, expectant mothers and mothers
of young children or other noncombatants,286 coincide with areas suitable for environmental protection, the Fourth Convention will contribute to saving the quality of the environment during armed conflict. While protected areas might be
inland, some could be located in coastal areas subject to naval bombardment, many
more might be within the range for air attack, and still others might be aboard vessels in territorial or inland waters. Similarly, a Convention-protected hospital287
part of, e.g., a park, might support protecting a surrounding area by its presence. A
similar principle protects sick and wounded armed forces in hospitals or hospital
ships in territorial or inland waters in previously-agreed neutralized zones. 288
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These buildings or vessels might be located near areas or objects otherwise deserving environmental protection. When wounded and sick armed forces members are
convoyed through environmentally sensitive water areas pursuant to the Second
Convention,289 similar considerations apply. These provisions restate customary
law. 290
The Fourth Convention, Article 53, also prohibits:
... destruction by the Occupying Power of ... property belonging ... to private
persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative
organizations ... , except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by
military operations.
Article 147 declares that extensive destruction and appropriation of property is a
grave breach of the Convention.291 To the extent that such property is within the
scope of naval operations and is environmentally sensitive, Articles 53 and 147
would have a collateral effect of protecting the environment. The prohibition is
broader than in earlier conventions. 292 Many of those provisions are customary
law293 and therefore were binding on belligerents in the Tanker War as custom as
well as by treaty law. There is no evidence regarding application in this context,
however. The story was different in the 1990-91 GulfWar. 294
The Convention also gives limited protection to civil defense ~CD) personnel
during occupation.295 Unless performing hostile acts, they are entitled to protection. 296 The corollary to this is that if such personnel are known to operate from
certain facilities, and these are environmentally sensitive areas, the environment
may thus be protected collaterally. No Tanker War incidents inv..oked these principles for naval warfare at sea or bombardment from the sea.
The Falklands/Malvinas War Red Cross Box innovation, not grounded in
treaty or customary law297 and First and Fourth Convention rules for hospital and
similar zones,298 suggests belligerents might agree on "Green Boxes" during war,
i.e., for environmentally sensitive areas not protected by existing law or areas not
readily recognizable through intelligence or other sources. Areas or buildings flying prescribed warning flags or emblems may not be discernible from afar; it
would be small comfort to protest destruction later, even though adequate warning, disproportionality, etc., claims might succeed. These agreements should be in
writing, definite in area, description and duration and adequately noticed, following Red Cross Box and 1949 Convention standards.299

(II) The Cultural Property Convention. The Cultural Property Convention (1954)

was drafted with war at sea in mind300 and supplements 1899 Hague II, Hague IV,
Hague IX and the Roerich Pact on coverage, substituting its protective symbols for
emblems in the earlier treaties. Unlike them, the Convention has no Martens
clause. 301 It applies to declared wars or other armed conflicts between two or more
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parties, even ifa state of war is not recognized by one or more parties. It also applies
to partial or total occupation of a party's territory, even if there is no armed resistance. Like the 1949 Geneva Conventions, if a party to a conflict is not a Convention party, it remains in force for Convention parties; if a nonparty accepts
Convention terms, the acceptance binds Convention parties.302
Cultural property is defined broadly; it includes movable and immovable property, refuges for movables, and buildings or building complexes housing it. 303 Protection of Convention-covered property also includes safeguarding of and respect
for it. 304
Convention parties undertake to prepare for safeguarding cultural property
against foreseeable effects of armed conflict by taking appropriate measures. 30S
Refuges, "limited [in] number," for movable property and centers containing
monuments, "and other immovable cultural property of very great importance,"
may be designated. However, refuges must be "at an adequate distance" from large
industrial centers or "any important military objective constituting a vulnerable
point, [e.g.,] ... a port ... of relative importance ...." Refuges for movable property
can be established anywhere ifbuilt to withstand bombing. Cultural property near
an important military objective may be put under special protection if the State
asking protection undertakes not to use the objective during armed conflict. For
ports and other transportation hubs, this would mean diverting traffic from them.
Centers containing monuments are deemed used for military purposes ifused for
moving military personnel or materiel, even if they are in transit. Use for military
purposes includes activities directly connected with military operations, stationing personnel, or producing war goods, within the center. 306 There are procedures
for designated improvised refuges during war by filing with UNESCO. 307
The Convention provides for transporting cultural property to third States and
from occupied territories. Transported property and the carrying vessel or other
platform, e.g., aircraft, is immune from seizure, being adjudicated a prize or capture. The Convention preserves a right of visit and search.308 Although the Convention is silent on the point, customary law permits diversion instead of visit and
search; aircraft, ships and cargo involved in transporting goods that are not cultural property within the Convention's meaning are subject to the law ofprize after
visit and search or diversion. In appropriate situations these ships or aircraft
would also be liable to capture and perhaps destrllction.309 If cultural property is
transported on a vessel devoted to scientific or philanthropic missions that does
not contribute to an enemy's war effort, that vessel has the same protections as
other ships engaged in scientific or philanthropic expeditions. 310
The Convention also provides for a UNESCO-maintained International Register of Cultural Property Under Special Protection. Although States where property is located usually register it, occupying powers can do so. There is a procedure
for parties' objections that an item is not Convention-protected cultural property
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or that property does not comply with Convention conditions. Registrations can
be cancelled if a State where the property is requests it, or where objection to the
property's nature as cultural property or for Convention noncompliance is confirmed. 311 During war parties must appoint cultural property representatives, including ones for occupied territory, who will work with Protecting Powers312 and
a Commissioner-General for cultural property to administer protection.313
Convention parties agree to respect cultural property within their territories
and in other parties' territory by refraining from using property and its immediate
surroundings or its protective appliances protection for purposes likely to expose
it to destruction or damage during war. 314 Parties agree to refrain from hostile acts
against the property, particularly that registered under the Convention, unless
"military necessity imperatively requires" it.31S Parties agree to prohibit, prevent
and stop thefts, pillage or misappropriation of and vandalism against cultural
property. Reprisals against cultural property are forbidden. 316 Parties assume
these obligations even though another State does not take protective measures before war. 317 States occupying another party's territory must support authorities in
occupied territory in safeguarding and preserving cultural property. If these authorities cannot ac~ to preserve it, an occupying power must cooperate closely with
them to take "the most necessary measures of preservation.,,318
If cultural property is considered part of the human environment, the Convention applies of its own force; given the broad definition of cultural property, which
includes scientific collections and buildings or centers to house them as well as
property of great importance to people's cultural heritage, sometimes this may be
the case.319 If the environment is considered not to include cultural property, wanton destruction of the environment also risks violating the Convention. 320 Although most Convention issues involve land warfare, the Convention is a factor in
cases of cultural property close to a shoreline and therefore susceptible to naval
bombardment or missile or air attack. Provisions requiring location of cultural
property away from transportation hubs such as ports could involve naval planners. 321 Rules for transporting movable cultural property, which might include
sealift or ocean overflight, also implicate naval warfare planning. Because the Convention predates the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, which settled the issue of
territorial sea sovereignty, there may be an issue as to whether Cultural Property
Convention coverage extends to territorial sea areas where it does not declare applicability, for those States that did not claim territorial sea sovereignty then. 322
The same problem may arise for coverage for the continental shelf, but not as to an
EEZ; the 1982 LOS Convention resolved those issues well after 1954.323 As with
humanitarian law generally, there can be no derogation from the 1954 Convention
because ofwar. 324
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Iran, Iraq and many countries involved in the Tanker War were parties to the
Convention and Protocol. 325 Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States and
other States that were not parties observed it in practice. 326
There is no evidence ofclaims related to destruction ofor moving cultural property during the Tanker War.
If cultural property is considered part of the environment, the Green Box concept suggested earlier might be considered in conflicts where countries, e.g., the
United States, are not party to the Convention. Even ifcultural property as defined
in the Convention is not considered part of the environment, defining a Box to include nearby cultural sites and property could be considered. 327
(//l) Other Cultural Property Conventions. UNESCO has sponsored two more cultural property conventions328 that may have ramifications for environmental protection if a broad definition of the environment, to include creations of
humankind and esthetics, is accepted.
In 1970 the Convention on Means of Prohibiting and Preventing Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property was opened for signature. 329 Iran and Iraq were parties in 1980, and Australia, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Syria and the United States, among other countries involved in the Tanker
War, had ratified it.330
Primarily designed to operate during peacetime,331 the Convention seeks to
prevent illicit import, export and transfer of cultural property.332 The Convention
cultural property definition is broaderthan the Cultural Property Convention, Article 1. Each 1970 Convention State may designate what it considers as cultural
property.333 The Cultural Property Convention requires property to be registered
with UNESCO according to its criteria. 334 Article 11 of the 1970 Convention can
apply to armed conflict: "[E]xport and transfer of ownership of cultural property
under compulsion arising directly or indirectly from the occupation of a country
by a foreign power shall be regarded as illicit." The Cultural Property Convention
applies only to armed conflict and covers only export ofproperty.335 Toman claims
that because the 1970 Convention defines illicitness in relation to nationallegislation for transfers, etc., in situations other than armed conflict, "Article 11 defines
the illictness arising from occupation without linking it with or referring to nationallaw.,,336 This is one possible reading; the other is that Article 11 illicitness is
the same as Article 3 illicitness, i.e., that only that which is defined as cultural propertyunder the Convention, Article 1, by States is subject to Article 11. Besides the
obvious application during war as to States not party to the conflict, i.e., their responsibility under the Convention to refuse to accept import or transfer of Article
11 property from belligerents, the Convention would also seem to require refusal
to accept import or transfer of this property from third States who wrongfully or
perhaps unknowingly accept it.
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Do obligations to "undertake ... to participate in a concerted international effort to determine and to carry out the necessary concrete measures, including the
control of exports and imports and international commerce in the specific [cultural patrimony affected by potential pillage],,337 include use offorce? Is use of
force contemplated in the Convention obligation "to restrict by ... vigilance,
movement of cultural property illegally removed from any State Party to this Convention ...,,?338 Recent analysis does not interpret the Convention to include this
option in either case, but in an extreme situation, might use of force, e.g., on the
high seas to interdict Article 11 or other property shipments, be considered a Convention obligation?
There is no report of removal of Convention-covered property by sea during the
Tanker War. The Convention is a treaty obligation of major maritime powers and
may be invoked for seaborne shipments in future wars, however. 339
The 1972 World Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention also has possible
ramifications for the LOAC. Although also designed to operate only in peacetime,340 it has been advocated for application during war as well. 341 The Convention provides that States must protect sites considered as cultural or natural heritage, and designated by them as such, within their territories. 342 "Territory"
presumably includes the territorial sea and inland waters. 343 The Convention
broadly defines "cultural heritage" and "natural heritage." Objects properly designated by States are considered "world heritage for whose protection it is the duty of
the international community ...to cooperate." Parties undertake "not to take any
deliberate measures which might damage directly or indirectly the cultural and
natural heritage," as defined in the Convention, "on the territory of other ...
Parties .... ,,344
While the Cultural Property Convention primarily protects cultural property
with perhaps peripheral coverage for the natural environment,345 the 1972 Convention goal is to protect the natural environment in areas States designate as the
Convention provides.346 Some have urged this for protecting these areas during
war. 347 The Convention's World Heritage Committee has adopted an emblem,
reminiscent of those required for Cultural Property Convention sites;348 this may
be prophetic for the future.
Perhaps because no designated sites were involved, there appear to have been no
claims concerning the Convention in either Gulf conflict.349 Iran, Iraq and nearly
all States involved in the Tanker War were party to it by 1988;350 by 1998, 148
countries were party,351 pushing its terms close to recognition as customary
norms. 352 Planners must take the Convention into account, particularly if the
Convention is deemed to apply to armed conflict situations. If so, war in the territorial sea may implicate it; shore bombardment and air operations will also be
affected.
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iv. Environmental Modification (ENMOD) Convention; Protocol I. The
ENMOD Convention and Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, signed in
1977, have direct and indirect implications for the LOAC and the maritime
environment.
(1) The 1977 Environmental Modijication Convention. The ENMOD Convention is
primarily a disarmament treaty but has environmental implications insofar as it
limits risks of intentional environmental damage. 353 The Convention, Article 1,
perhaps ratified with Kuwait's no first use reservation,354 prohibits "military or
any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury
to any other State Party.,,355 The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,
which prepared the Convention at the UN General Assembly's request, appended
an understanding for Article 1:

· .. [F]or the purposes of this Convention, the terms "widespread"; "long-lasting"
and "severe" shall be interpreted ... :
(a) "widespread": encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred
square kilometres;
(b) "long-lasting": lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season;
(c) "severe": involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human
life, natural and economic resources or other assets.
· .. [T]he interpretation ... above is intended exclusively for this Convention and
is not intended to prejudice the interpretation of the same or similar terms if used in
connexion with any other international agreement.3 56
Article 2 defines "Environmental modification techniques" as "any technique for
changing-through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes-the dynamics, composition or structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere, or of outer space.,,357 The Committee appended an
understanding to Article 2:
· .. [These] examples ... [illustrate] ... phenomena that could be caused by the use
of environmental modification techniques as defined in article II: earthquakes;
tsunamis; an upset in the ecological balance of a region; changes in weather patterns
(clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various types and tornadic storms); changes in
climate patterns; changes in ocean currents; changes in the state of the ozone layer;
and changes in the state of the ionosphere.
· .. [P]henomena listed above, when produced by military or any other hostile use
of environmental modification techniques, would result, or could reasonably be
expected to result, in widespread, longlasting or severe destruction, damage or injury.
Thus, military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques as
defined in Article II, so as to cause those phenomena as a means of destruction,
damage or injury to another State Party, would be prohibited.
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... [T]he ... examples set out above [are] not exhaustive. Other phenomena, which
could result from the use of environmental modification techniques as defined in
Article II could also be appropriately included. The absence ofsuch phenomena from
the list does not ... imply that ... Article I would not [apply] ... to those phenomena,
provided the criteria ... in that article were met.3 58

The Convention allows using these techniques for peaceful purposes, subject to
"generally recognized rules of international law concerning such use.,,359 Among
these recognized rules is the overriding principle of self-defense. 360
The Convention has worldwide application but is subject to limitations. First,
insofar as there are no first use reservations, the Convention will not be in force as
among reserving countries and those States not accepting the reservations. 361 Second, it applies only as a treaty among treaty partners;362 Iran and Iraq, e.g., were
not parties.363 Therefore the Convention could not apply as treaty law for the
Tanker War. However, both countries signed the Convention and were bound to
do nothing to defeat its object and purpose. 364 And if it restates customary law, as
some argue,365 its norms applied to the Gulf conflicts.
The most critical issue is the third: Whether ENMOD, whether stated as conventional or customary law, could have applied to the Tanker War.
ENMOD standards are triggered when there is a "deliberate manipulation of
natural resources" by a State, according to Article 2;366 simple negligence is not
enough, but gross negligence or wanton conduct might establish a potential for liability. Examples of deliberate manipulation are in the Article 2 understanding; the
list is illustrative, not all-inclusive.367 Article 1 says there must be resulting "widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury"
to a State. 368 ENMOD intends that there be nine alternatives forresults because of
the double disjunctive in Article 1, ranging from widespread destruction through
severe injury. However, the understanding to the Article says that "widespread"
means an area of several hundred kilometers; "long-lasting" means an effect lasting months, or about a season of three months; and "severe" means "serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other
assets.,,369 Thus Article 1 as amplified by the understanding means that a result of
a deliberate attack must extend over a considerable area, must last at least three
months, but may be harmful to humans, the natural environment, or "other assets."
Commentators have said the environmental modification, not the technique, must
cause the damage. 370 Convention parties have expressed a different view, however,
stating that an environmental modification technique is any technique having as
its direct object modification of the environment.371 Moreover, a State must be
damaged. 372 However, Article 2's general language, speaking of the Earth and
outer space,373 the latter then and now part of the common heritage of humankind,374 indicates a broader view, particularly because of the Article 2 understanding, which illustrates with examples of phenomena having no boundaries. 375
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Ifa narrow view is taken, no ENMOD violation could occur on the high seas beyond a State's sovereignty, unless high seas freedoms, e.g., freedoms of navigation,
overflight, fishing, etc.,376 are within the meaning of "economic resources or other
assets" in the Article 1 understanding. 377 The postulated view, that no ENMOD
claim can arise because of impact beyond a State's sovereignty, is too narrow.
There is a financial cost for being deprived of rights to shipping lanes, air traffic
rights, or established fishing grounds, including deprivation offish that must be
thrown back, because of pollution. Similarly, navies have a right to conduct exercises on the high seas whether in belligerent status or otherwise;378 these operations are not without cost. High seas pollution resulting in ending, changing or
suspending them can trigger an ENMOD violation claim. Finally, since the understanding also defines "severe" as "involving serious or significant disruption or
harm to ... natural ... resources,,,379 regardless of economic factors, high seas pollution where ocean quality is diminished might also support an EJ\MOD violation
claim. In each situation other ENMOD criteria must be satisfied. If ENMOD
claims can include high seas deprivations, damage to continental shelf, fishing
zone, EEZ waters, contiguous zone and territorial sea rights 380 through pollution
otherwise covered by Convention criteria will also support an ENMOD claim. 381
To the extent that an ENMOD claim involves damage to areas over which sovereignty or jurisdiction obtains under the LOS conventions, e.g., the territorial sea,
the continental shelf or the EEZ,382 ENMOD clearly applies without resort to the
foregoing analysis. To different extents under the LOS, these areas are considered
part of sovereign territory as much as the land.
Although Kuwait and many States involved in the Tanker War were ENMOD
parties, Iran and Iraq were not; as signatories they were committed not to defeat
the Convention's object and purpose.383 Therefore, liability for maritime pollution must be grounded primarily in custom parallelling the Convention. If
ENMOD restates custom, and evidence points to that;384 if the Convention covers
techniques as well as environmental modifications;385 and if States were damaged
(e.g., threatened with damage because of concern over closing desalination plants,
or by not being able to exercise high seas navigation or other rights, e.g., fishing),386 then the N owruz oil spill during the Tanker War resulted in widespread or
severe damage, i.e., serious or significant disruption or harm, under the Convention. If the slick lasted nine months as a commentator claimed,387 this ENMOD
requirement was also illet; nine months is longer than a season.388 On the other
hand, if the pollution did not last three months, failure to meet the "long-lasting"
criterion is not critical, since Article 1 speaks in the disjunctive; the Nowruz
bombing met ENMOD Article 1 standards.389 However, Article 2 requires intent
to manipulate the environment, or perhaps gross or wanton conduct; mere negligence does not support an ENMOD claim. 390 Iraq probably attacked N owruz with
a goal of depriving Iran ofuse of the facility for transshipping petroleum to support
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its war effort. If there was no deliberate attempt to harm the maritime environment, or ifIraq's action was not gross negligence or wanton conduct, the Article 2
standard was not met. For the N owruz operation, the verdict must be "not proven"
as to Iraq's liability, unless it is argued that Iraq, as a major oil-producing State
with similar terminals, knew or should have known that indiscriminate attack on
N owruz had a high probability ofproducing a major spill. If this amounted to wanton or grossly negligent conduct, there was an ENMOD violation. There is no evidence of the extent, duration or effect of attacks on other terminals, or the intent
behind them. 391
Although there was spillage from Iranian and Iraqi attacks on vessels during the
Tanker War,392 there does not appear to have been widespread, long-lasting or severe damage to any State (except perhaps shipping losses, which were big, but
these were largely covered by insurance) 393 or the environment generally; thus
the Article 1 threshold was not met. 394 There is no evidence either State deliberately sought to manipulate the environment, the Article 2 trigger. 395 On the other
hand, it could be argued that both were wanton or grossly negligent in attacks on
shipping, by mines or other methods, and that the Article 2 criterion was thus satisfied. However, since there is no evidence of Article 1 durational requirements'
having been met, there was no Convention violation as to belligerents' attacks on
shipping. There were LOAC violations as to neutral merchant shipping not carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining cargo or contraband for either belligerent or
not taking active part on behalf of a belligerent,396 however. Belligerents' observing these principles would have contributed to a cleaner Gulf environment.
There is no record of widespread, longlasting or severe effects on the environment, or an attempt to deliberately manipulate natural processes when Libya
sowed mines in the Red Sea in 1984.397 However, Libya's conduct was wanton in
nature, and but for the requirement that both criteria be met (Article 1 and Article
2 standards),398 there would have been an ENMOD violation.
Tanker War neutrals acted pursuant to rights of self-defense, and this Charter-stated norm superseded treaty or customary norms, e.g., those in the Convention,399 in defending neutral shipping or in responding to belligerents' attacks
that employed mines, aircraft or surface combatants. If the Convention could be
said to supply customary norms for self-defense, there is no evidence that neutrals'
conduct resulted in liability under ENMOD standards. There is no evidence that
oil slicks resulting from self-defense responses resulted in "widespread, longlasting or severe effects," or that neutrals deliberately manipulated natural processes, or acted wantonly or with gross negligence,400 in responding in
self-defense. States cooperating in removing the Red Sea mine threat also satisfied
these standards.
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(II) Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions were also signed in 1977. Many States involved in the Tanker War were
not then Protocol I parties, e.g., France, Iran, Iraq, the United Kingdom and the
United States.401 Protocol I did apply if it restated customary law. 402 Although
Protocol I does not generally apply to naval warfare,403 and Protocol II governs
only non-international conflicts, e.g., civil wars,404 some principles in these agreements apply to war at sea; others restate customary norms. Some Protocol I principles might be adopted by analogy.40S Other Protocol I provisions, if applicable to a
conflict, offer indirect protection to the environment.406 There are thus several
overtones for application of Protocol I principles to sea warfare.407 If parts of Protocol II use the same language as in Protocol I, they should have similar interpretation.408
(A) Protocol I and Customary Law. Some Protocol I provisions declare environmental protection standards; others restate principles for all armed conflict, and
these may protect the environment when applied.
Article 35(1) declares the customary rule that "the right of the Parties to the
conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited." This restates a
general principle for all modes ofwarfare. 409 Article 35(1) could be invoked separately from Article 35(3)'s terms and thereby offer protection to the environment
through its general principle. For example, ifa State uses projectiles causing superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, Article 35(2)'s principle would be invoked,410 along with Article 35(1). Ifuse of this weapon would also damage the environment, its protection would be enhanced by observance of Articles 35(1) and
35(2) without reference to Article 35(3) necessarily.
(1) Protocol I Environmental Protections. Protocol I, Articles 35(3) and 55, speak
directly to the problem of environmental degradation during international armed
conflict.
Article 35(3) "prohibit[s] ... methods or means of warfare ... intended, or may
be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.,,411 Article 35(3)'s preparatory works reveal definitions for these requirements, which must be satisfied conjunctively, and which are therefore
different from those in the ENMOD Convention, which has similar but disjunctively-stated requirements in its Article 1(1).412 To come within Article 35(3), all
three factors, widespread, long-term and severe as the Protocol defines them, must
be present.
Unlike ENMOD, Protocol I's geographic defmition, "widespread," can mean
an area less than several hundred kilometers. "Long-term" has been defined as a
time of a decade or more, and "severe" means damage prejudicing over a long term
(i.e., 10 or more years) continued survival of a civil population or risking causing it
major health problems.413 The Article 35(3) standard, as its preparatory works define it, is relatively high.414 "The two texts [ENMOD, Article 1(1) and Protocol I,
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Article 35(3)] should not be seen as redundant, but rather as distinct and complementary, since one [ENMOD] deals with geophysical warfare, and the other [Protocol I] with environmental warfare.,,415 Despite the difference in the two treaties'
purpose,416 a State could wage environmental warfare that is geophysical in nature, for which ENMOD would be invoked, and could mount a geophysical attack
degrading the environment and violate Protocol I, thus calling into question applying both treaties for the same situation.
Article 35(3) mayor may not restate a customary norm.417 The contemporaneously-completed ENMOD Convention states the same three criteria, widespread,
long-lasting, severe, but disjunctively. Even if ENMOD declares a customary
norm,418 Protocol I's lumping them together conjunctively may not.419 IfENMOD
does not restate custom, as some argue, the debate remains as to whether Protocol
I's Article 35(3) does, as some believe.420 However, in a given context, commonly-accepted definitions of Article 35(3)'s terms may exclude a given armed
conflict scenario from its coverage. 421
Article 55 of Protocol I seems to repeat Article 35(3); however, Article 35(3) refers to methods and means of warfare, while Article 55, dealing mainly with land
warfare,422 is part of the Protocol declarations for protection of civilians:
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against
widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of
the use of methods or means of warfare ... intended or may be expected to cause such
damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of
the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way ofreprisals are prohibited.423

The Netherlands and the United Kingdom filed declarations to Article 55, stating
that "military commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon or
executing attacks necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis of their assessment of the information from all sources ... available to them at the time,,,424 these
interpretations425 meaning that hindsight review of decisions covered by Article
55 is not admissible. Presumably the same interpretations of "widespread, longterm and severe" apply to Article 55(1) as to Article 35(3).426
Although it has been argued that Article 55(1) applies generally to naval war':
fare,427 most commentators,428 and the Protocol's terms, refute this. Protocol I,
Article 49 provides:
... 1. "Attacks" mean acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or
in defence.
2. The provisions of this Protocol with respect to attacks apply to all attacks in
whatever territory conducted, including the national territory belonging to a Party to
the conflict but under the control of an adverse party.
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3. The provisions of this Section [i.e., Articles 48-67] apply to any land, air or sea
warfare which may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian
objects on land. They further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against
objectives on land but do not otherwise affect the rules ofinternationallaw applicable
in armed conflict at sea or in the air.
4. The provisions of this section [i.e., Articles 48-67] are additional to the rules
concerning humanitarian protection ... in the Fourth Convention, particularly in
Part II [i.e., Arts. 13-26] thereof, and in other international agreements binding ...
Parties, as well as to other rules of international law relating to the protection of
civilians and civilian objects on land, at sea or in the air against the effect of
hostilities. 429

"Territory" and "national territory" in Article 49(2) are not defined, but this could
mean the territorial sea as well as inland waters are covered,430 particularly because Article 49(3) declares that Articles 48-67 of the Protocol "further" apply to
"attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land but do not otherwise
affect ... armed conflict at sea or in the air." If attacks from the sea against the land
are included within the Protocol, it is consistent that territorial seas bordering
land attacked are also covered; they are part of the area subject to States' sovereignty. On the other hand, the EEZ, continental shelf, etc., are not part of a State's
sovereign territory.431 Beyond this, Article 55(1) does not apply to the law of naval
warfare.
The question remains as to whether either Article 35(3) or Article 55(1) standards, if applied as customary norms and however erroneously with respect to naval warfare in the case of Article 55(1),432 were violated during the Tanker War.
Both provisions require environmental degradation to be intended and widespread, long-term and severe, in the conjunctive.433 Both define "widespread" as
an effect covering several hundred square kilometers, "long-term" as 10 years or
more, and "severe" as damage likely to prejudice, over a long term, a civil population's continued survival or risking causing major health problems. 434
As to the 1983 N owruz spill, there is no question that the effect was widespread
and would have been severe if the slick had fouled the desalination plants or would
have destroyed aquatic life upon which the Arabian peninsula depended. The record on results from other attacks on oil terminals during the Tanker War is not
clear as to size, duration, severity or intent.435 But did Iraq intend to destroy the
environment? As noted in the ENMOn analysis, more likely than not this was a
military operation against a permissible target, petroleum production facilities,
that resulted in the potential for environmental degradation. Resolution of the intent issue is not easy, since most hard evidence is undoubtedly in classified files. 436
Even ifintent is proven, the slick did not last a decade or more, the interpretation
of "long-term." Thus the Nowruz attack will not support a claim under a customary standard applying Articles 35(3) or 55(1), assuming the latter applies to naval
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warfare, nor could other attacks on terminals raise Article 35(3) or Article 55(1)
issues.
Leakage from damaged merchantmen or warships Iran or Iraq attacked during
the Tanker War would not support Article 35(3) or 55(1) claims. Like the Nowruz
spill, undoubtedly these attacks were military operations against shipping, in
some cases unlawful under the LOAC, and may not have been intended to degrade
the environment. There is also no evidence that pollution was widespread,
long-term and severe within the Protocol's meaning.437
Neutrals' self-defense responses involve different law. 438 There is no evidence
that oil slicks from these responses, on oil platforms, aircraft downed at sea, or surface ships damaged or sunk at sea, was intended to degrade the environment or
caused pollution that was widespread, long-term and severe within the Protocol's
meaning,439 if that standard would be assimilated to the law of self-defense, which
governed these situations.440
(2) Other ProtocollProvisions Whose Standards May Protect the Maritime Environment. Many Protocol I provisions, if observed, may protect the maritime environment through application, even though most of the Protocol is concerned with
land warfare, a major exception being air and missile attacks from the sea.441 Often
they restate custom common to all warfare.
(a) Protocol!Provisions Applicable As Customary Law toAllModes of Warfare. Article 35(2) prohibits weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare
causing superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. This principle, derived from
the Hague Regulations, is customary law applying to all warfare. Weapons legitimate in one context have a potential for being used unlawfully in another. 442 Although this principle normally applies as between combatants, it could affect
environmental quality, just as specific application of it, like specific prohibitions
on certain weapons, e.g., gas and bacteriological weapons and warfare, which can
affect animals and plants as well as humans,443 has environmental implications. If
a belligerent fires at an area with dum-dum projectiles intending to injure the enemy, this violates Article 35(2) and customary rules.444 The projectiles would not
discriminate among combatants, civilians, animals and plants in the fire zone, and
culpability would lie for the attack on humans. The deterrence value of denying
use of these weapons will accrue to civilians and the environment.
There is no indication that weapons used in the 1983 N owruz or other terminal
attacks caused superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.445 Wildlife, i.e., fish,
may have experienced superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, but Protocol
I's purpose is to protect combatants, civilians or victims of international armed
conflict446 and not wildlife. However, since the Nowruz attack threatened water
supply from neutrals' desalination plants,447 a claim of a potential for unnecessary
suffering to humans could be made. As to risk ofinjury to civilians through loss of
water supply, however, Article 35(2)'s history is that it applies only to
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combatants.448 Althougli there was a risk to neutral civilian water supplies, there
I
could be no claim under Article 35(2).
With respect to merchant ship attacks during the Tanker War,449 Article 35(2)
principles applied to attacks on vessels that were legitimate targets (and many were
not), if there was deliberate firing at a crew when an attack's purpose was to stop a
ship. There were reports, e.g., of deliberate firing into crew areas when a ship could
have been stopped by other well-placed shots. 450 However, the record is not clear
as to whether these attacks, including mine attacks, caused unnecessary suffering
among combatants.
Charter law governed neutrals' self-defense responses,451 i.e., neutrals' firing on
oil platforms, warships and military aircraft. The same is true for belligerents' attacks on neutrals' petroleum facilities,452 which were subject to Charter principles.453 IfArticle 35(2) principles would be incorporated by reference into Charter
law analysis, there are no reports ofunnecessary suffering in these situations under
Article 35(2) standards.
(b) Other Protocol Terms, Applicable to Land Warfare As Restated Custom, Or As a
Restatement ofNorms Applicable to All Modes of Warfare. Other Protocol I provisions
besides Articles 35(1) and 35(2) recite customary rules of general application; like
other Protocol I provisions, they have force as custom for two reasons: (1) for parties bound by the Protocol as a treaty, they apply only in respect ofland warfare and
attacks from the sea;454 and (2) because many countries, including the
belligerents, were not Protocol I parties during the Tanker War, and the Protocol
could only apply as custom among those States, including the belligerents, involved in the Tanker War. 455 However, to the extent these principles repeat general customary rules for naval warfare, Tanker War participants were obliged to
observe them.
(i) Protocol 1, Article 48: Basic Rule of Distinction. Article 48 states a "basic
rule,,456 of distinction:
... [T]o ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall . . . distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives
and ... shall direct ... operations only against military objectives.

This restates custom. 457
Tanker War attacks on neutral merchantmen, or ships otherwise entitled to
protection from attack, offer examples of the customary norm Article 48 restates
for naval warfare. IfIran and Iraq had observed this principle as to legitimate objects for attack,458 protected vessels would not have been hit, and the environment
would have been that much cleaner from less oil leakage into the Gulf from
stricken or sunken ships. The N owruz and other Iranian terminals were legitimate
targets,459 but one might ask whether collateral damage,460 in terms of impaired

Maritime Environment

521

high seas navigation rights, fishing, and risk to desalination plants after the
Nowruz attack,461 was not excessive given the advantage expected at the time by
the attack. Nor was proportionality observed in Iranian and Iraqi use of drifting
mines during the Tanker War.462
Article 48 could not apply as a LOAC customary rule for belligerent attacks on
neutrals' oil facilities, or for neutrals' self-defense responses to belligerents' attacks
on neutral shipping. Charter law governed, and there is no indication that neutrals' self-defense responses were other than proportional under the Charter. On
the other hand, belligerents' attacks on oil facilities in neutral territories was a violation of the Charter.463
Other Protocol provisions following Article 48 protect specific objects ofattack.
Depending on how the environment is defined, some or all of these objects might
be said to be part of the environment. Even if not considered part of the environment, their proximity to environmentally sensitive objects may result in derivativeprotection, as has been seen in analysis of Hague and Geneva Conventions law,
other treaties, custom and general principles.
(ii) Protocol 1, Articles 51, 52, 57: Protection for Civilians and Civilian Objects. Articles 51-52 and 57 of Protocol I state protections for the civilian population, individuals, and civilian objects. Articles 51-52 and 57 in part restate custom, some ofit
longstanding and applicable to all armed conflict, including naval warfare; States
and commentators differ on whether other provisions restate custom.
Article 51 declares that the civilian464 population and individual civilians, unless they take direct part in hostilities, cannot be objects ofattack. Acts or threats of
violence, primarily intended to terrorize the civilian population, are prohibited.
Indiscriminate attacks, i.e., those not directed at a specific military objective,
which employ methods or means of combat that cannot be directed at a specific
military objective, or which employ methods or means of combat whose effects
cannot be limited as the Protocol requires and thus are likely to strike military objectives, civilians or civilian objects without distinction, are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks include bombardment treating as a single military objective
clearly separated, distinct military objectives where civilians or civilian objects are
concentrated, e.g., in cities. They include attacks that may be expected to cause incidentalloss oflife or injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
of such, excessive relative to a concrete, definite military advantage anticipated.
Reprisal attacks against civilians are prohibited, as are use of civilians as human
shields for military operations or military objectives. 465
Four countries filed declarations to Article 51, stating understandings that military commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon or executing attacks necessarily must reach decisions on the basis of their assessment of
information from sources available to them at the relevant time, i.e., a judgment
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cannot go against planners, etc., based on hindsight.466 Three defined "military
advantage" as advantage gained from an attack as a whole.467
Article 52 is a general rule for protecting civilian objects:
1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or reprisals. Civilian objects are
all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2.
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature,
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at
the time, offers a definite military advantage.
3. In case of doubt whether an object ... normally dedicated to civilian purposes,
such as a house ... , is being used to make an effective contribution to military action,
it shall be presumed not to be so used.468

As in the case ofArticle 51, four States interpreted Article 52 to mean that a planner
or commander of an attack is responsible only for information from all sources
available to the planner or commander at the relevant time; 469 i.e., hindsight information does not apply. Three States interpreted Article 52 to allow attack on a specific area ofland as a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons
specified in Article 52, its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization offers definite military advantage, in circumstances ruling at the time.470
Article 57 requires constant care to be taken to spare the civilian popUlation, civilians and civilian objects in conducting military operations. 471 Those planning
or deciding on attacks must
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither
civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are
military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it
is not prohibited by ... this Protocol to attack them;
take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with
a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects;
refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidentalloss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
military advantage anticipated[.]472

Attacks must be canceled or suspended ifit becomes apparent that the objective is
not a military one or is subject to special protection, or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss ofcivilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination of these, excessive relative to the concrete and direct military advantage expected. Effective advance warning must be given for attacks that
may affect the civilian population, "unless circumstances do not permit." If there
is a choice among several military objectives to attain a similar military advantage,
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commanders must select the one that will cause the least danger to civilian lives
and objects. In naval or air operations parties to a conflict must, consistent with
their rights and duties under international law applicable during armed conflict,
take reasonable precautions to avoid loss of civilian life and damage to civilian
property.473
Six States filed reservations or declarations to Article 57. Austria's reservation
said, "Article 57(2) of Protocol I shall available a military commander to reach any
decision is determinant [sic]," which may have lost meaning in translation but
seems to imply that the commander's determination is binding, which seems to be
close to the Swiss declaration, that Article 57(2) obligations can only be imposed
on commanders at battalion or group levels, and those of higher rank.474 Four
other countries added understandings identical with theirs for Articles 51 and 52,
i.e., commanders must decide on the basis ofinformation from sources available to
them at time of decision, and that "military advantage" refers to advantage
expected from the totality of the attack and not just part of it, in assessing
proportionality.475
Article 51(2) and 51(5) prohibitions on attacks on civilians, absent exceptions,
e.g., those who take up arms, restate customary law.476 Civilians may not be used as
human shields, nor may they be a subject of attacks intended to terrorize them, although othenvise legitimate attacks that happen to terrorize them are permissible.
The specific intent to terrorize civilians gives rise to culpability.477 Article 52
states a general customary norm, except the prohibition on reprisals against civilian objects in Article 52(1), for which there is a division of view.478 The distinction, necessity and proportionality principles, with the concomitant risk of
collateral damage inherent in any attack that are stated in Articles 51 and 57, generally restate customary norms.479 These do not protect the environment by their
terms, but observing protections for civilians and civilian objects can result in protection of environmentally sensitive objects and areas around them.
During the Tanker War neither belligerent observed distinction principles for
attacks on neutral and other protected vessels. The collateral result was increased
leakage of petroleum, bunkers and cargo, into the Gulf with higher potential for
environmental damage. 480 A clear example oflack of distinction was the Iraqi missile attack on U.S.S. Stark in 1987. The same is true about indiscriminate mining
ofU.s.S. SamuelB. Roberts and merchant tankers.481 The N owruz facility was a legitimate military target,482 but query whether Iraq observed proportionality principles, in terms ofloss of freedom of navigation rights, fishing catches, and threats
to desalination plants. The record is not clear as to belligerents' attacks on other
terminals. However, Iran's attack on neutrals' shore facilities, ifIran was otherwise
seeking a proper target, totally lacked discrimination.483
Neutrals' self-defense responses were governed by Charter law, not the LOAC.484
There was no reported significant spillage from US naval responses to Iran's
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Silkworm missile attack on a US reflagged tanker, on oil rigs serving as bases for
Iranian gunboats. The US operation was proportional and necessary, in that the
source of attacks on neutral shipping was removed. 485 Similarly, US proportional
self-defense responses to the Roberts mining, the Iran Ajr minelaying, and to attacking Iranian naval units were justified. There was no reported major pollution
of the Gulf resulting from these operations either, although there necessarily had
to have been loss ofbunkers.486
(iii) Protocol 1, Article 53: Protection of Cultural Property. Article 53 declares,
without prejudice to the Cultural Property Convention487 and "other relevant international instruments," e.g., the Roerich Pact,488 that belligerents may not
(a) ... commit any acts of hostility against the historic monuments, works of art or
places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples;
(b) ... use such objects in support of the military effort;
(c) ... make such objects the object ofreprisals.489
Although Article 53 applies in some situations to the law of naval warfare, e.g., in
shore bombardment,490 it restates a general customary norm applicable to all warfare, subject to the exception that such objects lose protection if they support enemy military effort.491 Cultural Property Convention parties may also claim
imperative military necessity,492 since Article 53 is subject to it. According to
Toman, "States which are not parties to the [Hague} Convention do not have the
right of recourse to military necessity and must apply Article ... 53 ... in all circumstances.,,493 Granted this interpretation, which assumes that a customary
norm ofmilitary necessity could not apply, it would appear that Article 53 must be
read in the context of Article 52, the general rule for protection of civilian objects,
and that since, e.g., a house ofworship may be attacked ifit is a legitimate military
objective under Article 52(3), the same house of worship if a cultural object under
Article 53(a) could likewise be attacked.494
These rules have little relevance for high seas operations, except for oceanic
transport of cultural objects. There may be considerable application for inshore
operations.495
Although cultural property issues abounded in the 1990-91 war, there appear to
have been none connected with the Tanker War, the naval warfare aspects of the
1980-88 conflict.
(iv) Protocol 1, Article 54: Sustenance of the Civilian Population. If the environment includes sustenance of human beings, Protocol I, Article 54 applies:
1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs,
agricultural areas for [producing] ... foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water
installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying
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them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party,
whatever the motive, whether to ... starve out civilians, to cause them to move away,
or for any other motive.
3. The prohibitions in ... 2 shall not apply to such of the objects covered by it as are
used by an adverse Party:
(a) as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or
(b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action, provided, however, that in no event shall actions against these objects be
taken which may be expected to leave the civilian population with
such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its
movement.
4. These objects shall not be made the object of reprisals.
5. In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in the
defence ofits national territory against invasion, derogation from the prohibitions ...
in ... 2 may be made by a Party to the conflict within such territory under its own
control where required by imperative military necessity.496

Article 54 applies in a limited way per se to naval warfare, e.g., to shore bombardment, although inshore operations might involve all of it.497 The law of blockade,498 a high seas operation during armed conflict, could contribute to conditions
covered by Article 54, but is another example of the law of naval warfare not covered per se by Protocol I, although some of its provisions, e.g., relief convoys, may,
in the future, be invoked by analogy.499 Some countries and commentators say Article 54(1) does not restate custom; they also disagree as to whether Article 54(2) restates custom. All agree that Articles 54(3)-54(5) articulate customary norms.Soo
These might be cited ifbelligerents attack fisheries or aquaculture areas in the
territorial sea where the catch or product is essential to the civilian population's
survival and other Article 54 criteria are met. This may have been at stake in Iraq's
1983 Nowruz attack, if fishing grounds necessary to sustain populations were destroyed, and in other attacks on Iranian oil facilities. SOl The record is not clear on
this point, and it is therefore unlikely that Iraq violated custom stated in Article 54.
Attacks on neutral facilities S02 were Charter violations; Article 54 could not apply
except perhaps to supply a standard in considering the situations. s03
(v) Protocol 1, Article 56: Attacks Resulting in Releasing Dangerous Forces. Article
56(1) is perhaps the most controversial provision in this part of Proto colI. It states
rules for attacks on works or installations containing dangerous forces:
... Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and
nuclear generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these
objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous
forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other military
objectives located at orin the vicinity of these works orinstallations shall not be made
the object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces from the
works or installations and consequent severe losses among the civilian
population.S04
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These protections end if installations are used for other than normal functions, to
support military operations, i.e., impounded water behind a dam or power station
acting as a moat between belligerents, and if attack is the only feasible way to end
support of a belligerent. Nuclear power stations may be attacked if they supply
power in regular, significant and direct support of military operations, and if attack is the only feasible way to end it. Other military objectives located at or near
such installations may be attacked if they regularly, significantly and directly support military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to end such support. 50S These installations cannot be an object ofreprisals. 506 Four countries filed
declarations interpreting Article 56 to say that a decision on whether to attack can
only be based on assessment of information from all sources available to the
decisionmaker at the relevant time;507 hindsight judgments are not admissible in
considering whether Article 56 is violated.
Article 56 does not apply to wartime defensive measures, e.g., to deliberate
flooding of a State's own territory to deny access to its advancing enemy,508 nor by
the majority view does it state customary norms. 509 However, for those States that
do not ratify Protocol I or accept it as a customary norm, proportionality and necessity principles apply to attacks on these installations. 510
Article 56 has slight relevance to the law of naval warfare, except for air or other
attacks from the sea on shore installations.511 It might be invoked for floating
plants powered by nuclear fuel or tidal dams to generate electricity and located in
the territorial sea, since the Protocol appears to apply in territorial waters.512 Necessity and proportionality, which must be observed in all warfighting, apply to attacks on these installations too. 513 Article 56 does not apply to oil refineries and
presumably other petroleum production facilities; these are natural military objectives.514
Article 56 could not have applied to Iraq's Nowruz attackS IS with a resulting
threat to the desalination plants, during the Tanker War. First, Article 56 does not
state a customary norm. Second, even if it did, by its terms it did not apply, unless
there was a risk of explosion or similar reaction to oil being sucked into intakes.
Third, and most importantly, the risk of damage was to neutrals, not Iran; it was
neutral facilities that were at risk. Any threat to neutral facilities was covered by
Charter law; Article 56 might have supplied the criteria for determining liability,
but Article 56 could not apply of its own force. 516
(vi) Protocol 1, Articles 59, 60, 62, 65: Undefended Localities, DMZs, CD Facilities. Ifundefended localities, demilitarized zones (DMZs)517 and CD facilities
coincide with environmentally sensitive areas, Articles 59, 60 and 62 will protect these areas. Such localities, DMZs and CD facilities lose protection if they
commit or are used to commit acts harmful to the enemy, outside their proper
usage. Conversely, if an area loses, e.g., its Article 59 protection, it retains other
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Protocol I or custom-based protections it may have. 51S Undefended localities
and DMZs must fulfil these conditions:
(a) all combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment must
have been evacuated;
(b) no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establishments;
(c) no acts ofhostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the population; and
(d) no activities in support of military operations shall be undertaken.

For DMZs, military activity linked to the military effort must have ceased, and
parties to a conflict must agree on interpretation to be given this requirement and
those persons to be admitted to the DMZ. Acts not considered harmful to the enemy in the case of CD facilities include:
(a) ... civil defense tasks are carried out under the direction or control of military
authorities;
(b) .•• civilian civil defense personnel cooperate with military personnel in the
performance of civil defense tasks, or ... some military personnel are attached to
civilian civil defense organizations;
(c) ... performance of civil defense tasks may incidentally benefit military victims,
particularly those ... hors de combat.

CD personnel may carry light weapons. 519 The Fourth Convention also gives
some protection to these persons.520
Protocol I clarifies Hague rules against bombarding undefended localities; 521
it is a customary norm today.522 Cities or towns behind enemy lines are not considered undefended; military objectives within them may be attacked. 523 Immunity
of agreed-upon DMZs from attack is a customary rule. 524 Customary law also protects CD personnel and facilities so long as they do not engage in activity hostile toward the enemy.525 Absent Protocol I protections for these areas and activities,
they are covered by customary norms, some longstanding. And as with hospital or
previously-agreed neutralized zones under the 1949 Conventions,526 environmentally-sensitive areas or objects within or near these facilities, zones or areas protects them for another reason. Protocol I principles for DMZs were used by
analogy during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War when the belligerents agreed on
a "Red Cross box" on the high seas for transfer of sick and wounded. 527
During the Tanker War none of these areas were involved in the conflict at sea.
However, as suggested previously, the Red Cross Box concept for sick and
wounded at sea might be considered for establishing Green Boxes to protect environmentally sensitive areas. 528

(B) Summary: Were Protocol I Protections Related to Protecting the Environment, or
Related to the Law o/Naval Waifare and Peripherally Related to Environmental Protection, Violated During the Tanker War? The response to the first issue is clearly No,
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since the Protocol did not apply to this conflict as a treaty. During the Tanker War
Iran and Iraq and many Tanker War neutrals were not parties to it. To the extent
Protocol I restated custom, they were bound by these principles.529
Assuming that Article 35(3)'s prohibitions against attacks involving damage to
the environment restate customary norms, it was not violated during the Tanker
War. To be sure, the environmental damage of the 1983 Nowruz attack was widespread and severe within the meaning of Article 35(3), but did it have a "longterm" effect? Moreover, did Iraq intend to disrupt the environment? Could Iraq
have anticipated, at the time, that its attacks would produce the spill? If the effect
was not long-term within the meaning of Article 35(3), then the conjunctive statement of requirements (widespread, long-term and severe) defeats its application.
Even if that hurdle is cleared, the question ofIraqi intent at the time arises. If intent is the same under each article, then application of Article 35(3) as a customary
norm fails, unless wanton or grossly negligent conduct suffices to trigger liability.
Here too the record is less than clear. As an alternative to intent, Article 35(3)
would predicate liability on Iraqi conduct at the time of decision that "may be expected" to cause environmental harm. Here too the record is less than clear, with
part of the answer lying with documents and witnesses that are not available.
As to attacks on merchant shipping, including bulk petroleum carriers, the response is clearer. There is no evidence that the spills caused severe environmental
degradation, were long-term, or were widespread, or that there was an intent to
damage the environment, or that belligerents could have expected the environment would be damaged when decisions were taken. Thus there was probably no
Article 35(3) violation during the Tanker War.
Similarly, there was no Article 55(1) violation, for the same reasons, but also because Article 55(1), and any customary norm flowing from it, does not apply to
maritime warfare.
Belligerents' attacks on neutral petroleum facilities, e.g., Iran's attacks on Kuwaiti and UAE installations were governed by UN Charter law, where there were
violations of the prohibition on threats to or attacks on the territorial integrity of
States,530 and Protocol I standards might be used in determining liability in those
situations. Similarly, US and other neutrals' self-defense responses were governed
by Charter law;531 any claims of damage covered by Protocol I must be considered
in that context. There are no known environment-related claims related to these
responses.
It might be argued that Iraq's Nowruz attacks, which might have disrupted neutrals' desalination plants, violated Article 54, as several have argued with respect to
Iraq's attempt to disrupt the desalination plants by flooding the Gulfwith oil during the 1990-91 war, in that fouling the plants would deprive the civilian population of an adequate water supply.532 There are two difficulties with this claim.
First, neither Article 54 in its entirety, nor Article 54(2), which deals with
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materials essential to the civilian population's survival, restate customary law. Second, even if Article 54 does recite applicable custom, these norms apply only to the
LOAC; Charter law governs attacks on neutrals;533Article 54 could apply only as a
standard for possibly informing the content of Charter law.
Could Article 56's terms, dealing with assaults on nuclear power generating stations, be invoked to condemn these seaborne attacks? The response is threefold.
First, most commentators say Article 56 does not now state customary norms. Second, as in the case of Article 54 and most of Protocol I, its terms do not apply to attacks on neutrals; this is governed by the Charter. 534 Third, unless an explosion of
the plants could have released radioactive material or otherwise have triggered Article 56's standards, Article 56 could not apply under its own terms.
On the other hand, Article 48, 51-52 and 57 standards, which restate general
principles of the military objective, target distinction, and proportionality were violated by both States in their indiscriminate mine and surface ship attacks on merchant shipping. Charter law governed neutrals' self-defense responses,535 and
there is nothing in the record to indicate that these responses were not necessary
and proportional under the customary law of self-defense.
With Protocol 1's continuing acceptance as treaty law, albeit with reservations
and declarations and applicable as it is mainly to land warfare or air and missile attacks from the sea, the Protocol may come closer to restating custom for aspects of
the LOAC except for persistent objectors. Perhaps further in the future, or alongside this development, the LONW as a separate component of the LOAC may feel
Protocol 1's influence, if not its displacement of traditional LONW standards in
some instances.
v. Other Applicable Law. Since 1977 other treaties related to the LOAC have
been ratified; these present the same kind ofissues as Protocol I. The other development has been revitalization of the Security Council as a law-making institution, especially since the USSR's collapse.
(I) The 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention and Its Protocols. Arguments for applying the Conventional Weapons Convention, with its preamble language, "recalling that it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare ... intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment," and its land mines and incendiary weapons protocols in particular,536 as customary law governing naval warfare, may be advanced in future wars.
Iran, Iraq and most States involved in the Tanker War were not parties to the Convention or its Protocols at that time. 537
The United States ratified the 1980 Convention and 1980 Protocol~nd II
with four reservations or understandings in early 1995, and a condition rejecting
applicability of the preamble language, which tracks Protocol!, art. 35(3).538 Many
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US allies have also ratified the Convention and its Protocols. 539 Moreover, a potential for review conferences means that the law of naval warfare may be implicated
in the future. 540
The Convention governs all modes of warfare,541 but most Protocol provisions
state norms for land warfare or the law of bombardment and not armed conflict at
sea. 542
The Mine Protocol to the Conventional Weapons Convention applies only to,
inter alia, "mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings, but does not apply
to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or in inland waterways.,,543 By its terms this
Protocol has little or no application for oceans warfare, except insofar as a commander might consider a mine-infested beach for amphibious landing, perhaps a
factor leading to the faked shore landings during the GulfWar.544 The Protocol
would affect those operations and arguably could embrace mines, including those
aircraft launched, laid at low tide ashore and covered by higher tides that push
coastal waters over the "ground or surface area,,545 where mines are laid.
The Protocol's statement ofprinciples ofproportionality, the illegality ofin discriminate weapons, and reasonable warnings under the circumstances, is reminiscent of customary norms recited in the Hague Conventions and Protocol 1: 546
· .. It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct weapons to which this Article [3]
applies in offence, defence or by ... reprisals, against the civilian population as such
or against individual civilians.
· .. [I]ndiscriminate use of weapons to which this Article [3] applies is prohibited.
Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons:
(a) which is not on, or directed against, a military objective; or
(b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed
at a specific military objective; or
(c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
· .. All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects of
weapons to which this Article [3] applies. Feasible precautions are those precautions
which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances
ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.
· .. It is prohibited to use weapons to which this Article [4] applies in any city,
town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians in which
combat between ground forces is not taking place or does not appear to be imminent,
unless either:
(a) they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective or under
the control of an adverse party; or
(b) measures are taken to protect civilians from their effects, [e.g.,] ••• posting of warning signs, the posting of sentries, the issue of warnings or the
provision of fences.
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The Protocol defines "military objective" as
... any object which by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage.

"Civilian objects" are objects not defined as military objects in the Protocol. S47
The Amended Mine Protocol has similar provisions, adding with respect to the
military objective a presumption, from Protocol I, that in case of doubt an object
normally dedicated to civilian purposes is not being used for effective contribution
to military action. S48
There are no provisions on mine warfare's environmental impact. However, the
Protocol's statement of military objective, indiscriminate weapons, proportionality, military necessity, and notice principles reinforce those rules in other contexts. These principles, if observed, indirectly protect the environment as in the
case of Protocol I standards and customary law defining the military objective and
proportionality.
Although the Incendiary Weapons Protocol applies to war at sea in the context
of attacks on civilians,S49 incendiary weapons, remain, in the US view,SSO a legitimate means of warfare against combatants at sea. However, these weapons are
rarely seen in naval warfare.SSl The Protocol repeats, in slightly different language, principles of military objective, civilian objects, necessity and proportionality found in Protocol I but has no warning requirements.SS2
The Protocol also prohibits "mak[ing] forests or other ... plant cover the object
of attack by incendiary weapons except when such ... are used to cover, conceal, or
camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military objectives."SS3 This has been characterized as not imposing a severe restriction on legitimate military use of incendiaries. 554 It applies to shore bombardment or air or
missile attack from the sea. While such plant cover is a feature of traditional landward forests, tropical or subtropical shores have mangroves or other trees extending into othenvise navigable territorial waters, particularly during high tides. SSS
The Protocol's approach, banning attack on a specific part of the environment,
forests, unless used for military purposes or if the forest itself is a military objective, might be compared with the general standard of Protocol I's controversial Article 56, forbidding attack on dams, dikes and nuclear power generating stations
unless they are used for military purposes or are military objectives.SS6 These
might be contrasted with Protocol I, Article 35(3)'s banning methods or means of
warfare causing "widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment,"
or the ENMOD Convention prohibition on "military or any other hostile use of
environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe
effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any ... Party." 557 The
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generalized approach is better. During the 1990-91 Gulf War commentators attempted to analogize Protocol I provisions, of doubtful standing as custom, to
cover situations its drafters did not contemplate.SS8 Will this be the fate ofIncendiary Weapons Protocol Article 2(4), the forests provision? What is a forest?
Would claimants try to extend it to grasslands which have occasional coppices or
trees along water courses? Does Article 2(4) protect a considerable acreage of
young saplings, on the way to becoming a forest, on land formerly farmed but now
reverting to woodland? These kinds of definitional problems may make Article
2(4) unworkable in practice.
The Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols are a restatement of,
and therefore an enhancement for, customary definitions of principles of military
objective, necessity and proportionality, and the prohibition on indiscriminate
weapons, applying to all warfare. This is their principal value. In some respects
they do not state customary norms, and for these provisions they must await ratification by major military powers.
Iran, Iraq, the United States and many other countries involved in the Tanker
War were not parties to the Convention and its Protocols; by 1987, twenty-eight
States had ratified them. SS9 Therefore; they could have applied only as customary
law for the Tanker War.
Insofar as the Tanker War is concerned, the Mine Protocol did not apply, by its
own terms; there is no record of amphibious landings to which it might have applied. It did not apply to sea mine attacks. The Incendiary Weapons Protocol
might have applied to attacks on shore installations, but there is no record of use of
incendiary weapons in this context. There is also no record of weapons meeting
Fragments Protocol criteria. The technical terms of the Convention and its Protocols did not apply to martime aspects to the extent they stated customary law.
However, insofar as the Convention and its Protocols' recitation of customary
norms of the military objective, discrimination, necessity and proportionality
strengthened those principles for war at sea; belligerents observed or violated
them to the same extent they would be said to have violated the identical terms in
Protocol I, to the extent that those terms reflect customary law. The result is that
customary norms restated in Protocol I have been strengthened.
Since the Convention and its Protocols are in effect a supplement to the 1949
Geneva Conventions and Protocol I and therefore govern LOAC situations,S60
they could not have applied to self-defense scenarios during the Tanker War.
Charter law governed these,561 although the general customary law of necessity
and proportionality might have informed the content of these Charter norms. In
any event, as noted in the Protocol I and earlier analyses, the record indicates neutrals did not violate these standards in the self-defense context.
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(II) Developments in the Law ofArmed Conflict Under the UN Charter. Before the
Gulf War, UN interest in the relationship between war and environmental protection had resulted in treaties, e.g., the Cultural Property Convention, ENMOD
Convention, Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols, and the LOS
Convention, among others. Action within UN principal organs was largely
through non-binding General Assembly resolutions, e.g., the Assembly's endorsing the UN Environment Programme after the 1972 Stockholm Conference and its
Principles, which found their way into later treaties,562 the 1982 World Charter for
Nature,563 and the 1992 Earth Summit.564 UNEP has promoted many regional
agreements subject to the LOS conventions and their other rules clauses, including the Kuwait and Red Sea Conventions.565
The Security Council, and later the Assembly during the Soviet veto era, voted
resolutions dealing with actual or potential armed conflict situations.566 However,
there was little direct linkage with environmental protection in particular conflicts. 567 For example, during the Tanker War, Council Resolution 598 called for a
cease-fire, "deplor[ed] ... attacks on neutral shipping ... ," the violation ofinternational humanitarian law and other laws of armed conflict, and demanded that
belligerents "discontinue all military actions on land, at sea and in air." Prior Resolutions 540 (1983) and 552 (1984) had been in similar vein; 540 specifically called
upon belligerents "to refrain from any action that may endanger ... marine life in
the region of the Gulf.,,568 If obeyed, these resolutions would have helped protect
the environment, in that if no further shipping attacks occurred, Gulf waters
would have been cleaner. To the extent that Resolutions 540, 552 and 598
incorporated by reference parts of the LOAC applying to belligerent naval operations in the Gulf that had ramifications for environmental quality, e.g., attacks on
oil terminals such as N owruz,569 they would have declared environmental protections
if heeded.
Coincident with the USSR's demise, the Council began to assume a more active
role in world affairs. During the Kuwait crisis and Gulf War, it passed resolutions
with direct or indirect ramifications for the environment during war. These are beyond the scope of this book. 570 Two deserve particular attention, however.
Resolution 678, a Council decision authorizing the Coalition "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) [demanding Iraqi
withdrawal from Kuwait] and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore
international peace and security in the area[,]" incorporated earlier resolutions
such as 664-67, 670, and 674 into its binding mandate. 571 When these resolutions'
content is examined, it is clear that the Council meant to include the law of armed
conflict in treaties and custom, and the Fourth Convention specifically, and therefore direct and indirect environmental protection principles in this law. This
inclusion was subject to the resolution's "all necessary means" and "relevant resolutions" clauses. Participating governments considered that Resolution 678
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incorporated by reference all the relevant LOAC applicable to the war. 572 This was
consistent with the language, ambiguous as it was, of Resolution 678. However, the
point remains, as noted with respect to the prewar resolutions, that the Council
might decide on action to incorporate or supersede all or part of the established
LOAC.
This is not the case with Resolution 687, where the Council directly addressed
environmental degradation during armed conflict; it reaffirmed "that Iraq ... is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental
damage and the depletion of natural resources, ... as a result ofIraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait[.]" It also invited Iraq to reaffirm its obligations
under the Geneva Gas Protoco1.573 As in prior Resolutions incorporating the
LOAC and international agreements,574 the Council appears to have done nothing
more than incorporate conventional and customary norms into Charter law, without creating new liability, which may have been the case with other resolutions. 575
The Council properly reaffirmed its position; Resolution 687 had declared that
prior resolutions continued in full force and effect, and demanded that Iraq "Accept in principle its liability under international law for any loss, damage, or injury
arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations,
as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait" and "Immediately begin to return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq ... ,,,576 thereby affirming cultural
property conventions' policies, which arguably are protective of the total human
environment. 577
Resolution 687 continued the theme of Council resolutions with indirect effect
on environmental quality during war through inviting Iraq to renew its Geneva
Gas Protocol pledges. The same was true for Resolution 686's affirming prior resolutions that, if complied with, would have afforded environmental protection
through observance of treaties and other international law incorporated by reference. Resolution 686's requiring Iraqi acceptance ofliability under international
law for loss, damage or injury to Kuwait, other countries and their nationals can be
read as supporting liability for environmental damage as stated in international
law.
These resolutions did not decide ultimate liability; there are still issues ofproof
and damages in individual cases. They do, however, powerfully affirm a potential
for international liability for environmental damage during war.
The resolutions also demonstrate that belligerents risk a Council decision going beyond customary and conventional law if there is environmental damage during armed conflict. Moreover, the strength and quality of the law may be greater
than the factorial approach common to international law analysis. 578 If a Council
resolution governing environmental norms is part ofa decision, it binds UN Members. 579 There is also a possibility that these resolutions, intrinsically binding or
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not,580 may approach or be declared jus cogens, trumping treaties and custom. 581
Resolutions may restate treaty or customary norms, thereby strengthening them. 582
Future wars may find the Council more vigorous, and at the least States can expect more activity from it and the General Assembly.

b. Final Thoughts. Conclusions to the foregoing subparts demonstrate that there
apparently were few LOAC violations, in terms of norms specifically addressed to
environmental protection, or where existing law if observed would give collateral
protection to the environment. However, part of the reason for this is the relatively
meager record on environmental degradation during the Tanker War compared
with the 1990-91 Gulf War, where world media attention focused on environmental outrages Iraq committed. 583 Is there a need for a specific treaty, i.e., a "Fifth"
Geneva Convention or a "Green" Convention, as some urged after the Gulf
War?584
For now, the response is No. As the long foregoing analysis demonstrates, there
are general terms in two treaties, ENMOD and Protocol I, as well as many other
agreements, many ofwhose terms are now also customary norms, that, if observed,
will protect the environment through compliance with them: the 1907 Hague
Conventions, the Geneva Gas Protocol (condemning gas and bacteriological warfare), the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the cultural property conventions, and the
Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols. These treaties, and customary norms paralleling them in many cases, recite general terms (i.e., notice in some
cases, discrimination, necessity and proportionality), limit or prohibit attacks on a
wide range of specific objects, or limit or prohibit methods of warfare, all of which
have the important tangential effect of safeguarding the environment. Moreover,
the General Assembly and the Security Council have been active in promoting
these norms through resolutions for general standards or specific issues. Although
until recently most resolutions have been nonbinding unless they restated customary or treaty norms, this action has had the effect of strengthening these principles at the least. With the end of Cold War vetoes and revival of the Council so
that it can function as the Charter drafters intended, there is the prospect of its
passing situation-specific resolutions, including binding decisions, in future
conflicts.
It seems unnecessary to add yet another international agreement now. 585 General standards in place should suffice until time has had its opportunity to settle
out customary observance, perhaps with widespread acceptance of ENMOD and
Protocol!. This is particularly true in the context of the LOS, since the 1982 LOS
Convention, the first major agreementto include norms to govern the oceans environment, is now gaining wide acceptance as treaty law.586 If a new "Green" treaty
would recite technical rules, similar to administrative regulations accompanying
US environmental legislation, there is the risk of their becoming outmoded before
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the ink would be dry.587 Developing custom will allow the flexibility that is helpful in a relatively new area oflaw.588 The 20 new States that have appeared in the
last five years may not have had time to assess policy positions with respect to
treaty succession,589 let alone a complex new agreement. The sheer number ofparties to a new multilateral agreement on a controversial body oflaw may promote
delay in negotiations, reservations or understandings that can cloud the treaty's
meaning,590 and engender delays in ratification.
There are counter arguments. Developing custom through State practice for
wartime rules is an awfully expensive way to write law. Treaties are favored by
many new States, carry with them the pacta sunt servanda principle,591 and can parallel and thereby augment custom as a source. 592 Treaties can publish black-letter
rules in the public domain,593 whereas custom remains in classified private foreign
ministry files and can be elusive to research. 594
On balance, however, the time is not right for a general multilateral agreement,
like the Geneva Conventions, on environmental protection during armed conflict.
c. The San Remo Manual; Other Analyses ofthe Place ofthe Environment During War. The San Remo Manual (1995) may be influential in its attempt to
recompile the law of naval warfare on the order of the 1913 Oxford Manual; it is not
a draft treaty like the London Declaration, although it could serve as a basis for future diplomatic conferences.595 The Manual refers to environmental protection
during armed conflict in several contexts. The ICRC developed Guidelines for
protecting the environment during armed conflict, and these have had their influence. The 1997 NWP i-14M, successor toNWP 9A for the US Navy, Marine Corps
and Coast Guard, also refers to the need for environmental protection during
armed conflict.

i. A "Due Regard" Fonnula for Interfacing the LOAC and the LOS. The Manual appears to endorse Robertson's view596 that the relation of States not party to a
conflict and belligerents should be in terms of "due regard" that belligerents must
pay those States' LOS rights and obligations in, e.g., the EEZ.597 There may be a
critical difference; Robertson would apply a due regard formula, which he extracted from similar principles in the LOS Conventions,598 subject to preexisting
rules of international law, e.g., prohibitions on certain weapons or means of warfare, targeting, treatment of civilian persons or objects,599 while the Manual is not
as clear on the point in all cases,600 i.e., whether due regard should be applied where
there are no preexisting LOAC rules, or whether it is a separate consideration
along with the rules. In those situations where the Manual does not qualify its due
regard formula, the context of other Manual provisions would appear to make it
clear that its drafters meant that due regard would be subject to other LOAC rules.
The Manual takes no position on how a due regard formula would factor into
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situations Charter law governs, e.g., the right of self-defense. 601 Part B.1 proposes
that an analogous due regard formula be applied in these situations.
This sub-Part discusses the Manual provisions and comments on whether due
regard should be applied in the absence of preexisting LOAC rules, which is Robertson's view, or whether due regard is a factor to be considered alongside the preexisting rules.
ii. Due Regard Formula for Interfacing Law of Naval Warfare and Environmental Claims. The Manual uses a due regard formula to describe the duty
belligerents owe for protecting the marine environment,602 except for sensitive areas of special importance. For the latter, the Manual provides:
[P]arties to the conflict are encouraged to agree that no hostile actions will be
conducted in marine areas containing:
(a) rare or fragile ecosystems, or
(b) the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species or other forms of
marine life. 603

This provision is hortatory, not mandatory, and reflects LOS Convention language.604
The environmental due regard formula must be integrated into the basic rules
of methods and means of warfare, i.e., general LOAC principles of military objective, necessity and proportionality, and that weapons cannot be indiscriminate or
cause unnecessary suffering to humans,60S to the extent specific rules are not
stated in custom or treaties, e.g., hospital ships employed in their normal role606 or
rules against gas and bacteriological weapons.607 The specific example ofhomogenizing environmental protection with a method of naval warfare is the relationship of belligerent minelaying and neutral EEZ and continental shelf rights and
duties. 60S
The Manual, recognizing "the growing number of treaty rules, international
resolutions and constitutional provisions laying down the obligation of the State
to protect the environment," declares that "at the very least ... there is a general
recognition of a need to protect the marine environment, and a duty upon every
State to protect and preserve the marine environment.,,609 However, proliferation
ofsources, and the generality of those most in point, led the Manual drafters to rely
on a due regard formula in most cases.610
iii. Limitations of and Omissions in the San Remo Manual; Its Strengths. The
Manual is not as specific as it might be for sea areas the LOS Convention recognizes. Part of the reason is that the traditional law of naval warfare recognizes only
two divisions of the seas: high seas and coastal waters, i.e., the territorial sea,611 the
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situation in 1907 when the Hague Conventions and later LONW treaties were
signed. The result since then has been customary practice built around these treaties and independently of binding agreements, the circumstance of, e.g., the 1909
London Declaration. Thus there is no specific consideration of the relationship of
the law of naval warfare with environmental concerns, including conservation, in
the Area, high seas fishing areas, offshore fishing operations where the coastal
State has not declared an EEZ, the EEZ, the continental shelf, the contiguous
zone, or the territorial sea.612 To be sure, some of these ocean zones, but not the
Area, a separate governance under the Convention,613 are covered by the Manual's
high seas provision,614 but the relationship of the Convention's subtleties as to
them in terms of the environment and the law of naval warfare recited in theManual is not discussed.
Another limitation was the drafters' decision not to include warfare related to
the land, e.g., shore bombardment from the sea or the air, except as these rules are
part of LOAC general principles. 61S There is no statement of the relationship of
the due regard formula generally applicable to environmental concerns in shoreward projection situations.616
On the positive side and somewhat apart from environmental issues, the Manual charts new courses by including material on the jus ad bellum, i.e., the law of
self-defense and situations where the UN Security Council has acted;617 recognizing without approving the possibility of nonbelligerency status between belligerency and neutrality;618 introducing the military objective concept into the law of
naval warfare;619 rules applicable to exclusion zones;620 clarification of whether
naval operations can be undertaken in certain sea areas under the law of the sea;621
and principles of air war at sea.622 All could interface with environmental protection claims.
iv. Conclusions with Respect to "Due Regard"; Problems with Analysis. In
general, both positions of the Manual, i.e., using a due regard formula forinterfaces
between the LOS and the law of naval warfare, and between the law of naval warfare and environmental concerns, are correct. There are three caveats.
First, any general due regard standard should be subject to specific customary,
treaty or general principles norms. The Manual recognizes this in several contexts,
e.g., custom or general principles based rules of proportionality, etc., and in citing
treaties like the ENMOD Convention and its prohibition on military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having "widespread, long-lasting or severe effects" as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other
Convention party.623 Such standards must be subject to law under the UN Charter;624 this is implied but not specifically stated.
Second, the Manual does not indicate the content of either due regard standard;
it declares a standard of due regard for the relationship between the LOS and the
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LOAC and its law of naval warfare component, and a second due regard standard
for the relationship between the LOAC and environmental norms. It does not discuss the content of due regard.
Third, the Manual does not say whether the two standards, or a due regard standard to be applied in situations governed by the Charter,625 should be considered
together as part of a general due regard principle, or whether they should be considered sequentially, i.e., applying due regard in the LOS -LOAC context first, and
then applying environmental norms against the result of this analysis, or the other
way around, i.e., applying due regard in analyzing the LOS and environmental
norms, and then factoring this result into analysis with the LOAC.

d. The [CRC Guidelines for Military Manuals. In 1994 the ICRC published
guidelines for military manuals and instructions on protection of the environment
during armed conflict. 626
The Guidelines publish a list of international agreements, many of which reflect custom, observance of which would assist in protecting the environment.627
Besides specific rules, the general principles of international law applying to
armed conflict, e.g., distinction and proportionality, also provide protection for
the environment. "In particular, only military objectives may be attacked[,] and
no methods or means of warfare which cause excessive damage shall be employed.
Precautions shall be taken in military operations as required by international
law.,,628 International environmental treaties "and relevant rules ofcustomary law
may continue to be applicable" during armed conflict,
to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the applicable law of armed conflict.
Obligations relating to the protection of the environment towards States not party to
an armed conflict (e.g., neighboring States) and in relation to areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction (e.g., the High Seas) are not affected by the existence of the
armed conflict to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the applicable law of
armed conflict.629

In cases not covered by treaty rules, "the environment remains under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience. ,,630
The ICRC appears to recognize that some international agreements, but not all
of them, related to environmental protection, may apply during war. This is consistent with the general law applying to suspension or termination of treaties during
armed conflict, which delares that some treaties, e.g. humanitarian law conventions, continue to apply during war. 631 This also appears consistent with the other
rules principle of the LOS conventions, which say that the LOS, now including
many provisions protective of the peacetime maritime environment in the LOS
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Convention, may apply during armed conflict.632 In terms of the maritime environment, the LOS Convention declares that all treaties related to the LOS must be
generally consistent with it, and particularly those related to environmental protection. 633 If these factors are taken into account, the ICRC Guidelines appear consistent with the general LOS-LOAC relationship contemplated by the LOS
conventions and the general principles of international law. The Guidelines do
not explicitly adopt a due regard formula like that the San Remo Manual drafters
developed almost contemporaneously, but they do seem to say that the environment shall be a factor to be taken into account for applying general principles of the
LOAC and specific rules. The Guidelines do not recommend principles for thejus
ad bellum, i.e., Charter law, which includes the right to self-defense.634

e. NWP I-14M and Environmental Protection During Armed Conflict. NWP
I-14M, published nearly a decade after the Tanker War, has a slightly different approach to environmental protection during armed conflict:
It is not unlawful to cause collateral damage to the natural environment during an
an attack on a legitimate military objective. However, the commander has an
affirmative obligation to avoid unnecessary damage to the environment to the
extent ... practicable to do so consistent with mission accomplishment. To that end,
and as far as military requirements permit, methods or means of warfare should be
employed with due regard to the protection and preservation of the natural
environment. Destruction of the natural environment not necessitated by mission
accomplishment and carried out wantonly is prohibited.... [A] commander should
consider the environmental damage which will result from an attack on a legitimate
military objective as one of the factors during targeting analysis.

This reflects, to a certain extent, the ICRC Guidelines approach. 635 Like the San
Remo Manual, NWP I-14M appears to implicitly require compliance with a positive norm, a lawful military objective, but would qualify lawfulness of the objective
by the environmental factor, along with other factors, during target assessment.
NWP I-14M does not appear to address the issue of due regard in the LOS-LOAC
context, nor does it consider the environmentalfactorin the context ofCharter law
issues, e.g., the right of self-defense.636

4. The Tanker War; Proposed Resolution of Issues Raised by the San Remo
Manual, the ICRC Guidelines and NWP I-14M
The Tanker War ended in 1988. The ICRC published its Guidelines in 1994;
the San Remo Manual, developed contemporaneously with them to deal with environmental and many otherissues in naval warfare, appeared in 1995;NWP I-14M,
also dealing with a broad spectrum (LOS, UN Charter issues, LOAC in all contexts) was published in 1997. Chapters II and VI demonstrate that there was little
reportage of, or concern with, environmental issues during the Tanker War, the
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Nowruz spill being a conspicuous exception. The 1990-91 Gulf War raised these
problems to international attention, and the Guidelines, Manual andNWP 1-14M
were among the reponses. Nevertheless, Tanker \Y/ar scenarios can supply analysis
to help resolve issues these sources appear to raise. This subPart attempts to resolve those issues.
Any general due regard policy must give way to a specific norm from the Charter, e.g., the inherent right of self-defense637 or other binding Charter-based
norms, e.g., Security Council decisions,638 and jus cogens principles,639 as well as
treaties or other primary sources, e.g., established custom. Examples ofestablished
norms include those under Hague IX relating to shore bombardment and general
principles of proportionality and distinction, and the Geneva Gas Protocol and its
no first use reservations, both of which are considered to state custom.640
There should be one, general due regard analysis, throwing both LOS due regard concerns, e.g., those for an EEZ of a State not party to a conflict, and environmental concerns, into common analysis with other factors, if there are no binding
LOAC rules, or there is no binding Charter law, governing a situation. There
should be no seriatim analysis of the relationship of LOS standards and environmental concerns under a due regard rubric, followed by a second, similar analysis
of the relationship of environmental concerns and the LOAC, or the other way
around. A similar analysis should apply in Charter law-governed situations. This
is so for five reasons:
(1) Some environmental principles are stated in treaties or custom whose geographic parameters may overlap but not coincide with LOS geographic coverage,
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention for example.641 If such a
treaty applies during war,642 it would be legally ludicrous to say that protected species in the territorial sea would be subject to a double due regard standard, once
under a LOS-environmental law analysis and a second time under a LOACenvironmental law analysis, while these species' neighbors would not be analyzed
under LOS principles because they were on dry land or beyond LOS ken. 643
(2) The degree of conflict between marine environmental protection treaties
and the LOS Convention has not been sorted out through practice under the latter. 644 The LOS Convention is not yet treaty law for some countries, including the
United States.645 How analysis would proceed between the LOS Convention as
custom and the environmental conventions, whether stating treaty norms or perhaps restating customary norms, is even more problematical.
(3) There are environmental standards in the LOS Convention's navigational
provisioI1S,646 for which the Manual apparently states a separate due regard requirement. 647
(4) There is a huge volume of recent bilateral and regional treaties648 with a
myriad ofenvironmental norms. A double level due regard standard would further
complicate analysis.
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(5) Applying a single due regard formula can be more easily accomplished as
part of the military planning process,649 even as rules of engagement (ROE)650
may be customized for particular military operations or scenarios.

a. The Specifics ofthe ProposedAnalysis. TheRestatement (Third) ofForeign Relations Law ofthe United States factorial analysis, combined with an earlier, similar
approach in the Restatement (Second), Conflict ofLaws, 651 offers a method for determining what law to apply where claims for applying the LOS, the LOAC, and international environmental law intersect. The Restatement (Third) approach to
prescriptive jurisdiction, i.e., a State's authority to apply its law to persons or activities outside its territory,652 is particularly appropriate. 653
To be sure, theRestatement (Third) analysis in a transnational context has its detractors. 654 Some US courts and academic critics have rejected the Restatement
(Second), Conflicts. 655 Nevertheless, many US federal courts have adopted a Restatement (Third)-style analysis for transnational litigation involving federallaw;656
these courts use analyses similar to the Restatement (Second), Conflicts or the Restatement (Third) for admiralty and maritime cases.657 Many US state courts use a
variant of the factorial approach, if they do not accept verbatim the Restatement
(Second), Conflicts. 658 Commentators and courts outside the United States have
been less hospitable to US courts' extraterritorial reach under formulas like theRestatements,659 but there has been a trend toward recognizing the effects doctrine in
all but name. 660
However that may be, the Restatement analysis proffered here is submitted in a
different context, i.e., conflict of different countries' public international law interests, the interests of international organizations in some situations, and the
interests of three different bodies of public international law, the LOS, environmental law and the LOAC. Moreover, as distinguished from the courtroom
context and its necessarily after-the-fact interest analysis that has generated opposition in some quarters to the Restatements' factorial approaches,661 this kind of
analysis can be a valuable planning tool before military operations662 and may, if
thoroughly and neutrally applied, be useful justification for the operation ifclaims
arise during or after execution. In this regard the proposed methodology as a planning device is more akin to US NEPA requirements663 or its Antitrust Guidelines.664 The latter note participation of other countries in multilateral and bilateral negotiation processes665 to avoid friction; this supports a view that this type of
planning has justification in internationallaw.666 There is indication that factorial analysis may be gaining acceptance, claims and commentators to the contrary
in other contexts notwithstanding,667 particularly in the LOS context.668

b. Method ofAnalysis. Rather than proceeding directly to a factorial analysis to
determine the due regard formula in a given context, as might seem to be
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recommended by the Restatement (Third), the first inquiry should be, by analogy to
Restatement (Second), Conflicts, whether positive norms govern the situation.669 If
so, those norms should control.
The first step is to determine whether UN Charter670 orjus cogens671 norms apply; if so, they should apply without regard to customary, treaty or general principles norms. An example is the inherent right ofself-defense.672 If Charter orjus
cogens based principles apply, they trump any due regard analysis unless, ofcourse,
the due regard principle is considered part of Charter law or jus cogens in a given
context.
Second, if a state of armed conflict does not exist as between contending
States,673 a balance must be struck between competing international law norms,
i.e., the LOS and the law of the maritime environment. If positive principles govern this interface, e.g., a coastal State's right to regulate innocent passage through
its territorial sea674 or perhaps a regional or global agreementto protect part of the
marine environment that lays down rules or standards,675 those norms, including
those recognized in custom or general principles, would govern without recourse
to a due regard formula. The analyst would employ the traditional factorial approach generally used for public international law issues to balance among these
primary and secondary or evidentiary sources.676 If the applicable law, usually in
treaty format, prescribes due regard for the marine environment, then the proposed due regard formula, or one like it, would be taken into account. Charter and
jus cogens norms would prevail over the balancing process.677 The only time that a
due regard formula would be employed in the absence of incorporation by either
the LOS or the law of the maritime environment would be where the two bodies of
law collide, and resolution cannot be had without a balancing process.
Ifan armed conflict situation exists, the same principles apply. IfLOAC principles explicitly take into account environmental claims during war, those principles must be applied. The LOS, as stated in the LOS conventions, declares that it is
subject to "other rules ofinternationallaw," i.e., the LOAC and its LONW component. 678 A traditional factorial analysis would be applied to sources of the LOAC
bearing on the issue. 679 This would include sources protecting the maritime environment during armed conflict, e.g., the ENMOD Convention.680 Applying a due
regard formula would have no place unless incorporated as part of the analysis of
stated sources oflaw.681 As with peacetime situations at sea, Charter andjus cogens
norms will trump principles based on traditional sources.682 As in the LOS-law of
marine environment context, due regard analysis would only be applied, absent
incorporation of due regard by positive law, where the LOAC and the law of the
marine environment directly conflict, and there can be no resolution without a
balancing process.
Belligerents must pay due regard to LOS rights of States not party to the conflict and have due regard for those States' marine environment rights and for the

544

The Tanker War

maritime environment.683 States not party to the conflict, i.e., neutrals and
nonbelligerents (if this status in international law exists)684 must pay due regard to
LOS rights of States not party to the conflict, and to such States' marine environment rights, and for the maritime environment, except insofar as the LOAC might
apply as between them and belligerents' claims.685 These States must do the same
with respect to belligerents' LOS and environmental rights, and the maritime environment. However, as stated for other scenarios,686 no due regard analysis would
be necessary if positive principles oflaw, e.g., the LOS, the law of the marine environment or the LOAC, require it, or if comparing these bodies of law produces a
conflict, and a more refined analysis must resolve the issue.687 Charter orjus cogens
norms will trump traditional sources and due regard analysis. 688
The reality of much of the foregoing is that, apart from Charter principles dealing with territorial integrity of States and the right of self-defense,689 little Charter
law will impact States' actions regarding environmentally-related issues unless the
Security Council issues a decision. 690 Jus cogens is an amorphous concept at best
and perhaps small in scope.691 Apart from the LOS conventions' due regard formulas,692 no declarations of that sort in positive law have been found in the LOAC
or, more specifically, the law of naval warfare; the law of the maritime environment apart from the LOS conventions; or the law of the marine environment during war. The only other major source is the San Remo Manual, itself a secondary or
evidentiary source693 although purporting to recite established law most of the
time. 694 There is a relatively wide potential for applying due regard (or reasonableness) principles in LOS-law of the marine environment interfaces, between
belligerents in a naval warfare context, or in relationships among States not party
to a conflict and belligerents.
c. The Content ofDue Regard; Factors to be Considered. The final issue is the
content of due regard, not discussed in the San Remo Manual. 695 Factors for the
content of due regard, or reasonableness, a nonexclusive enumeration might include these, based on Restatement (Third) § 403(2):
(a) Linkage ofa belligerent's activity to the jurisdiction or sovereignty ofa
State not party to a conflict, i.e., the extent to which belligerent activity takes
place within that State's jurisdiction or sovereignty, or is perceived at the
time to have substantial, direct and foreseeable effect on sovereign or jurisdictional interests of a State not party to a conflict;
(b) Connections, e.g., flag State of vessels or aircraft, nationality ofpersons
involved on e.g., offshore oil platforms or on vessels, or economic activity at
the time between a belligerent and a State not party to a conflict;
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(c) Character of the activity of a State not party to the conflict to be curtailed, regulated or eliminated; importance of that activity to that State; the
extent to which other States have curtailed, regulated or eliminated that activity in the past; and the degree to which desirability of such curtailment,
regulation or elimination is generally accepted by other States at the time;
(d) The extent of justified expectations, by States not party to a conflict
and other interests, e.g., shipping interests and their insurors, that might be
protected or affected by a belligerent's actions at the time;
(e) The importance at the time of a belligerent's action or interests of a
State not party to the conflict, to the international political, legal and/or economic systems;
(f) The extent to which a belligerent's action, or the response ofa State not
party to the conflict, is consistent at the time with traditions of the international system;
(g) The interest to which other States, or international governmental or
nongovernmental organizations, may have in acting in the situation at the
time;
(h) The likelihood of conflict with action by another State or an international governmental or nongovernmental organization at the time;
(i) The impact, from what is apparent at the time, that action by States,
whether belligerent or not party to a conflict, will have on other States' duties
or obligations with respect to the environment; and
(j) The impact, from what is apparent at the time, that action by States,
whether belligerent or not party to the conflict, will have on the environment
irrespective of any State's duties or obligations with respect to the environment. 696

This proposed enumeration contemplates an armed conflict situation involving a
State as a belligerent and therefore the LOS, the LOAC and its component the
LONW, and the law of the marine environment, are involved. However, the same
kind of analysis could be employed where contending States base claims solely on
the LOS and its interface with the law of the marine environment. Similarity ofinterests and factors considered for the latter situation becomes apparent when the
scenario of active intervention on the high seas to minimize pollution from a'leaking tanker, whether after a grounding or following attack during armed conflict, is
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considered. Assuming identical spillage in either case, the result for the environment will be the same unless action is taken, including anticipatory action. 697
The factorial list has a two-State analysis in mind. Given a possibility ofself-defense alliances,698 interactions of States not party to a conflict through regional organizations, e.g., those dealing with environmental problems, or more informal
arrangements, e.g., the Gulf War Coalition, probably many more than two States
will be involved in armed conflict situations, where LOS and law of the marine environment issues mix with law of naval warfare problems, or scenarios involving
the LOS and the law of the marine environment. For these circumstances, the law
of treaty reservations might be consulted for analogous analysis. 699
One critical refinement is inclusion of the phrase "at the time" in the analysis?OO Taken from declarations to Protocol I,7O! two Conventional Weapons Convention protocols and the Second Protocol to the Cultural Property Convention,7°2 and the San Remo Manual for naval warfare,7°3 the phrase would limit culpability to what is reasonably known to participants when decisions involving the
environment or others' LOS rights or responsibilities, and the LOAC if applicable, are taken. The same qualification should apply in self-defense situations;
planners or actors should be held accountable for what they knew or should have
known at the time ofdecision?04 Although the foregoing sources and the proposed
factorial analysis contemplate a war scenario, planners should not be liable for
more than they know, or with reasonable investigation should know, when only
the LOS and the law of the maritime environment apply.
d. Testing the Proposed Analysis. The Tanker War offers examples of how the
suggested factorial analysis might apply in future conflicts. With one exception,
the Iraqi attack on Iran's Nowruz facilities, situations taken from the Tanker War
are largely hypothetical because of the incomplete factual record related to environmental issues in other instances. Analysis follows the same nonexclusive list
proposed above. Three scenarios have been selected to illustrate how analysis
might proceed: (1) Charter law, i.e., self-defense, was involved in US responses to
attacks on its warships and other platforms, and attacks on US-flagged merchant
ships. (2) Belligerents' attacks on neutral shipping involved application of the
LOAC in an LOS context. (3) Iraq attacked Iran's Nowruz facilities, resulting in a
massive oil spill threatening fishing grounds, neutrals' desalination plants, and
possibly high seas navigation; the LOS, including LOS-based treaty law, and the
LOAC were involved in this situation as well.
i. US Self-Defense Responses Against Iranian Warships. If due regard for the
environment is part of the self-defense norm, the record seems fairly clear that US
responses against Iranian platforms involved no significant oil spillage. There
necessarily was spillage in connection with sinking or disabling attacking Iranian
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warships. Because the Charter, Articles 51 and 103, have no criteria beyond statements of the inherent right of self-defense and superiority of Charter law at least
over treaties,1°S the nonexclusive indicia listed above are considered,1°6 along
with other self-defense criteria, necessity and proportionality and, for anticipatory
self-defense, action that admits of no other alternative: 707
(a) There was definite linkage ofIranian activity to a State not party to the
conflict (the United States) when Iran began offensive naval operations
against US warships. Threatening to fire, or firing, weapons against another
country's men of war had a substantial, direct, foreseeable effect on that
country's (i.e., US) sovereign interests. Factor (a) clearly points to validity of
the US response. Since the attack occurred on the high seas, there were no environmental interests ofother States to consider, except insofar as the resulting slick from damaged or sunken ships might have impeded high seas
freedoms or have fouled their shores. There is no record of such, and in any
event Iran's action demanded immediate US response in anticipatory
self-defense.
(b) Connections to the flag were strong as to both actors: warships were involved, and this factor is evenly balanced.
(c) As to character and importance of the activity ofa State not party to a
conflict, the United States had an inherent right of unit self-defense; US
high seas freedom of navigation under the LOS was also at issue. Factor (c)
strongly supports the US action.
(d) Given Iran's record of attacking neutral merchantmen carrying cargoes not destined for Iraq, clear violations ofinternationallaw, and the near
certainty that these attacks would continue in the future, the balance of this
factor tips heavily in favor of the US action. Although leakage from damaged
warships could be expected to pollute the maritime environment, this could
be expected to be relatively slight compared with what could be expected if
Iran hit just one fully-loaded large tanker.
(e) It was vitally important that the United States assert the right of countries not party to the conflict to high seas freedom of navigation; it was important that the right ofself-defense be vindicated. It was also important that
economic interests ofocean carriers, their consignees and insurers, which lie
behind the freedom of the seas, be protected. Factor (e) weighs strongly in favor of the US action.
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(f) Iran's action was not, and the US response was, consistent with tradi-

tions ofthe international system.
(g) Other States, and international governmental organizations, had expressed their policies by that time; the Security Council had passed resolutions deploring these attacks, and other countries' navies were engaged in
actions to protect shipping?08
(h) There was no likelihood of conflict with other States or international
organizations' actions; if anything, the US action was in line with what Iran
might have expected if attacks on other countries' warships had occurred.
(i) The impact of US self-defense measures on other States' duties or obligations to the environment is not clear. The Iran-Iraq conflict ended soon afterward. This factor is neutral in application.
(j) The same is true with respect to what impact the US measures would
have on the environment irrespective of other States' duties or obligations to
the environment.

When these 10 nonexclusive factors are considered, it is relatively clear that environmental deprivation claims based on pollution from sunken or damaged Iranian
warships would have been countered with strong policy arguments under the
Charter and the LOS to justify US action and for finding that the United States observed due regard for other States' environmental interests and for the environment in its responses. If attacking Iranian warships had included a deep-draft
naval auxiliary tanker with potential for a large slick if damaged or sunk, naval
thinking and planning might have dictated different actions so long as US warships' fundamental security was assured?09 For example, if the tanker were not in
an immediate area of confrontation and was in the rear to replenish the Iranian destroyers, and it was otherwise militarily advantageous to remove the tanker from
further participation as part of self-defense measures, disabling fire as distinguished from destruction might have been ordered. Towing the disabled tanker
back to port might have had a salutorypolitical-military side effect of "delivering a
message" besides encouraging better law compliance.
ii. Belligerents' Attacks on Neutral Shipping. A second analysis from the
Tanker War may illuminate issues where there are no self-defense norms or other
Charter-based principles at stake. The record is not clear as to the extent of marine
pollution that accompanied Iranian and Iraqi attacks on neutral shipping. Ifit had
been considerable, and no treaty, e.g., the Kuwait Regional Convention and
Protocol710 or other customary standards were direcdy involved, either with
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respect to individual attacks or attacks taken as a whole, the 10-factor analysis
might proceed thus:
(a) Belligerents' activities had clear and devastating effect on other countries' sovereign or jurisdictional interests. In the case ofwarship, e.g., U.S.S.
Stark and U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts as noted in the first hypothetical, the only
States involved were the belligerents and the United States. In the case of
merchantmen, the issue is more complicated. To be sure, the law of the flag
from the law ofnaval warfare711 applied to the ships, buttherewere other significant interests involved, e.g., nationality of beneficial owners of vessels,
charterers, crew members, cargo owners, cargo consignees and insurers.712
Moreover, there were seafaring States' interests using the Gulf for navigation, fishing and other high seas rights and freedoms; and coastal States'
rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ, continental shelf, fishing zones, and territorial sea; and coastal States' interests in protecting desalination plants and
their coastal environment in general.
(b) The same sort of connections were at stake with respect to these States'
associations or economic activity. This is an example of the overlap of
factors.
(c) Freedom of navigation and high seas fishing without concern for environmental factors such as polluted seas that would force curtailment of naval
operations, diversion from regular shipping lanes or from some fishing
grounds; the right ofseafarers to pursue occupations in a clean environment;
the right of coastal States and their peoples to potable drinking water and a
clean environment; were all important interests.
(d) The interests in Factor (c) were justified in expectations for a clean environment, and these were affected by belligerent actions.
(e) The apparent justification of the attacks was to curtail shipment of
goods to finance opponents' war efforts and to intimidate other Persian Gulf
users. 713 On the other hand, interests of States not party to the conflict were
strong, based on the LOS.
(f) Iran and Iraq did not act consistently with traditions of the international system, including Charter principles such as those in Article 2(4), nor
did they behave consistently with well-established LOS rights of freedom of
navigation and fishing, or equally well-established LOAC principles. On the
other hand, States not party to the conflict were within their Charter rights
(e.g., the Article 51 inherent right of self-defense), the LOS, and the LOAC.
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This weighs strongly against the belligerents in terms ofsignificant environmental deprivations incident to their actions against Gulf shipping.
(g) Other States' interests, whether individually or in groups, in acting
has been described. 714 In addition, Council Resolutions 552 and 598 condemned these attacks in 1984 and 1987.715 Although these actions, individual and collective, by other States did not state environmental concerns, this
strong manifestation of interest would be weighed against belligerents for
any ensuing environmental damage.
(h) Based on the record summarized in Factor (g), there was little if any
conflict with actions by other States or international organizations at the
time.
(i) There was some potential for serious impact on coastal States' duties or
obligations with respect to the natural environment, e.g., obligations to protect their coastal areas or their obligation to provide potable water for their
peoples, livestock and plants.
(j) Finally, it may have been apparent, at the time, that these attacks, individually or taken as a whole, would have deleterious effects on the
environment.

In summary, if significant environmental degradations occurred in belligerent attacks on Gulf shipping during the Tanker War, and no norms based on treaties
such as the Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol had applied, evaluation under an expanded due regard analysis would have found the belligerents guilty of
not having given due regard to environmental considerations for this aspect of the
conflict. The factors would have weighed strongly against them.

iii. The Iraqi Attack on Iran's Nowruz Facilities. Analysis for the massive spill
in the wake ofIraqi attacks on Iran's Nowruz facilities was different in three respects: there was a definite threat to the high seas environment and to neutrals'
fishing grounds and desalination plants,716 the Security Council did not act, and
the Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol, treaties governing offshore pollution,717 were involved with respect to neutrals; they may have been suspended or
terminated between Iran and Iraq, and perhaps as to neutrals. 718 If the Convention
and Protocol did not apply because oftreaty termination or suspension factors, any
custom, perhaps based on the treaty or the general LOS, continued to apply.719
The 10-factor due regard analysis might proceed thus:
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(a) Although N owruz was an Iranian facility and subject to Iranian sovereignty, the Iraqi attacks had clear linkage to States not party to the conflict
through threats to their fishing interests, desalination plants and high seas
freedom of navigation and other LOS rights. Whether Iraq could have
known at the time that its attacks would result in substantial, direct and foreseeable effects is not known, but there is almost a conclusive presumption
thatIraq as a major oil-producing country knew, or should have known at the
time, that its attacks would likely have some or all of these effects. This factor
weighs heavily against Iraq.
(b) There was a connection between Iraq and neutrals, i.e., at least the customary LOS and perhaps the Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol ifit
continued to apply. This cuts against Iraq.
(c) As in the case of high seas attacks on neutral shipping, there were very
important interests of neutrals involved, including interests in having potable water and a source of food (fish), laying aside the additional right of neutrals to trade with Iran at the terminal. Although the Security Council did
not act, the record indicates that neutrals, e.g., the United States, expressed
concern and may have tried to help curtail the spill. This factor weighs
against Iraq.
(d) Neutrals' justified expectations were as high at the time of the Nowruz
attacks as when their merchantmen were attacked on the high seas. This factor weighs against Iraq.
(e) As in the second scenario, neutrals' interests were high in being able to
exercise freedom of navigation, to feed their peoples, and to have sufficient
drinking water. On the other hand, depriving Iran ofNowruz, a legitimate
target under the LOAC, was very important to Iraq. Without having the full
facts for Iraq's or neutrals' positions, this factor is even in strength of
policies.
(f) Iraq's actions, and neutrals' reactions, were both consistent at the time
with traditions of the international system. In terms of factorial analysis,
Iraqi sovereign interests in prosecuting its war effort was very strong; it was a
total war for the belligerents.

(g) Other States had interests in acting in the situation at the time. Besides
loss of an opportunity for legitimate trade at N owruz, neutrals had interests
in freedom of navigation in the Gulf, feeding their peoples, and preserving
their water supplies, all threatened by the result ofIraqi attacks. There was
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no official IGO or NGO action with respect to the attack. Nevertheless, this
factor inclines toward the neutrals.
(h) Apart from Iran's attempts to defend N owruz, at the time of the attack
there seemed to be little likelihood of conflict with actions taken by another
State or an international organization, although the Security Councilor
other international organization could have reacted to the attacks. This factor favors Iraq.
(i) Iraq's action had strong impact on other States' duties or obligations
with respect to the environment, particularly those States' coastal environment. This factor cuts against Iraq.
(j) There was no impact, apparent at the time, of other States' action that
would have involved the environment.

Thus under the 1O-factor analysis two factors favor Iraq (f, h), six would oppose the
Iraqi action (a, b, c, d, g, i), and two (e, j) were neutral. A nose-count vote would say
that Iraqi action was unlawful under a due regard standard. However, as noted in
the first two scenarios, the relative strengths of each policy must be considered.
Here too the interest in a clean, safe Gulf environment outweighs the perceived advantages Iraq had in successfully attacking Nowruz. Seen as a proportionality
analysis under the LOAC, the attack was not proportionate when environmental
factors are taken into account. 720
e. Conclusions. The foregoing analysis is quite tentative; the Restatement-based
factors are not exclusive in enumeration and are submitted as a first brief to assist
in solving issues made more knotty by confluence offour bodies oflaw: oceans law
as stated in the LOS Convention with its major contribution of guiding principles
with respect to the martime environment; international environmental law, relatively in its infancy and incorporated in part in the Convention; the LOAC and
particularly the law of naval warfare, most of which is customary and which is incorporated in the LOS Convention, its predecessors and parallel customary
norms, through the other rules clauses; charter law. Further thinking might apply
this methodology to other events of the Tanker War or to other armed conflict situations, particularly when concrete facts related to environmental conditions are
available. In any event, multifactor analysis, already a feature of modern military
planning, should take environmental concerns into account.721
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Part C. General Conclusions and Projections for the Future
Ocean pollution is not a new phenomenon, nor has been the attempt to prevent
it through international agreements and customary law. Oil largely replaced sail
and coal as the propellant of choice for oceangoing vessels, and navies also became
dependent on it early in this century. The motor vehicle and aircraft became the
transportation of choice on land, and transoceanic flights were harbingers of the
future. The world's largest oil reserves were discovered in the Middle East. During
World War II the lifeblood of the combatants was petroleum, not only to fire ships'
boilers but to propel aircraft and increasingly mobile armies and to lubricate the
sinews of mechanized armed forces.
Since World War II, however, a veritable explosion in use of petroleum has occurred. Although nuclear power has replaced oil for some warships, petroleum remains the primary fuel for most navies, including countries with nuclear-powered
warships, e.g., China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Motor vehicle use and numbers have grown exponentially worldwide. Airlines
have absorbed much of overland mass transit demands and have largely replaced
ocean liners, except for the cruise line industry, for transoceanic travel. To satisfy
this demand, steamship companies have built ever larger tankers, not necessarily
more of them, to transport oil more cheaply in bulk. Although pipelines frequently
carry oil across national borders, they must stop at the water's edge or perhaps offshore terminals built to accommodate huge tankers. Other types of merchant ships
have also grown larger in tonnage, and the cargoes they carry sometimes include
consignments as toxic to the environment as before the Second World War but are
greater in relative size. The result is that each accident, incident of negligent navigation or attack by belligerents can result in more massive pollution than before
the War, when typical tankers ranged between 5,000 and 10,000 tons displacement. 722 The same is true to a lesser extent for warships, which have also grown in
size and therefore voracity and capacity for fuel, and the supply trains accompanying mobile task forces also include larger supply tankers. The result, as in the case
of negligent navigation or accidents that befall merchant tankers, is a potential for
larger slicks from damaged or sunken ships of war.
The law applicable to the ocean environment has also grown in size and complexity. While agreements concluded early in this century occasionally attempted
to regulate oil pollution at sea, more often than not treaties tried to deal with principles, e.g., SOLAS or COLREGS, which, if observed, would contribute to a cleaner
environment. Since ratification of the Charter in 1945, however, there has been a
sea change in environmental regulation. The old themes, represented by newer
SOLAS and COLREGS versions, continued, but multilateral treaty responses to
maritime disasters as they occurred, e.g., losses ofAmoco Cadiz and Torrey Canyon,
began to promote environmental controls. The 1958 LOS conventions
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represented a parallel development, restating in international agreements major
components of the law of the sea, until then largely customary in format. The UN
General Assembly began promoting a cleaner environment through nonbinding
resolutions, particularly those resulting from the 1972 Stockholm Conference, and
since then the UN Environmental Programme has promoted negotiation and ratification of many regional agreements for protection of the maritime environment.
The 1958 conventions and regional environmental treaties preserved longstanding customary norms in most cases, e.g., immunity of warships, naval auxiliaries,
State vessels on noncommercial service, and State aircraft, or crystallized new customary norms, e.g., the continental shelf. The 1958 conventions' other rules
clauses declared that these treaties were subject to the LOAC and its law of naval
warfare component in appropriate situations. The Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties recognized traditional grounds for treaty suspension or termination,
impossibility or fundamental change of circumstances but did not include rules
for suspension or termination during armed conflict, the latter being left to customary norms.723
A major watershed came in 1982 with the LOS Convention, which went into
force in 1994, and which has found increasing acceptance by ratifications and accessions since. Besides consolidating terms of the 1958 LOS conventions, much of
which had become customary law by then, the 1982 LOS Convention recognized
and regularized rules for innocent passage, straits passage, the EEZ (now a customary norm), the continental shelf and archipelagic waters while expanding the permissible reach of a territorial sea to 12, and a contiguous zone to 24, miles. The
Convention's major innovations were rules for the deep seabed through terms establishing and governing the Area, and many provisions, including Part XII, to
regulate the maritime environment. Countries such as the United States that have
not ratified the Convention have recognized the customary nature of its navigational articles and therefore many provisions affecting the maritime environment
encased within these terms. Much of Part XII of the Convention, the principal repository of environmental principles, repeats custom and is not innovative. The
same is true of other Convention provisions; the principle of immunity for warships, naval auxiliaries, government ships on noncommercial service, and State
aircraft is repeated, as is the other rules concept.724
The LOAC as it relates to the environment has followed a similar pattern. The
1907 Hague Conventions, and before them the 1899 conventions, provided for
protecting historic monuments, universities, etc., not connected with conflict,
thereby codifying custom in some cases. Today many more Hague principles are
customary norms binding all States. These agreements did not articulate environmental concerns any more than the first treaties governing navigation or safety at
sea, but their effect, if observed, protects the environment. This trend continued
through the mid-Twentieth Century with development of customary norms and
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agreements, some of which limited or forbade means of warfare, observance of
which promotes environmental protection (e.g., the Geneva Gas Protocol); or further protected areas, objects or classes of persons (e.g., the Roerich Pact, Hague
Cultural Property Convention, Genocide Convention, and 1949 Geneva Conventions, particularly the Fourth Convention), which also contribute to environmental protection ifobserved during war. Most of these treaties affected land warfare or
aerial bombardment, perhaps from the sea. For the most part, the law of naval warfare has remained customary in nature. 725
Several developments late in the Twentieth Century pointed toward direct interest in regulating naval warfare as it relates to the environment, however. Protocol I includes provisions related to environmental protection, stated generally and
perhaps not yet customary in nature, and the ENMOD Convention, probably accepted as custom today, relates directly to the oceans environment. Protocol I and
the Conventional Weapons Convention and its protocols restate customary principles applying to all warfare: discrimination, proportionality and necessity, and
Navies began revising their operational law manuals to reflect these LOAC developments as well as the LOS, chief among them NWP 9, and its successor, NWP
I-14M. In 1995 the San Remo Manual, the first compilation of rules of naval warfare since the 1913 Oxford Naval Manual, included environmental protections during war at sea and advanced a concept of requiring belligerents to have due regard
for the environment and due regard for obligations and rights of States not party to
the conflict with respect to the law of the sea. These ideas were taken from the LOS
conventions' due 'regard principles. The ICRC Guidelines (1994) andNWP I-14M
(1997) also publish principles for environmental protection during war.1 26
The Manual did not expand on the due regard principle. A principal focus of
this Chapter has been to advocate that due regard principles governing relationships between the LOS and the LOAC, and the LOAC and the law of the marine
environment, should be considered together and not seriatim or separately. Due regard should be defined through a factorial approach similar to those used in the
American Law Institute's Conflict of Laws (Second) and Foreign Relations Law
(Third) Restatements, unless there are positive rules of law from the Charter, jus
cogens or sources such as treaties or custom establishing a standard.727
The UN Charter, and development oflaw under it, has been another phenomenon of the second half of this century. This can have major implications for the
LOS and the law of the marine environment, and the LOAC. After a Cold War hiatus since 1950, use of Security Council decisions binding UN Members under Articles 25 and 48 has been revived, particularly with respect to the 1990-91 Gulf
War. Council and General Assembly resolutions may also be non-binding in nature, i.e., as calls for action or recommendations, but they can restate and therefore
strengthen other sources oflaw, e.g., custom or treaties. This process was used during the Tanker War when Council resolutions condemned attacks on merchant
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shipping. Council resolutions also superseded the traditional law. The Gulf War
also marked the first time that the Council specifically condemned a country, Iraq,
for environmental pollution and held it liable for damages. Other recent crises and
conflicts, e.g., the 1990-91 GulfWar728 and crises in the former Yugoslavia729 and
Haiti730 have also been influenced by Council resolutions, some binding and some
hortatory. The Assembly has a long and strong record of activity related to environmental protection and the LOAC, the 1972 Stockholm Conference being a watershed. Assembly resolutions are nonbindingper se, but they can restate custom or
treaty norms or influence later primary sources. This has been apparent in, e.g., the
1982 LOS Convention and treaties stating rules for armed conflict.
Besides the Council and Assembly, UN specialized agencies, such as IMO,
which sponsors environment-protective treaties for oceans travel and safety, and
nongovernmental agencies, e.g., the ICRC, sponsor of the Geneva Conventions
and their Protocols, have contributed significantly to the legal milieu.
Yet another phenomenon since the end of World War II has been a worldwide
communications and media revolution, particularly the use of television, and increased attention of national and worldwide publics on the environment. There is
also near real-time coverage ofwars?31 Worldwide use of the Internet promises
even more intense public interest in environmental affairs and armed conflict.
The US Congress passed NEPA in 1972, and there has be~n a flood of more specialized national environmental legislation since then, much ofit related to the condition of the oceans.732 As this practice becomes more worldwide, these national
statutes can also contribute to customary standards. Media war coverage has
grown too, beginning with the Viet Nam conflict. As yet technical capacity and
shipboard space and security have limited media reporting of ongoing environmental casualties at sea, especially during armed conflict, which is usually a matter
of minutes, not days, as in the case of land warfare. There is little room aboard
smaller naval vessels, e.g., for media passengers, and during the Tanker War standard US NOTAMs and NOTMARs warned away vessels and aircraft (which
might have been hired by media looking for a story) because of the risk of suicide
attacks on US warships. One result has been lack of public sources to assess the nature of environmental disasters at sea; often these are locked in classified government files or reports, other unpublished sources, e.g., arbitrations or otherwise
unreported litigation results because of lawyer-client privilege related to private-party litigation or the national security exception to evidence disclosure, or in
private company files. Moreover, in earlier instances massive pollution might occur, but media focus was on other aspects of the tragedy, a recent example being
merchant ships attacked during the Tanker War. There were print reports and occasional television sound bites of flaming ships and dying merchant sailors, but
there was no statement of the extent of pollution. Even the Nowruz oil spill received only scant attention. Whether this will change in the future is a matter of
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technology, national security, the rules of evidence and interest of readers, viewers
or Internet users.
If the impact of media coverage and public interest in pollution at sea, whether
from merchant ship accidents or negligent navigation, oil pumping blowouts, or
the result of conflict, is conjectural, there are other factors that must be considered
for the future.

1. The Proliferation ofPlayers
Although planners have been aware of the possible impact of Council decisions
and the influence of other Council resolutions or those of the Assembly, and of the
ICRC promotion of the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, there is also a
wide range of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations
that are or would be connected with the law of the sea, the international law of the
environment, and the law of armed conflict. These range from IMO, a UN specialized agency; regional organizations of countries such as those party to the Kuwait
Regional Convention and its Protocol; the UN Environment Programme, sponsor
of such agreements; Greenpeace, an environmental advocacy group that has urged
a fifth Geneva Convention to protect the environment; to the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, which sponsored the San Remo Manual. Some of these,
e.g., IMO, can develop rules binding on member countries like the United States.
All can produce policy documents and rules that may influence development of
custom or treaties in the fluid legal environment. There are comparable groups
within countries, such as the Maritime Law Association within the United States,
analogous to the American Bar Association, composed of maritime lawyers, judges
and academics and linked to the Comite Maritime Internationale in Brussels, Belgium, which sponsors treaties related to maritime law, or the Sierra Club, a
US-based environmental advocacy group.
A recent phenomenon has been another spurt in newly independent States, primarily in Europe, matching the post-World War II decolonization movement.
This may promote controversy because of the amorphous law of treaty succession.133 Moreover, to the extent these countries have coastlines and navies and
therefore interests in the LOS, the law of the maritime environment and the law of
naval warfare, there is a potential for further uncertainty in these subjects because
they may not have sorted out policies on these complex matters. This is one reason
why the time is not ripe for a treaty on the environment during war.1 34
The sheer number of States today (there are over 180 UN Members, ranging
from tiny Andorra, Liechtenstein and San Marino to powerful giants like China,
Russia and the United States), when coupled with the development of regional
agreements and perhaps varied custom around the world, raises the further problem of unanimity within the context of a particular military operation. For example, during the 1990-91 Gulf War, some States were parties to Protocol I; others,
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e.g., the United States, were not. This meant that Protocol standards could be applied only as custom. While that issue seems to have been resolved for that short
conflict, the problem of different national or regional views and practices as to
three intertwined bodies oflaw, the LOS, environmental law, and the LOAC, remains. Even if the law is the same on paper, how it is interpreted or practiced in the
multinational context may provoke questions. Military planners must consider
these factors in drafting clear, workable ROE for each operation.

2. The Right to a Clean Environment as a Human Right
Although not mentioned specifically in worldwide735 or regionae36 human
rights conventions as such, commentators have urged recognizing a decent environment as a human rights norm?37 That trend is in its infancy; how it will develop,
perhaps as customary law,738 is not clear. International Labor Organization conventions concerned with a safe, healthful workplace739 arguably could be seen as
requiring a safe, healthful labor environment, even as European Union law, whose
general policy has been creating a common labor market, has been held to require
equal pay for women?40
If this trend becomes law, the next issue is the relationship of human rights
norms to the LOAC. Humanitarian law, whether grounded in treaties or other
sources, applies during armed conflict?41 Its requirements may differ significantly from those of human rights law. Some human rights conventions, e.g., the
Civil and Political Rights Covenant, include derogation clauses limiting their
scope to core rights during "time of public emergency.,,742 Others may not?43
While all human rights conventions are subject to Charter law,jus cogens norms
and principles of the law of treaties, e.g., impossibility, fundamental change of circumstances and armed conflict, there is the problem of a human right seen as ajus
cogens norm balanced against Charter norms such as Article 51's right of self-defense, perhaps also recognized as ajus cogens norm. If a convention-based human
rights norm ascends tojus cogens status, treaty suspension rules cannot apply. This
could have important ramifications for applying humanitarian law and the law of
naval warfare, whether in treaty or customary format, during armed conflict?44
Some countries, e.g., the United States, may not be party to as many human
rights agreements as other nations, some of which may have incorporated human
rights norms into their national constitutions, thereby binding them to these standards in practice. There may be issues ofconflicting norms among regional treaties,
a problem mostly eliminated for environmental law because of terms' commonality in UNEP-sponsored treaties for the most part.
In any event, planners must be aware of a potential for human rights violation
claims by opponents, or conditioning of responses by allies or coalition partners
due to national human rights commitments. If a right to a safe, healthful
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environment becomes a human right, another factor must be added to a decision
matrix for conducting naval operations and naval warfare?45

3. The Carryover ofLand Warfare Concepts, Particularly from Protocol I
Some provisions of Protocol I and the Conventional Weapons Convention and
its Protocols, restate custom applying to all modalities of warfare, e.g., discrimination, necessity and proportionality, although there may be disputes as to definition
or scope of custom. However, there has been a trend, rejected by some commentators, to incorporate more of these treaties' norms into the law of naval warfare. 746
There is always a possibility of a reversal of direction.
4. A New Treaty to Protect the Environment During Armed Conflict?
During and after the Gulf War, there were calls from commentators and within
the United Nations for a new international agreement directed toward protecting
the environment during armed conflict. The ICRC advocated rejection of such a
move, stating that the problem was not so much lack oflaw, but lack ofobservation
and enforcement. Ultimately the United Nations took no action. 747 The ICRC was
correct, as this Chapter demonstrates with respect to the law of the sea and the law
of naval warfare as related to environmental protection. However, if there are wars
in the future with significant environmental damage, whether covered by existing
law or not, there may be further calls for another treaty if there is no enforcement
against perpetrators of military or other actions degrading the environment. A
principal factor here is availability ofa veto-free Security Council as one vehic1efor
meaningful action.

s.

Final Thoughts
This Chapter demonstrates that the environmental protection factor is a real issue for those who plan naval operations in peace and in war today and in the foreseeable future. While there are few bright navigational beacons to guide the way in
terms ofapplicable law during armed conflict at sea, there is also a real opportunity
to develop workable norms to assure maximum permissible use of the Earth's
oceans, protect the maritime environment, and security to countries through lawful use of force at sea. Perhaps the factorial approach this Chapter suggests for according due regard to environmental concerns is a step in that direction.
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environment" in UN Committees and in the LOS Convention drafting. Introduction, '11 XlI.11, 4 Nordquist 8-9;
REsTATEMENT (THIRD), Part VI, Introductory NOle, at 99; ieI. § 602, r.n.l; see also BIRNIE & BOYLE 39-53; Petsonik, n.
II.62, 351. The Conference Report (Stockholm Conference Report) included a Declaration on the Human
Environment (Stockholm Declaration), with 26 Principles, an Action Plan for the Human Environment, and various
resolutions. See 11 ILM 1416 (1972). Principle 6 states in part that "[D]ischarge oftoxic .•. or other substances and the
release of heat in such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the environment to render them
harmless, must be halted ... to ensure that serious or irreversible damage is not inflicted on ecosystems." Principle 7
declares that "States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances ... liable to create
hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other
legitimate uses ofthe sea ••• "Principle 21 says States must achieve a balance between exploiting their resources and
responsibility so that c.xploitation does not harm others' environments:
States have, in accordance with the [UN Charter] and the principles ofinternational1aw, the sovereign right
to c.xploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment ofother States orof
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction[,]

i.e., the high seas. Principle 22 would require "States [to] co-operate to develop further the internationa1law regarding
liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within
their jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction...•" Principle 26 protested against
nuclear weapons, and other weapons ofmass destruction, with a plea for agreements to eliminate and destroy them. leI.
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at 1418, 1420-21. United Nations Environmental Programme Participation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-188, § 2,87
Stat. 713, declared US Congressional policy "to participate in coordinating efforts to solve environmental problems of
global and international concern ...." G.A. Res. 3281, Charrero/Ec01UJmic Rights andDulieso/Slales, arts. 29-30, in 14
ILM 251 (1975) reiterated nations' duties to use the sea for peaceful purposes to preserve the environmenL These
resolutions, unless they restate customary or treaty law, do not bind U.N. Members. UN Charter, arts. 10, 14; see also n.
IV.57 and accompanying texL
54. Kuwait Regional Convention, n. 11.63; Kuwait Protocol, n. 11.63. All countries bordering the Persian Gulf
were parties: Baharain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE. See n. 11.64 and accompanying tcxt. A
related Protocol on Pollution Resulting from Exploration & Exploitation of the Continental Shelf, Mar. 29, 1989, has
been signed. BROWN 355-56.
55. Convention for Conservation of the Red Sea & Gulf of Aden Environment, Feb. 14, 1982, in 2 WALLACE 2282
(Red Sea Convention); Protocol Concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil & Other Harmful
Substances in Cases of Emergency, Feb. 14, 1982 (Red Sea Protocol), in id. 2293. Signatories include]ordan, Palestine
Liberation Organization for Palestine, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan and
Yemen Arab Republic, all bordering the Red Sea and GulfofAden; any Arab League member can accede to iL Red Sea
Convention, preamble, art. 26(2), id. 2282,2291.

56. See nn. 11.264, 384 and accompanying text.
57. E.g., Kuwait Regional Convention, n. 11.63, arts. 16-18, 1140 UNTS 159-60; Kuwait Protocol, n. 11.63, arts. 3,
5-13, id. 202-06; Red Sea Convention, n. 55, arts. 16-20,22, 24, 2 WALLACE 2287-90; Red Sea Protocol, n. 55, arts. 3,
5-13, id. 2295-98. Another recent example, involving US participation, is an agreement package governing protection
of the South Pacific Ocean. Convention for Protection of Natural Resources & Environment of the South Pacific
Region, Nov. 24, 1986, in 26 ILM 38 (1986); Protocol for Prevention of Pollution of the South Pacific Region by
Dumping, Nov_ 24, 1986, in id. 65 (1986); Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution Emergencies in
the South Pacific Region, Nov. 24, 1986, in id. 59 (1986); see also US understanding, S. Treaty Doc. 101-21,53.
58. See, e.g., LOS Convention, arts. 23,39,41(5), 43(a), 94(4)(c), 94(5), 197, 200-02, 207-12, 217, 221-22, 303; see
also 5 Nordquist 1111 311.8.m, 311.11.
59. Vienna Convention, preamble, arts. 38, 43; see also ICJ Statute arts. 38,59; REsTATEMENT (fHIRD) §§ 102-03;

see also n. 111.10 and accompanying text.
60. Nicaragua Case, 1986 IC] 31-38, 91-135; Corfu Channel, 1949 IC] 22; see also n. III.I0andaccompanyingtexL
61. Akehurst, n. IV.56, 49-52. LOS Convention, arL 221(1) seems to anticipate this possibility for proportionate
anticipatory action to ward off pollution threats. ld., arL 310 provides:
Article 309 does not preclude a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, from making
declarations or statements, however phrased or named, with a view, inter alia, to the harmonization ofits laws
and regulations with .. _ this Convention, provided that such declarations or statements do not purport to
exclude or to modify the legal effect of ... this Convention in [its] application to that State.
Art_ 309 forbids reservations or exceptions to the Convention and is the reason for the agreement to amend the
Convention, Part XI. See n. IV.3 and accompanying texL Such statements, taken collectively, arguably could
articulate custom apart from the Convention. However, occasional presence of clear, contradictory authorizations for
custom, e.g., LOS Convention, arL 221(1), plus "obscurity and uncertainty" of arL 310's meaning, cf. 5 Nordquist 11
310.5, suggest custom and other sources can be considered alongside Convention norms. This is true for the largely
customary law of naval warfare, which enters through LOS Convention' other rules clauses, with which the LOS
Convention and the 1958 LOS conventions are replete. See, e.g., LOS Convention, arL 87(1); High Seas Convention,
arL 2; see also nn. 111.952-67, IV.IO-25 and accompanying texL
62. UN Members must comply with Security Council decisions under UN Charter, arts. 25,48; these supersede
treaty obligations. ld., art. 103. The Councilor the General Assembly may also recommend action or call upon States
for action pursuant to id., arts. 10,14,39-41, but these resolutions do not have the binding force of decisions, but they
may restate custom or treaty norms and thereby strengthen them. See n. IV.57 and accompanying text; Part B.1.

63. :Jus cogens theorizes a fundamental norm overrides rules in treaties and custom, two primary sources of
international law stated in, e.g., IC] Statute, arts. 38, 59; REsTATEMENT(THlRD) §§ 102-03. Its contours are vague and
depend on commentators' views, ranging from expansive (e.g., those of the former USSR, whose jurisprudence may
still have influence) to totally deprecatory. See n. 111.10 and accompanying text. National sovereignty is a competing
factor. If UN Members give up freedom to make treaties to the measure of UN Charter, arL 103, that does not
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necessarily mean they gave up a sovereign right to build custom that may contradict a treaty norm. See, e.g., id., arts.
2(1),2(7); LOS Convention, art. 157(3); nn. IIUO and accompanying text.

64. Compare, e.g., LOS Convention, preamble, arts. 2(3) (territorial sea), 19, 21, 31 (innocent passage), 34(2)
(straits transit passage), 45 (straits innocent passage, incorporation by reference of arts. 19,21,31),52(1) (archipelagic
sea lanes passage), 58(1), 58(3) (EEZs), 78(2) (continental shelf; coastal State cannot infringe or interfere with
"navigation and other rights and freedoms ofother States as provided in this Convention"), 87(1) (high seas), 138 (the
Area), 303(4) (archaeological, historical objects found at sea; "other international agreements and rules of
international law regarding the protection of objects of an archaeological and historical nature"), with, e.g., High Seas
Convention, art. 2; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 1. Although two 1958 conventions do not have other rules clauses,
they state that they do not affect status of waters above as high seas in the case of the continental shelf, or other high
seas rights in the case ofhigh seas fisheries. Continental ShelfConvention, arts. 1, 3; Fishery Convention, arts. 1·8, 13.
65. For citations to these conclusions, recited in this Chapter for the reader's convenience but previously
analyzed in Chapters III and V,see nn.III.lO, 952-67, IV.IO-34 and accompanying text. Citations in this Chapter are
limited to necessary primary sources.
66. ILC Report, n.lIl, 192, 267-68. A few commentators miss the point, but those who say the other rules clauses
mean the LOAC are in the majority. See also nn. III.955-56 and accompanying te.xt.
67. LOS Convention, art. 88. Area use is reserved for peaceful purposes; marine scientific research must be
conducted for peaceful purposes.ld., arts. 141, 143(1), 147(2)(d), ISS, 240(a),242(1), 246(3). See also nn.III.956, IV.15
and accompanying te.xt.
6S. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 521, cmt. b, citing UN Charter, art. 2(4); LOS Convention, arts. 88, 301; referring to
REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 90S, cmt. g; see also nn. 111.958, IV.16 and accompanying text.
69. UN Charter, art. 103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text; Part B.!.

70. Sec nn.III.957-60, IV.15-18 and accompanying te.xt.
71. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51, 103; see also S. Doc. 103-39, n.IV.3, 51. There is a debate on whether anticipatory
self-defense, as opposed to "reactive" self-defense, where an aggressor strikes the first blow, is permitted in the Charter
era. The US view,supported by many commentators, is that anticipatory self-defense is permissible in the Charter era.
Iran and the USSR had the opposite view. See generally Chapter III and Part B.!.

72. See nn. IV.16, 67 and accompanying te.Xt; Part V.F.
73. Cf. nn. 12-14,21-22 and accompanying text.

74. E.g., 1969 Civil Liability Convention, art. 3(1). ICAO Convention, art. 89 says it does not affect parties'
freedom of action during war and for a state of emergency if the country declaring the emergency notifies ICAO. See
also n.IV.20 and accompanying te.xt.

75. E.g., 1954 Oil Pollution Convention, art. 19; Treaty of Rome, n. II1.819, arts. 223-26, 298 UNTS 88-89;seealso
n.IV.21 and accompanying te.xt.
76. NAFTA, n.III.949, art. 2204, in 32 ILM 702 (1993). NAFTA has many environmental protection provisions.
NAFTA, arts. 104, 709-24, 901-15,1101,1114,2005,2014-15,2101, id. 297-98,377-83,386-92,639,642,694-97,699,
analyzed in DANIEI.liAGRAW, NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS ch. 1 (1995); Stewart A. Baker,
After the NAFTA, 27 INrI. LAW. 765, 769 (1993); Jack I. Garvey, Trade Law and Quali!Y ofLife -Dispute Resolution
UnderthcNAFTA Side Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89 AJIL439 (1995); Raymond B. Ludwiszewski, "Green"
Language In the NAFTA: Reconciling Free Trade and Environmental Protection, 27 INrI. LAW. 691 (1993); Richard B.
Stewart, The NAFTA: Trade, Competition, Environmental Protection, id. 751 (1993). NAFTA has a national security
e.xception, stating inter alia that nothing in NAFTA may be construed to prevent a party from taking actions it
considers necessary to protect its "essential security interests," during war or other emergency in international
relations, or to prevent a party from acting pursuant to its Charter obligations for maintaining international peace and
security. NAFTA, arts. 2102(1)(b)-2102(c), 321LM 699-700. See also nn. 111.949, IV.22 and accompanying text.

77. E.g., Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol, n. II.63; Red Sea Convention and Protocol, n. 55.
78. High Seas Convention, preamble; see also nn.1I1.962, IV.24 and accompanying text. The LOS Convention's
navigational articles also reflect custom. See nn.1I1.963 and accompanying text; Chapter IV.
79. IC] Statute, arts. 38, 59; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102-03; see also n. III.I0 and accompanying text.
80. Vienna Convention, art. 61; see also nn. 11I.92S, IV.26 and accompanying text.
Sl. Vienna Convention, art. 62,see also nn.III.929, IV.27 and accompanying text.
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82. See nn. 111.930, 1V.28 and accompanying text.
83. See nn. II1.938-51, IV.29 and accompanying text.

84. See nn. 111.948, 1V.30 and accompanying text.
85. UN Charter, art. 2(2); Vienna Convention, art. 26; see also nn. III.934, 1V.31 and accompanying text.
86. Vienna Convention, art. 18; see also n. 1V.32, 60, VI.45 and accompanying text.

87. See Symposium, State Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
88. 1CJ Statute, arts. 38,59; REsTATEAIENT (THIRD) §§ 102-03; see also n. 111.10 and accompanying text.
89. High Seas Convention, preamble. The LOS Convention navigational articles are also said to reflect custom;
these have numerous other rules clauses. See n. 78 and accompanying text.
90. "In at least one respect [its terms] are more restrictive than customary international law, namely in the case of
the territorial sea." 2 O'CoNNELL, LAw OF THE SEA 994; see also Charney, The Marine Environment, n. IV.49, 887.
91. S. Doc. 103-39, n. 1V.3, 19.

92. E.g., LOS Convention, am. 1(1)(4)-1(1)(5),21,23,39,41,43,54, 56(1)(bXiii), 60(3), 63, 66-67, 94(7), 116,
123(b), 145-47, 155(2), 162, 165.
93. LOS Convention, art. 192; compare Stockholm Declaration, n. 53, Principle 7,11 ILM 1418 (1972); see also 4
Nordquist 36-43. The US Department of Defense and the US Navy view Convention art. 236 and Part XII "as a
mandate to ensure responsibility for environmentally sound practices." WilliamJ. Schachte, Jr., The Value ofthe 1982
UN Convention on the lAw ofthe Sea: Preserving Our Freedoms andProteCling the Environment, 23 ODIL 55, 61 (1992). See
also NWP I-14M Annotated118.5.1; nn.19-20 and accompanying text; Part B.2.
94. See generally 2 Nordquist 11 1.23, arguing for an evolving conceptual definition; 4 id. 'II 192.11(a); Daniel
Tolbert, Defining the Environment, in ENVRONMENTAL PROTECTION, n. 2, 259.

95. S. Doc. 103-29, n. IV.3, 19.
96. LOS Convention, art.l(I)(4); 2 Nordquist 11111.1-1.15,1.22-1.24,1.26-1.31. The LOS Convention definition
means the environment is human and nature centered. See Tolbert, n. 94, 259.
97. LOS Convention, art. 193; compare Stockholm Declaration,n. 53,Principle 12, 11 ILM 1419 (1972); see also 4
Nordquist 45-49. Jose Luis Vallarta,Protection and Preservation ofthe Marine Environment and Marine Scientific Research
at the Third United Nations Conference on the lAw of the Sea, in Symposium, The lAw of the Sea: Where Now, 46 L. &
CONTEMI'. PROBS. 146, 149 (1983) said the duty to preserve and protect the environment is ajus cogens norm. See also nn.
111.10, VI.63 and accompanying text.
98. This part of the LOS Convention does not state "significant" as part of the duty, but other LOS Convention
provisions, regional agreements, and commentators have added terms like "major," "serious," "significant" or
"substantial." E.g., LOS Convention, arts. 94(7), 233; Kuwait Protocol, n. 11.63, art. 1(2), 1140 UNTS 201; Red Sea
Protocol, n. 55, art. 1(2),2 WALLACE 2294; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 601(I)(b)-601(3), 603(1)(a), 603(2); Low &
Hodgkinson, n. 2, 422-23. Such sources, combined, can evidence custom. BROWNUE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1
OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3).
99. LOS Convention, art. 194(1); see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 603(2). The "prevention" theme was partly
derived from High Seas Convention, arts. 24-25, and limitation to "capabilities" from Stockholm Declaration, n. 53,
Principle 7, 11 ILM 1418 (1972). 4 Nordquist 1111 194.1, 194.1O(b). Diligent prevention and control are probably
binding norms. Cf. BIRNIE & BOYLE 95.
100. LOS Convention, art. 194(2); REsTATEAIENT (THIRD) §§ 601(I)(b), 601(2), 603(I)(a), 603(2).
101. 4 Nordquist 11194.10(e); see also Parts IV.B.2-IV.B.3.
102. LOS Convention, art. 1(1)(5) defines dumping; see also 2 Nordquist '11111.1-1.15, 1.24, 1.26-1.31.
103. LOS Convention, art. 194(3); compare MARPOL 73n8, art. 2(2), Annex II, defining "harmful substance," not
explained in the LOS Convention. 4 Nordquist 11194.10(j). Art. 194(3) sweeps more broadly than MARPOL 73n8.
Language in MARPOL 73n8, Annex II, art. 2(2) defining pollution is the same as LOS Convention, art. 1(1)(4).
MARPOL 73n8 parties represent 92 percent of world merchant tonnage. BOWMAN & HARRIS 293 (11 th Cum. Supp.
1995). It is fair to assume that its terms represent custom; similar terms used in similar circumstances in the LOS
Convention also restate custom. BROWNUE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §
102(3). The injury must be significant, however. See n. 98 and accompanying text. Act to Prevent Pollution from
Ships, 33 USC §§ 1901-08, implements MARPOL 73n8 for the United States, imposing grealer environmental

Maritime Environment

567

obligations on warships than do the treaties. William H. Wright,Naval Warfare and the Environment, in PROTECTiON OF
THE ENVIRONMENT 35, 38.
104. LOS Convention, art. 194(4),restatingcustom.4Nordquistll 194.1O(n); REsTATEMENT(THIRD) § 601 & cmt. a,
r.n.1, citing Inter alia Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 19(3)(d), Report ofthe International Law Commission,
2(2) YB Im-L L. CO/.lM'N 96, 31 UN GAOR, Supp. No. 10,226 (1976).
105. LOS Convention, art. 194(5). Ice·covered areas, governed by id., art. 234, are an example of a sensitive
environment. 4 Nordquist II 194.10(0), noting International Law Commission,Reporton the Work ofthe 42dSession, ch.
IV, 11312, § C, item 2, art. 22, Commentary, 11(2),45 UN GAOR, Supp. No. 10 (1990), in 2(2) YB Im-L L: COM/.\'N 57
(1990) defines "ecosystem" as "an ecological unit •.. ofliving and non-living components that are interdependent and
function as a community." The LOS Convention does not define the term.
106. LOS Convention, art. 195; see also 4 Nordquist 1111 195.2, 195.6.
107. LOS Convention, art. 196.
108. 4 Nordquist 1111196.1, 196.7(a).
109. LOS Convention, art. 197,partlybased on Stockholm Declaration,n. 53, Recomm. 92, 11 ILM 1456-57; 1972
Dumping Convention. 4 Nordquist II 197.3.
110. LOS Convention, arts. 200-01; see also 4 Nordquist 1111 200.1-200.6, 20Ll-201.7; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §
603(2). High seas freedoms include a right to conduct scientific research, subject to high seas users' rights, coastal
State continental shelfand other rights, under other LOS provisions and the due regard principle. LOS Convention,
art. 87; sec also Part IV.B.1. High seas oceans research is generally accepted as a customary right. 1 BROWN 429. It is
subject to the LOS other rules principle, however. See, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2;
see also nn. III.952-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying text; Part B.2.b.
111. LOS Convention, arts. 202-06, based in part on Stockholm Declaration, n. 53, Principles 16, 21, 11 ILM
1419-20; National Environmental Policy Act, 42 USC § 4332 (NEPA). 4 Nordquist 1111 201.1-202.6(b), 203.1-203.5(c),
204.1-204.8(d), 205.1-205.6(c), 206.1-206.6(c). At the time of the Tanker War NEPA was not applied extraterritorially
e.xcept in Antarctica. Bruce A. Harlow & Michael E. McGregor, International EnvironmentalLaw Considerations During
Military Operations Other than War, in PROTECTION OFTHBENVIRONMENT 315, 326, citing Environmental Defense Fund
v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Exec. Order No. 12,114,3 CFR 356 (1979) requires environmental impact
analysis for certain federal actions affecting the environment of the global commons or offoreign nations. DeMarco &
Quinn, n. 2, 88-89; Harlow & McGregor 326.
112. LOS Convention, art. 198. "IMO is as important in its particular fields of interest-maritime safety and
protection of the marine environment-as is the UNEP at global level." BIRNIB & BOYLE 53.
113. 4 Nordquist '11198.1; see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 601, cmt. e & r.n.4, citing inter alia Memorandum of
Intent Concerning TransboundarY Air Pollution, Aug. 5, 1980, Can.-US, 32 UST 2521, 1274 UNTS 235.
114. This "to some extent anticipates" LOS Convention, art. 221.4 Nordquist 11198.1.
115. LOS Convention, art. 199; see also 4 Nordquist 11199.1, noting that High Seas Convention, art. 25(2), requires
States to cooperate with competent international organizations to prevent radioactive materials contamination of the
seas or airspace over them. The LOS Convention covers a wider spectrum of required cooperation.
116. This "to some extent anticipates" LOS Convention, art. 221. 4 Nordquist '11198.1.
117. LOS Convention, arts. 207(1)-207(2), 208(1-208(3), 209(2), 211(2); see also 4 Nordquist 1I'11207.7(a)-207.7(b),
208.1O(a)-208.10(d), 209.10(3), 211.15(1); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 603(1)(a). As id. r.n.7 shows, the United States like
many nations has marine pollution legislation that may need amendment to align with LOS Convention standards. If
enacted worldwide, such laws can evidence custom. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAt. LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,26.
118. 4 Nordquist II 208.10(a). NWP I-14M Annotated '111.4; NWP 9A Annotated II 1.4 define "national waters" as
internal waters, territorial seas and archipelagic waters, and "international waters" as contiguous zones, EEZ waters
and the high seas.
119. LOS Convention, arts. 210(1)-210(3), 210(6); see a/so 4 Nordquist 'II 210.11(b); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 603.
National laws, e.g., those in id. r.n.7, ifsimilar around the world, can evidence custom. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,26.
120. LOS Convention, art. 210(5); see a/so 4 Nordquist '11'11 210.11(c)-210.11(g),noting 1972 Dumping Convention,
art. 4 requires prior approval.
121. 4 Nordquist'll 21O.11(g) & n.14, citing inter alia International Law Commission, Report on the Work of lIS
Thirty-First Session: DrafiArticles on State Responsibility, art. 32, UN Doc. N34/194 (1979), in 18 ILM 1557, 1568, 1576
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(1979), saying these are not defenses if an offending country contributes to a situation of material responsibility. Sec
also Commentary to Draft Articles on State Responsibility in International Law Commission,RepoTton the Work ofIrs
Thirty-First Session, UN Doc. N34/10 & Corr.l (1979), in 2(2) YB INT'L L. COMM'N 122-36 (1979). Practical experience
is that air-jettisoned fuel dissipates quickly and does not present an emergency. 4 Nordquist'll 210.11(g) & n.14.
REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 603 cmt. g & r.n.8 discuss aircraft noxious and noise emissions.
122. LOS Convention, arts. 18(2), 39(1)(c); see also Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(3). AsNWP 9A Annotated
and NWP I-14M Annotated 'II'll 1.4.1, 2.3.1, 3.2, 3.2.2, 7.3.2,7.3.7, demonstrate, this customary LOS norm follows
different principles during war. See also Hague VI, art. 2; Hague XIII, art. 21; Convention on Maritime Neuuality, art.
17; Nyon Arrangement, art. 5; Stockholm Declaration, ans. 4, 7,11 ILM 1418; OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, arts. 31, 34,
37; SAN RilMo MANUAL 'II\J21 (Hague XIII rule); 136, cmt.136.2 (Hague VI considered to be in desuetude); 168, cmt.
168.6(HagueXIII rule); Schindler,Commentary, n. V.87, 221 (Hague XIII restates custom with minor exceptions); sec
also nn. IV.494-506, V.16, 20 and accompanying text. This is an example of the other rules principle in operation. Cf.
LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. 111.952-67, IV.1O-25, V.2-3 and accompanying
text; Part B.2.b.
123. LOS Convention, arts. 207(3) (land-based pollution), 207(4) (seabed activities subject to national
jurisdiction).
124. LOS Convention, arts. 207(4), 208(5), 209(1), 210(4), 211(1), 212(3).

125. !d., ans. 211(3)-211(4); see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 604(3). LOS Convention negotiating history
demonstrates that coastal States cannot require warships to give notice or get prior consent before entering the
territorial sea on innocent passage. For this and other innocent passage principles, applying equally to merchantmen
and warships, except that submarines must navigate on the surface and show their flag, see LOS Convention, arts.
17-26,45,52(2); Part IV.C.3. Ports & Waterways Safety Act, 33 USC §§ 1221-36 regulates safety and environmental
measures enforcement in the US territorial sea. A worldwide pattern of these laws can evidence customaty standards.
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,26.
126. These rules cannot apply to foreign ship design, construction, manning or equipment unless theyeffectuaIe
generally accepted international rules or standards. LOS Convention, arts. 19(2)(h), 21; see also 2 Nordquist \J\J
19.1-19.11,21.1-21.12, noting some States' continued opposition to warships' right of innocent passage and linkage
between LOS Convention, art. 21(1)(f), and id., art. 192, analyzed nn. 93-94 and accompanying text. The art. 19(2) list
is exclusive, although id., art. 19(2)(1) ("any other activity not having a direct bearing on practice") could be read
expansively. See 2 Nordquist '1119.11, citingJointInterpretation, n. IV.341,art. 3, in 28 ILM 1446 (1989), noting Russia
has accepted this statement; NWP I-14M Annotated '112.3.2.1; nn. IV.337-50 and accompanying text. Aside from a
special rule for fishing craft, Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 4-5, uses a general reasonableness rule to define
innocent passage. See also nn. JV.301-13 and accompanying text. For other rules clause analysis, see nil. 111.952-67,
IV.I0-25, V.2-3 and accompanying text; Pan B.2.b.
127. These ships must carry special documentation. LOS Convention, ans. 22(2), 23; see also 4 Nordquist '!J\J
22.1-22.9, 23.1-23.9, noting link with LOS Convention, arts. 24(1)(b), 25(3), 227; REsTATEMENT(THIRD) § 513(2)(b) &
cmt. d. Joint Interpretation, n. IV.341, arts. 5, 20, 28 ILM 1446 (1989), clarify LOS Convention, art. 22's Russian text;
coastal States may designate sea lanes and traffic separation schemes "where necessary to protect the safety of
navigation." 2 Nordquist \J 22.9.
128. LOS Convention, art. 24; see also 2 Nordquist 'II'll 24.1-24.8, noting parallel language ("form or fact") in LOS
Convention, arts. 25(3),42(2),52(2),227; see also nn. JV.337-50 and accompanying text.
129. Wright, n. 103,38.
130. LOS Convention, art. 25;see also 2 Nordquist 'II'll 25.1-25.9, noting that Joint Interpretation, n. IV.341, applies
to art. 25, taken directly from Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 16(1)-16(3); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513(2)(a) & cmt. c,
which say there should be no discrimination among different countries' vessels during temporary suspension; it
should apply to ships of all flags; see also nn. IV.337, 439 and accompanying text.
131. 2 Nordquist'll 25.1, citing Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3).

132. See generally 2 Nordquist 'II'll 25.1-25.9; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 513, cmt. c.
133. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.21, VI.38-40 and
accompanying text.
134. LOS Convention, arts. 27-18, 30-32; see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 457,r.n.7; 461, cmt. e; 513(2)(b) & cmt.
c, e, h & r.n.2.
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135. LOS Convention, arL 2(3); see also Territorial Sea Convention, arL 1(2); nn. III.952-67, IV.I0-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.2.b.
136. LOS Convention, artS. 38(1), 45(I)(b), 52-54; id., art. 54 incorporates by reference id., artS. 39-40,42,44. LOS
Convention nonsuspendable straits passage rules reflect custom. See generally Part IV.B.6.
137. LOS Convention, arL 233, incorporating by reference id., arts. 42(1)(a)-41(1)(b), 236, would appear to apply,
strictly speaking, to straits transit passage regimes because of references to arL 42; the straits innocent passage regime
and provisions governing territorial sea innocent passage have no similar intervention provisions, although such
might be inferred from coastal State authority to enact environmental laws that might include authority to intervene.
Warships, naval auxiliaries,etc., have sovereign immunity as in the case of transit passage. See generally icl., arts. 17-32,
45,236; S. Doc. 103-39, n. IV.3, 11-15,23, saying that by e.'l:tension these principles apply to straits passage. The US
Navy has the position that a straits passage regime also applies to approaches to straits. This view, that warships
operating in their normal mode (i.e., submarines traversing these straits), may employ formation steaming and
conduct air operations as incidental to normal navigation practices, so long as there is no threat to the coastal State(s),
is consistent with the transit passage regime. Ale.'l:ander, n. IV.523, 92; Clove, n. IV.597, 105; Schachte,Intemational
Straits, n. IV.5S8, 184-86; n. IV.58S and accompanying te.'l:t; but see Lowe, The Commander's, n. III318 on naval
operations in transit straits. If this is accepted as practice, an environmental protection regime appurtenant to straits
passage applies to this area too. The issue of straits passage for belligerents illustrates the LOS-LOAC interface
preserved by the LOS conventions' other rules clauses. See generally NWP I-14M Annotated 1111233-233.2, 2.5.1.1;
NWP 9A Annotated 1111 23.2-233.2, 2.5.1; SAN RaIO MANUAL 111123-33; Akira Mayama, The Influence of the Straits
Transit Regime on the Law ofNeutrality at Sea, 26 ODIL 1 (1995); nn. III.952-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying text; Part
B.2.b.and accompanying texL
138. Wright, n. 103,38.
139. Sec nn. 136-37 and accompanying texL

140. UN Charter, artS. 51, 103; see also nn. III.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.21, VI.38-40 and
accompanying te.'l:L
141. LOS Convention, arL 33; compare Territorial Sea Convention, arL 24, providing for a 12-mile zone. The
contiguous zone outer limit means States asserting a territorial sea less than the extent the LOS Convention allows, 12
miles, or under custom for 1958 Convention parties, may declare a contiguous zone up to limits permitted by the
convention in force for them. See also nn. IV.296-300, 324-27 and accompanying texL
142. Sec generally 2 Nordquist 1111 33.1-33.8(i).

143. LOS Convention, artS. 303(1)-303(2) provide:
1. States have the duty to protect objects of an archeological and historical nature found at sea and shall
co·opcrate for this purpose.
2.... [TJo control trafficin such objects, the coastal State may, in applying article 33 [of the LOS Convention,
pcrmitting a 24-mile contiguous zone, n. 141 and accompanying textJ, presume that their removal in the
contiguous zone ••• without its approval would result in an infringement within its territorY or territorial sea
of the laws and regulations referred to in that article.
144. Sec generally 5 Nordquist 1111303.1-303.10.

145. AIL 303 also does not affect identifiable owners' rights, salvage law or other admiralty rules, or cultural
exchange laws and practices. LOS Convention, arts. 303(3)-03(4). Under admiralty law shipwrecks and objects found
at sea are finders' property, unless their national law or the law of the salvor provides otherwise. See generally
REs'rATEI>IENT(THlRD) § 521, r.n.6; SCHOENBAUl>lch.14; S. Doc. 103-39, n. IV3,51, citing US legislation that may alter
these rules. Warship or government aircraft title is never lost until a flag State officially abandons or relinquishes iL If
an aircraft or ship is captured, title vests in the captor State. See nn. IV.793-96 and accompanying text; see also
Agreement Concerning Wreck ofCSS Alabama, OCL 3, 1989, Fr.-US, TIAS No. 11687.

146. Sec nn. 136-37 and accompanying te.'l:L For analysis of treaties protecting cultural property during armed
conflict in the environmental conte.'l:t, see, e.g., nn. 272-77 and accompanying te.'l:t; Part B.3.a(lII)(B).
147. LOS Convention, artS. 136-37 define the Area as the abyss beyond the continental slope; it is declared the
common heritage of humankind. There is no Area in the Persian Gulf because of its shallow depth. See also nn.
II.66.69, IV.240 and accompanying te.'l:L
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148. 5 Nordquist 11303.10.
149. LOS Convention, art. 149.

150. See n. 147.
151. LOS Convention, art. 211(5). A qualification to this rule is id., arL 234: Coastal States may adopt and enforce
nondiscriminatory laws for preventing, reducing and controlling pollution from ships in ice·covered areas to their
EEZ limits where particularly severe climatic conditions and ice create obstructions or exceptional navigational
hazards, "and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the
ecological balance." Such laws must have "due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine
environment .... " Antarctic Treaty, n. III.957, art. 4,12 UST 796, 402 UNTS 74 froze territorial and territorial sea
claims for Antarctica. Until the next Ice Age, an. 234 only applies to Arctic Sea States, e.g., the United States. States
concerned, Canada, the former USSR and the United States, negotiated arL 234 to provide a basis for implementing
provisions for commercial and private vessels in the 1970 Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act
consistent with art. 234 and other LOS Convention provisions while protecting"fundamenta1 U.S. security interests"
in Arctic navigational rights and freedoms. S. Doc.102·39,n. IV.3,24. See also 2 O'CONNELL,LAWOFTHESI!A 1022·25.
152. LOS Convention, arts. 55, 56(l)(a), 56(1)(b)(iii)·56(c), 57-58 (defining the EEZ as extending 200 nautical
miles from territorial sea baselines, providing that coastal States have "sovereign rights for ... conserving and
managing their natural resources, ••• living or non-living, ofthe waters subjacent to the sea·bed and of the sea·bed and
its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, [e.g.,] • ••
production of energy from the water, currents and winds; [and] ... jurisdiction as provided for in ••• this Convention
[for] ... protection and preservation of the marine environment; [and] other rights and duties provided for in this
Convention"). See also id., arL 60 (coastal State exclusive rights and jurisdiction over artificial islands, other EEZ
installations), arts. 61-72 (standards for conserving, use of living resources; stocks occurring within two or more
countries' EEZs; various kinds of sea life; landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States' rights), art. 73
(standards for enforcing coastal State EEZ laws). See also 2 Nordquist 1111 55.1-55.11(d), 56.l-56.11(e), 57.1-57.8(b),
58.1-58.10(f), 60.1·60.15(m), 61.1·61.12(k), 62.1·62.16(1), 63.1·63.12(f), 64.1·64.9(f), 65.1·65.16(i), 66.1·66.9(g),
67.1-67.8(e), 68.1-68.5(b), 69.1·69.17(h), 70.1-70.11(d), 71.1-71.9(c), 71.1·71.10(b), 73.1-73.1O(h); S. Doc. 103·39, n.
IV.3, 25-27. As ofl992 86 States had EEZs; 20 more claimed fishing zones. The EEZ "is now widely considered to be a
part of general international law." 2 Nordquist 11 V.33; REsTATEMENT (THIRD), § 514, cmL a. While id. § 514(1)
generally follows Convention criteria as to EEZ sovereignty and jurisdiction, id., Source Note says "authority" is used
instead of "jurisdiction," because the REsTATEMENT characterizes jurisdiction differently in other contexts; set, e.g.,
Part V.C. Id. § 514, cmt. b's declaration, the Convention "does not explicitly designate the [EEZ] as part of the high
seas." Note, however, that LOS Convention arts. 55, 58, specifically referring to id., arts. 87·115, declare inter alia that
high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply in the EEZ. Some countries would prohibit naval operations in
their EEZs, but other LOS Convention terms allow these maneuvers. Wanime operations are permitted under the
Convention's "other rules" principle. States therefore cannot exclude warships on environmental grounds from their
EEZs. Stephen A. Rose, NtrVal Activity in the EEZ-Troubled Waten Ahead?, NAV. L. REv. 67, 73·76 (1990); nn.
IV.147-57 and accompanying texL

153. See n. 152 and accompanying texL See also LOS Convention, arts. 76·78, 80, (shelf can extend outward the
same distance, 200 nautical miles, as the EEZ, along the ocean bottom, or to the edge of the continental margin,
whichever is greater, but not over 350 miles); 2 Nordquist 1111 76.1-76.18(m), 77.1-77.7(d), 78.1-78.8(d), 80.1·80.9
(adaptation of Continental Shelf Convention, arts. 2-5); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 515; see also Pan IV.B.2.
154. 2 Nordquist 11 57.8(b), citing Continental Shelf(Libya v. Malta), 1985 ICJ 13,33; Delimitation of Maritime
Boundaryin GulfofMaine Area (Can. v. US), 1984 ICJ 245, 294; Delimitation ofMaritime Areas Between Canada and
France (Can. v. Fr.), 31 ILM 1145, 1163 (Arb. 1992). E.g., the United States claimed continental shelf rights,
Proclamation No. 2667, 3 CFR 67 (194348) in 1945, before asserting fishery management rights in what eventually
became its EEZ through the FCMA n. IV.143, or claiming full EEZ rights, n. IV.3. The United States had claimed
some offshore fishing rights in 1945 along with the continental shelf. See nn. IV.143, 193·94 and accompanyingtexL
155. LOS Convention, arts. 55, 56(l)(b)(iii), 56(2),58(3),60(3),60(7),78·80, also stating a "must not infringeunjustifiable interference" formula for shelf and high seas rights interfaces and a "reasonable exploration" - "may not
impede" rule for interfacing shelf and submarine cable and pipeline rights. See also 2 Nordquist '!III 56.11(e)·56.11(f),
58.1O·58.10(f), 60.15(f), 60.150), 66.9(d), 78.8(c), 79.8(e), 80.9; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 514, cmt. e; 515(2). "Due
regard" or similar phrases also appear elsewhere in the LOS Convention, e.g., art. 87(2) (due regard for others' high
seas rights and freedoms, Area activities); Continental Shelf Convention, arts. 4-5 ("reasonable measures ••• , may not
impede"; no "unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing," etc.); High Seas Convention, arts. 2, 26(2)
("reasonable regard" for others' high seas freedoms); Territorial Sea Convention, arL 19(4) (balancing navigation
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interests with right of arrest for crimes committed in territorial sea). See also Bernard H. Oxman & Anatoly L.
Kolodkin, Slabiliry in the Law oflhe Sea, in BEYOND CoNFRONTATION, n. III.358, 165, 175-76, 181-82.
156. LOS Convention, arts. 58(1)-58(2),78, referring to id., arts. 86-115; High Seas Convention, arts. 2, 8; see also
nn.III.953-67, IV.lO-25, 794 and accompanying text; Part B.2.b.
157. 4 Nordquist 1l2l1.15(b); see also Oxman & Kolodkin, n.155, 176-79.
158. LOS Convention, arts. 213-14, 216, 222; see also 4 Nordquist 1111 213.l-213.7(f), 2l4.1-2l4.7(c), 2l6.1-2l6.7(d),
222.1-222.8.
159. ResTATI!MENT(THIRD) § 603; see also n. 98 and accompanying text.
160. LOS Convention, arts. 217-20, 223-24, 226-31, expanding on rules in the navigational articles, id., arts.
21(1)(f), 28(2), 56(1)(b)(iii), 56(3), 60(1), 80; see also 4 Nordquist ~m 217.1-217.8(j), 218.1-218(9)(h), 219.1-219.8(d),
220.1-220.11(n), 223.1-223.9(c), 224.1-224.7(e), 226.1-226.11(e), 227.1-227.7, 228.1-228.11(h), 229.1-229.5,
230.1-230.9(c), 231.1-23l.9(c); ResTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 457, r.n.7; 461, cmt. e; 512.
161. LOS Convention, art. 225; see also 4 Nordquist '1111225.1-225.9; ResTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513, cmt. e.
162. LOS Convention, arts. 232, 235; see also 4 Nordquist 1111 232.1-232.6(c),235.1-235.10(g); ResTATEMENT (THIRD)
§ 604,r.n.3; Oxman & Kolodkin, n.155, 176-79. Art. 235 was derived from the Stockholm Declaration, n. 53, Principle
56, 11ILM 1418. 4 Nordquist II 235.l. The knowledge standard is the same as for self-defense and LOAC attack
situations. See Parts IlI.A.l.b(IX), V.A.2.
163. LOS Convention, art. 221; Charney, The Marine Etwironmenl, n. IV.49, 892 n.79; see also 4 Nordquist '11'11
221.1-22l.9(h); ResTATEMENT (THIRD) § 603, r.n.3 (similar provisions in 1969 Intervention Convention, art. 1;
Intervention Protocol, to which many countries are party), see TIF 400-01; Declaration of Principles Governing the
Sea-Bed & Ocean Floor, & Subsoil Thereof, Beyond Limits ofNationalJurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749(1972) 'II 13(b),in
10 ILM 220, 223 (1973) (Seabed Declaration).

164. Cf. BIRNIE & BOYLE 286; BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; ResTATEMENT (THIRD) §
102(3), cmts. f, i, r.n.5.

165. See nn. 4-8 and accompanying text.
166. See nn.III.952-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying text; Part B.2.b.
167. Compare LOS Convention, art. 236 wilh id., arts. 42(5), 96; see also High Seas Convention, arts. 8(1),9; 3
Nordquist '1111 95.1-96.6(c); 4id. '11'11 236.1-235.6(f). Warship and navalauxiliarY immunity is an accepted international
law rule. 3 id. '1195.1; 4 id. '11236.1; see also Part IV.C.4.
168. S. Doc. 103-39, n.IV.3, 24.

169. E.g., Convention on Protection of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1974, arts. 1, 13, 1092 UNTS 280, 296, 298,
among Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.
170. Kuwait Regional Convention, n. I1.63,3rt.14, 1140 UNTS 159; Red Sea Convention,n. 55, art. 14,2 WALLACE
2287.

171. See LOS Convention, arts. 237, 311(2). Other regional treaties are subject to the LOS Convention, e.g.,
Convention for Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Feb. 16, 1976, art. 3(1), 1102 UNTS 27,46, and
protocols. See nn. 48-50 and accompanying text.
172. See n. IV.3 and accompanying text.
173. Compare LOS Convention, art. 94(4)(c)wilh High Seas Convention, art. 10.
174. Compare LOS Convention, art. 94(7) wilh High Seas Convention, art. 11(1). See also 3 Nordquist 'II 94.8(k);
Part IV.B.2.
175. LOS Convention, arts. 122-23; 3 Nordquist 344; see also id. II 123.12(e), listing inler alia Kuwait and Red Sea
Regional Conventions, nn. 11.63, VI.55 among regional coordination treaties for semi-enclosed areas; Oxman &
Kolodkin, n. 155, 179-8l. See also Part B.2.c(lII).

176. Compare LOS Convention, art. 87(1) wilh High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also Part IV.B.l.
177. LOS Convention, art. 240(d).Id., art. 87(1)(f) declares that the right to conduct scientific research is subject to
the Convention, Parts VI and XIII. Part VI declares continental shelf rules; Part XIII states general marine
environmental protection principles. See Part IV.B.2 and accompanying text. Subject to other LOS Convention
provisions, States conducting research must give other countries reasonable opportunity to obtain information
necessarY to prevent and control damage to human health and safety and to the· marine environment. LOS
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Convention, art. 242. Research installations and equipment are subject to rules for conducting research.ld., arL 258.

Seealso 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OFTHE SEA ch. 26. The LOAC protects enemy ships collecting scientific data from capture
during war; ifengaged in data collection for likely military application, they are not protected. Hague XI, arL 4; stealso
nn. V.264, 274-76 and accompanying text.

178. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 87(1)(e), 116 with High Seas Convention, an. 2; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §
521(2)(c); see also Pan IV.B.l.
179. S. Doc. 103-39, n. IV.3, 27.
180. LOS Convention, an. 116, incorporatingia., ans. 63(2),64-67, 118-20; compare Fishery Convention, ans. 1-8,
13; see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 521, cmt. e; S. Doc. 103-39, n. IV.3, 27-28, listing treaties regulating or prohibiting
high seas fishing. LOS Convention, arts. 56, 61-73 regulates EEZ fishing. See also 3 Nordquist 'I!~ 116.1-116.9(g);
Charney, The Marine Environment, n. IV.49, 896-901.

la.,

181.
arLl(l)(I);see 2 Nordquist ~~ 1.1-1.19, 1.26-1.31; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 523,cmt. b,declaringthatid., §
523(1)(a) recites custom: "[N]o state may claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights over any part of
the sea-bed and subsoil beyond the limits ofnational jurisdiction, or over its mineral resources, and no state or person
may appropriate any part of that area .. _ ."
§ 523(I)(b) states the US view of the law:

la.,

... unless prohibited by international agreement, a state may engage, or authorize any[one] to engage, in •• _
exploration for and exploitation of that area, provided ... activities are conducted (i) without claiming or
exercising sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights in any pan of that area, and (ii) with reasonable regard
for the right of other states or persons to engage in similar activities and to exercise the freedoms of the high
seas; •.. minerals e.xtracted ... become the propeny of the mining state or person.
National jurisdiction means, inter alia, a declared EEZ or continental shelf: Legal status of the water column or
airspace above the Area is not affected by LOS Convention provisions dealing with iL LOS Convention, arL 135; see
also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 521, cmt. i; 523.
182. LOS Convention, arts. 136.140(1). The AntarcticTreaty, n. III.957, began the "common heritage" concept; it
has been copied in treaties on outer space. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 523, cmL b & r.n.2 adopted the then US position
that deep seabed mining was a high seas freedom, rejecting the "common heritage" Convention view. If the
Convention is accepted generally, "without dissent by .•. important ... states, the sea-bed mining regime •.. may
become effective also as custom ...." Id. § 523, cmt. e. See also BROWNLIE,INTERNATIONALLAW 5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28;
REsTATEAIENT (THIRD) § 102(3).

183. See Pan II.A.6.
184. LOS Convention, art. 137(2) vests Area governance in an Authority.ld., arts. 156-91 are the Authority's
constitutive provisions; the Convention protocol, n. IV.3, would modify them in amending LOS Convention, Part
XI. See S. Doc. 103-39, n. IV.3, 34-43. The Authority must adopt rules and procedures to prevent, reduce and control
pollution and hazards to the marine environment, including coastlines, that interfere with that environment's
ecological balance, with particular attention being paid to protection from harmful effects of activities, e.g., drilling,
dredging, excavation, waste disposal, building and operating or maintaining installations, pipelines and other
devices. These rules must also protect and conserve Area natural resources and prevent damage to flora and fauna of
the marine environmenL The Authority must take necessary measures, which may supplement existing treaties, to
protect human life in connection with Area operations. LOS Convention, arts. 14546. There is also an obligation to
preserve objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the Area, with panicular regard paid to
preferential rights of a State or country of origin, and which incorporates by reference other rules of law and
agreements dealing with artifacts protection.
arL 149. Area activities must be undertaken "with reasonable regard
for other activities in the marine environment." Area installations, like those in the EEZ and on the continental shelf,
must not be established "where interference may be caused to the use ofrecognized sea lanes essential to international
navigation or in areas of intense fishing activity ... Other activities in the marine environment shall be conducted
with reasonable regard for activities in the Area." The LOS Convention has an other rules clause for the Area:

la.,

The general conduct of States in relation to the Area shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Part
[XI], the principles embodied in the [UN] Chaner ... and other rules ofinternationallaw in the interests of
maintaining peace and security and promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding.
As in the case ofthe high seas, the LOS Convention declares the Area shall only be used for peaceful purposes. Compare
id., arL 141 wilh id., arts. 88, 240(a). The same interpretations should apply for these articles as under other parts of the
LOS Convention and its 1958 antecedents. "Other rules" means the LOAC may be applied in certain contexts; the
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peaceful purposes provision means no State may act, e.g., commit aggression, in violation of the Charter. Area
activities can include military operations, e.g., naval maneuvers. States may act in self-defense in the Area. UN
Charter, artS. 51, 103; see also nn. III.I0, 47-630,916-18,968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Parts. V.B.I-V.B.2.
185. The ueaties disclaim intention to affect parties' rights or claims to maritime jurisdiction "established in
conformity with intemationallaw." Kuwait Regional Convention, n. II.63, artS. 2,15,1140 UNTS 156, 159; Red Sea
Convention, n. 55, artS. 2, 15,2 WALUICE 2284, 2287. The protocols allow application to ports, harbors, estuaries, bays
and lagoons for a "marine emergency," defined broadly, and ifa particular State so decides. Kuwait Protocol, n. II.63,
arts. 1(2), 4, 1140 UNTS 201, 204. Red Sea Protocol, n. 55, artS. 1(2),4, 2 WALUICE 2294, 2296, are similar. These
implement LOS Convention, artS. 122-23; see n. 175 and accompanying text.
186. Compare Kuwait Regional Convention, n. II.63, art.l(a),114O UNTS 156,wilh Red Sea Convention, n. 55, art.
1(2),2 WALUICE 2283.

187. Kuwait Regional Convention, n. II.63, arts. 3(a), 4-7, 1140 UNTS 156-57; Red Sea Convention, n. 55, arts.
3(1),4-8,2 WALUICE 2284-85, which adds a pledge to prevent, abate and combat pollution "resulting •.• from other
human activities."
188. See generally Kuwait Protocol, n. II.63, 1140 UNTS 201; Red Sea Protocol, n. 55, 2 WALUICE 2293.
189. Compare Kuwait Protocol, n. II.63, art. 1(2), 1140 UNTS 201, wilh Red Sea Protocol, n. 55, art • 1(2), 2

WALLACE 2294. (Italics in origina!.)
190. See nn. 160·65 and accompanying text.
191. The Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Cenue, an adminisuative agency, also must be notified. Kuwait
Protocol, n. II.63, arts. 3, 10,1140 UNTS 202-03,205; Red Sea Protocol, n. 55, artS. 3, 7(2),2 WALUICE 2294-95, 2297.
192. Kuwait Protocol, n. II.63, art. 1(4), 1140 UNTS 202; Red Sea Protocol, n. 55, art. 1(4),2 WALLACE 2294.
193. See nn. 160-72 and accompanying text.

194. Cf. UN Charter, artS. 51,103; nn. III.lO, 47-630,916-18,968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part B.l.
195. See n. 185 and accompanying te.'(t.

196. See nn. II.264, 384, VI.185 and accompanying text.
197. See nn. II.368-72 and accompanying text.

198. Iran and Iraq were not parties to the 1958 or 1982 LOS Conventions. The customary other rules principle
restated in these agreements did apply, however. See, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2;
sec also nn. I1I.952-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying text; Part B.2.b.
199. Vienna Convention, arts. 61-62; see also nn. III.928-29, IV.26-27, VI.80-88 and accompanying text.
200. See nn. 185-89 and accompanying te.'(t.

201. See n. I1.213 and accompanying text.
202. See n. I1.214 and accompanying text.

203. BROWNUE,INTERNATIONALLAw5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsrATEMENT(THIRD) § 102(3); Okorodudu·Fubara,
n. I1.210, 197.
204. LOS Convention, arts. 232, 235; Kuwait Protocol, n. II.63, art. 1(2), 1140 UNTS 201; see also n.162 and
accompanying te.'(t.
205. See nn. II.212 and accompanying text.

206. The UN Security Council deplored attacks on merchant shipping and violations of LOAC principles. If
obeyed, these would have resulted in no more attacks on these vessels and therefore no more pollution ofthe Gulffrom
this cause. These resolutions covered a specific point, i.e., freedom of navigation, and therefore should not be
construed as applying special Charter law to theexcJusion ofconventional norms, to environmental situations. See nn.
34-37 and accompanying text.
207. Sec Part B.2.b.
208. See n. 184 and accompanying text.

209. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103;seealso nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84,IV.6-25 and accompanying text; PartB.l;
nn. 194, 197 and accompanying text.
210. See nn. 4-8 and accompanying text.
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211. See nn.198-202 and accompanying text.
212. UN Chaner, arts. 51, 103; see also nn.III.1O,47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; PanB.l.

213. See Parts V.A.I-V.A.2, VI.B.2.b.
214. See Pan B.2.a.
215. E.g., the United States' active policy of objecting to LOS variances in practice by other States. See generally
Chapter IV.

216. See, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. III.952-67, IV.I0-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.2.b.
217. Compare Part B.2.c.(I) with Part B.2.c(1I).
218. See Part B.2.a.
219. E.g., self-defense. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.I0, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.1.
220. See Symposium, Trea(Y Succession; Walker, Integratian and Disintegration.
221. UN Charter, artS. 25,48, 103; see also n.lV.57 and accompanying text.
222. Hague VIII arts. 1-6; see also Part V.G.2.

223. See n. V.686 and accompanying text.
224. LEVIE, MINE WARFARE, n. V.426, 137 predicts environmental protests if nuclear mines are detonated. The
same can be said for conventional mines, particularly if pollutants escape from mined ships, or mines are laid in
environmentally sensitive areas and locations are not published.

225. See Hague VIII, arts. 3-5; Part V.G.2.
226. See Part V.G.2.
227. Iran, formerly Persia, was an independent country in 1907 and signed but did not ratify Hague VIII. Iraq was
part of Turkey, formerly the Ottoman Empire, in 1907. The Empire, of which Turkey is a successor State, signed but
did not ratify Hague VIII. The United Kingdom did not accede to Hague VIII while serving 3S Iraq's mandatory
Power. See Symposium, Trea(y Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration; n. V.732 and accompanying text.

228. Cf. MEt.tA, n.1I.6, 119-27.
229. See Part V.G.2.
230. See n. 224.
231. Hague lX, arts. 1-4, forbidding naval bombardment of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings or
buildings. Ifautomatic submarine contact mines are anchored offa harbor, the place cannot be considered a defended
site. Military targets may be destroyed but only after warning, unless surprise or other "military reason" dictates
immediate action. Shelling undefended places may begin after due notice if local authorities fail to comply with
requisition requests proportionate to local resources. Undefended places may not be bombarded for failure to pay
money contributions. See Part V.G.l.

232. E.g., environmentally sensitive beaches or parks might be close to ports or be within towns to fall within
Hague IX's scope.
233. Hague IX, art. 5 also provides for visible signs for these structures; Cultural Property Convention, arts. 16-17,
20,36, or Roerich Pact, arts. 1-3 supersede art. 5 for some countries. E.g., the United States is party to HaguelX and the
Roerich Pact but not to the Convention. TIF 350, 442. The Pact does not have a supersession clause like the
Convention; law of treaties later in time principles govern. Vienna Convention, art. 30;seealso nn.IV.32, 60, VI.45 and
accompanying text.
234. Hague IX, arts. 6-7. Protocol I, art. 57(2)(c) repeats the notice to civilian popUlation principle as a precaution
in attacks when the situation permits; it is considered a customary rule. NWP I-14M Annotated' 8.5.2 & n.126; NWP
9A Annotated' 8.5.2 & n.l06, refine the rule:
... Where the military situation permits, commanders should make every reasonable effort to warn the
civilian population located in close proximity to a military objective targeted for bombardment. Warnings
may be general rather than specific warnings lest the bombarding force or the success ofits mission be placed
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in jeopardy •••• Warnings are relevant to the protection ofthe civilian population (so the civilians will have an
opportunity to seek safety) and need not be given when they are unlikely to be affected by the attack.
NWP I-14M Annotated ~ 8.5 and NWP 9A Annotated ~ 8.5 defme bombardment as naval and air bombardment of
enemy targets on land with conventional weapons. See also Part V.G.1.

235. Compare Hague IX, arts. 1-7 with Hague IV, Regulations, arts. 23(g), 25-28, superseding 1899 Hague II,
Regulations, arts. 23(g), 25-28; their terms differ slightly. Second Protocol, art. 15(1)(e) declares theft or pillage of
cultural property is a "serious violation" of the Protocol. Compare OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, arts. 25-29, with 1880
Oxford Manual, arts. 32-34, 53; Brussels Conference of 1874, Project 0/ and International Declaration Concerning the
Laws and Customs o/War, arts. 15-18 (1874), in id. 27,29; Lieber Code, arts. 19,34-36,38. Military codes criminalize
pillage,c.g., Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice, arts. 103, 109, 10 USC. §§ 903, 909, strengthening the customary norm.
BROWNLtI!,INTERNATIONALLAW5; 1 OPPENHEtM § 10, 26. See also TOMAN 7, 10-11,73,91,196 (Lieber Code, 1899 Hague
II, Hague IV cultural protection aspects).
236. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment & Sentences (Oct. 1, 1946), in 41 AJIL 172, 248-49

(1949); accurd, AFP 110-31 ~ 5-2b; 2 OPPENHEIM § 68,229; STONE 551; Diederich, n.17, 141, 146-47; Edwards, n. 2,
110-13; LeGrand, n. 12,26; Lijnzaad & Tanja, n. 2,183-84; Plant,LegalAspects, n.17, 222-23; Sharp, n. 2, 10-42; cf.
NWP I-14M Annotated ~ 8.1; NWP 9A Annotated ~ 8.1; McNeill, Protection, n. 2, 539; Harlow & McGregor, n.11I,
318.

237. See Part V.G.l.
238. Sec id.
239. 1980 TIF 347.

240. See nn. 231-38 and accompanying text.
241. See Symposium, TreatySuceessWn; Walker,Integration and Disintegration.
242. To that e.xtent LOAC bombardment principles were integrated into Charter law. UN Charter, art. 2(4); see

also Part B.l. They can be different, depending on circumstances. UN Charter, art. 103; nn. IV.57; Part B.l.
243. If an object is considered contraband or aiding the enemy war effort, its e.xemption is lost even ifsent through
themail.HagueXI.arts.I-2;seealsonn.V.112. 257, 271 and accompanying text.

244. See Paris Declaration, arts. 1-3; London Declaration, arts. 27-29; Part V.D.3.
245. London Declaration, arts. 61-62; see also Paris Declaration, arts. 2-3; Part V.B.3.
246. Hague XI, arts. 3-4, stating customary rules; see also nn. V.113, 265, 274-76 and accompanying text.

247. But see Parts B.3.a(l)(D), B.3.a(I)(F) (Hague IV; OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, art. 88).
248. Hague XI, arts. 3-4; SAN REMO MANUAL 1111 47(h), 136(g); see also nn. 264, 266 and accompanying text.

249. Sce Hague IV, Regulations, art. 23(c); Hague IX, arts. 1-4; Second Convention, arts. 12,18,21-22,24,26-27,
29-30, 32-33, 38, 43, 47; Third Convention, arts. 70-77, 118; Fourth Convention, arts. 107-13; Cultural Property
Convention, arts. 12, 14; Protocol I, arts. 8(b), 22-23,41; see also nn. V.II0, 113,240,258-69,274-76 and accompanying
text.
250. See Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration. Iran (formerly Persia), Iraq and the
United States were not Paris Declaration parties. Turkey, a Coalition member, signed but did not ratify the
Declaration and Hague XI. SCHtNDLER & TOMAN 789, 823·24; 1980 TIF 348.
251. Sce nn. 4·8 and accompanying te.xt.
252. See nn. 231-42 and accompanying text.
253. Hague IV, Regulations, arts. 22, 23(g), 46-47, 53, 55-56, superseding 1899 Hague II, Regulations, arts. 46-47,

53, 55-S6;seealso 1880 OXFORD MANUAL, arts. 51-55; Lijnzaad & Tanja,n. 2,174-76; EvanJ. Wallach, The Useo/Crude
Oil by an Occupying Belligerent State as a Munition de Guerre, 41 ICLQ 287 (1992); Edward R Cummings, Note, Oil
Resources in Occupied Arab Territories Under the Law 0/ Belligerent Occupation, 9 GEO. WASH. J. INrL L. & ECON. 533
(1974). Hague IV standards have been customary law since the end ofWorld War II.See n. 236 and accompanying texL
254. See nn. 231-42 and accompanying text.
255. Plant,Introduction, n. 2, 17 and Plant, LegalAspects, n. 17,222 suggested this for Protocol I, art. 1(2). See nn.
402,450 and accompanying text. If so, this analysis applies to Hague IV, preamble; 1899 Hague II, preamble. Hague
IX, preamble, does not have the Hague IV or 1899 Hague II language but recites:
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Whereas it is e.-..:pedient that bombardments by naval forces should be subject to rules of general application
which would safeguard the rights of the inhabitants and assure the preservation of the more important
buildings, by applying as far as possible to this operation of war the principles of the Regulation ofl899 [i.e.,
Hague II) respecting the laws and customs of land war ...
This might or might not be a Martens clause, but Hague XI, preamble, incorporates prior law to the extent it is not
inconsistent with Hague XI's norms:
Considering ... it is expedient, in giving up or, if necessary, in harmonizing for the common interest certain
conflicting practices of long standing, to commence codifying in regulations of general application the
guarantees due to peaceful commerce and legitimate business, as weU as the conduct of hostilities by sea; that
his expedient to lay down in written mutual engagements the principles which have hitherto remained in the
uncertain domain of controversy or have been left to the discretion of Governments;
That, from henceforth, ... certain ... rules may be made, without affecting the common law now in force with
regard to the matters which that law has left unsettled ...
For trends analysis perhaps leading to custom before negotiation of these conventions, see Pietro Verri, The Condition

ofCultural Property in Anned Conflicts, 1985 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 67.
256. OXFORD NAVAL.MANUAL, art. 88.
257. Verri, Commentary, n. !V.71, 337.

258. See Part V.B.3.
259. An exception is Hague III,notrelevant to this analysis and partly superseded by the Pact of Paris, n. III.l60,
and the UN Charter.

260. E.g., Hague IV, Regulations, aIL 53, superseding Hague II, Regulations, art. 53, declaring transportation
systems, including steamers and other publicly or privately owned ships, are subject to seizure, except cases covered
by naval law, i.e., the LONW.1880 OXFORD.MANUAL, aIL 51 is less precise:
Means of transportation (railways, boats, etc.), as weU as land telegraphs and landing-cables, can only be
appropriated to the use of the occupant. Their destruction is forbidden, unless ... demanded by military
necessity. They are restored when peace is made in the condition in which they then are.
Whether "boats" refers to oceangoing vessels, and if so which, is not clear.
261. COLOMBOS §§ 95-121; 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA ch. 3; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 512 & r.n.1 (issue not
resolved until Territorial Sea Convention ratified generaUy after 1958). There is a presumption against retroactively
applying treaties. Vienna Convention, art. 28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 322(1), cmt. a, r.n.1.; but see Namibia, 1971 Ie]
16,31. Todaycoastal State sovereignty includes the territorial sea and inland waters on the landward side ofa baseline,
usuaUy the low water line, marking the beginning of the territorial sea. LOS Convention, arts. 2-16; Territorial Sea
Convention, arts. 1-13. See also Part IV.B.4.

262. Compare Hague Air Rules, arts. 22-26with Hague IV,Regulations, arts. 23(g), 25-26, (land warfare) and Hague
IX, arts. 1-5 (naval warfare). Hague Declaration (XIV) Prohibiting Discharge of Projectiles & Explosives from
BaUoons, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2439; Hague Declaration (IV.1) to Prohibit for Five Years the Launching of
Projectiles & Explosives from BaUoons, & Other Methods ofa Similar Nature,]uly 29,1899,32 itL1839, also bear on
the issue, but most do not consider them as stating custom. AFP 110-31 11 5-2a; TOMAN 15, 178; Bierzanck,
Commentary, n. V.197, 396-97; Verri, Commentary, n. IV.7l, 133-35.
263. Compare, e.g., AFP 110-31, n.254, 1I5-2(c) ("they do not represent exiSh·ng customary law as a total codt") (italics in
original) with NWP I-14M Annotated 117.3.7 n.82 (Hague Air Rules represent custom); see also n. V.679.
264. See, e.g., AFP 110-3111115-3(b)(2), 5-17 n.22 (citing inter alia Hague Air Rules); 115-6, at 5-19 n.33 (Hague Air
Rules, art. 21); NWP 1-14 Annotated 11118.5.1.1 (Hague Air Rules,art. 24[4), declaring military objectives within a city,
town village may be bombarded if required for the enemy's submission with minimum e.-..:penditure of time, life,
physical resources; exception to the general rule that wanton or deliberate destruction ofareas ofconcentrated civilian
habitation is prohibited); 8.5.1.2 (Hague Air Rules, aIL 22; bombardment only for terrorizing civilian population is
forbidden); NWP 9A Annotated 11118.5.1.1, 8.5.1.2 (same). Seegenerally AFP 110-31 ch. 5; NWP I-14M Annotated 11'
8.5-8.5.2; NWP 9A Annotated 11118.5-8.5.2 for air bombardment rules; see also Part V.G.1.
265. See, e.g., Part V.D.3 (contraband).
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266. Robertson, Commentary, in PROTECTION OFTHE ENVIRONMENT 170; see also Part V.G.1.
267. Sce Part B.1.

268. Iran, Iraq and most if not all States involved in the Tanker War were either ratifying parties or were bound
through treaty succession principles to the Geneval Gas Protocol. 1980 TIF 294-95. The Protocol and its no-first-use
reservations are considered part of customary law. McDoUGAL & FELICIANO 634; NWP I-14M Annotated 'il10.3.2.1;
NWP 9A Annotated 'il1O.3.2.1; George Bunn,Banning Poison Gas and Genn Waifare: Should the United States Agree?,
1969 WIS. L. REv. 375, 384-85; John Norton Moore, Ratification of the Geneva Protocol on Gas and Bacteriological
Waifare: A Legal and Political Analysis, 58 VA. L. REv. 419, 447-52 (1972); Hays Parks, Classification of
Chemical-Biological Waifare, 13 U. TOLEDO L. REv. 1165, 1167 (1982); Elizabeth A. Smith, Note, International
Rcgulatlon of Chemical and Biological Weapons: "Yellow Rain" and Anns Control, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 1011, 1048-56.
Iran, Iraq and most States involved in the Tanker War were also bound by the Convention on Prohibition of
Development, Production & StockpilingofBacteriological(Biological) & Toxin Weapons, Apr. 10, 1972,26 UST 583,
1015 UNTS 163.1980 TIF 268. See AFP 110-31 'il64(b); NWP I-14M Annotated 'il10.4; NWP 9A Annotated 1110.4;
Moore 447-52 (any use of biological weapons is a customary law violation). Mark D. Budensiek,A New Chemical
Weapons Convention: Can ItAssure the End ofChemical WeaponsProli/eration?, 25 STAN. INT'LL.J. 647 (1990), 39 NAV. L.
REv. 15 (1990), traces developments leading to the Convention on Prohibition of Development, Production,
Stockpiling & UseofCbemical Weapons &on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993,-UST -,32 ILM 800 (1993), being
ratified worldwide. Convention parties agree not to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or retain these weapons; to
transfer them to anyone; or to use or engage in military preparations to use them. States pledge to destroy these,
production facilities and weapons abandoned on another party's territory. Helping combat chemical terrorism is a
Convention goal. Implementing these conventions, like the Geneva Gas Protocol, will also protect the environment.
Sec generally Panel,Implemcnting the Chemical Weapons Convention: Progress and Chollenges, 1994 ASIL PROC. 12,37-40
(1995). Legality ofThreat or Use ofNuclear Weapons, 1996(1) ICJ 248 held the Protocol had been interpreted to apply
to poison and asphyxiating gases; States had not treated it as referring to nuclear weapons. But see w., 508-12
(Weeramantry, J., dissenting). For reservation principles, see Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; n. III.621 and
accompanying text; for treaty succession issues, see Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and

Disintegration.
269. Scc Diederich, n. 17, 146; L. Craig Johnstone, Ecocide and the Geneva Protocol, 49 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 711, 718
(1971); Okorodudu-Fubara, n. II.21O, 158-59; Roberts, Environmental Issues, n. 2, 230. Wil D. Verwey, Comment:
Protcction of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict - Do We Need Additional Rules?, in PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 558, 563 did not consider this possibility.

270. Hence the territorial sea issue the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention settled does not arise with respect to the
Protocol. Sec n. 261 and accompanying text; Part IV.B.4.

271. See generally Chapter II.
272. States may fly a distinctive flag over monuments and institutions to identify them. Roerich Pact, arts. 1-3;
TIF 350. The Netherlands presented the Preliminary Draft International Convention for Protection of Historic
Buildings & Works of Art in Time of War, Oct. 1938, TOMAN 403, developed through the International Museums
Office, to governments in 1939; it was never accepted due to World War II. UNESCO developed the Cultural Property
Convention, analyzed nn. 300-27 and accompanying text, after the war. TOMAN 19,22; Introductory Note, SCHINDLER &
TO~IAN 741.
273. See n. 261 and accompanying text; Part IV.B.4.
274. Sec Parts IV.B.1-IV.B.2.

275. Roerich Pact, art. 1; TO.lIAN 386; see also nn. III.948, IV.30, VI.84 and accompanying text.
276. BROWNLIE, INTERNATlONAt. LAW 5,13-14; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3).
277. Sec nn. 231-42 and accompanying text.

278. The Genocide Convention was not invoked during Tanker War aspects of the 1980-88 conflict. The 1948
Genocide Convention addresses a different problem: intentional acts during peace or war designed to destroy a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group. However, some of this international crime's components, e.g., "Deliberately
inflicting ••. conditions oflife calculated to bring about [a group's] physical destrUction," Convention on Prevention
& Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, arts. 1, 2(c), - UST - , 78 UNTS 277, 280 (Genocide
Convention), might raise environmental issues. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 404 & r.n.1, 702 & cmt. c declare the
Convention definition of genocide is a customary norm for a universal jurisdiction crime. The Convention is
implemented for the United States by Genocide Implementation Act of 1988, 18 USC § 1091. See also Nuremberg
Judgment, n.253, in 41 AJIL 172-75, 220-21; Justice Case (Case 3), Opinion & Judgment, 3 Tr. War Criminals Before
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NurembergMilit. Tribunals under Control Council L. No. 10, 954, 955, 970-72, 974-75, 979, 983·84(1951). Nearly all
States including Iran, Iraq and other Tanker War participants were parties by ratifying it or through treaty succession
principles, or were bound not to act to defeat its object and purpose. TIF 367; Vienna Convention, arL 18; Symposium,
Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration; nn. IV.32, 60, VI.45 and accompanying texL Many countries
have reserved to the Convention, including the United States. See generally SCHINDLER & TOMAN 239-49 (list as of
1987); 28 ILM 754 (US reservations). The result may be a treaty law patchwork because of the law of treaty
reservations. See Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; Reservations to Convention on Prevention & Punishment of Crime
of Genocide, 1951 ICJ 19-30; n. IIL621and accompanying texL Ifnaval warfare is conducted to deliberately destroy an
environment that is a condition oflife for a group covered by the Convention, there is potential for genocide as well as
environmental deprivation claims. The same could be said of genocide through "Deliberate and public incitement to
commit genocide." Genocide Convention, aIL 3(c). Deliberate and public incitement to commit the crime may result
in environmental destruction as well; one may recall destruction of synagogues before and during World War II. A
landed naval or marine force could be held accountable for such behavior, by destruction of, e.g., houses of worship of
such a group. A genocide issue could also arise during psychological warfare, where naval personnel engage in
broadcasting or leafleting that incites to violations. Most genocide issues involving use of the military to inflict
damage by force will arise in the land warfare context, but if the prospect is for close inshore operations, sea services
involvement is more likely. Naval aviation and land-based air forces stand on an equal footing in this regard as to
targeting. See nn. 231-42 and accompanying text; Part V.G.1. An operation might or might not involve genocide
claims. If,e.g., enemy fishing communities or their environment are ordered destroyed with intent to destroy them as
a group because of national, ethnic, racial or religious attributes, a genoide issue arises. If enemy coastal craft are
destroyed because of suspected aid to the enemy through gun running, and not because of ethnic, etc., composition of
crews, an issue arises under HagueXJ, arL 3, and not the Genocide Convention, See also nn. 243-51 and accompanying
text. Either scenario might raise environmental issues. The Convention has no territorial limitation; issues related to
the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, continental shelf and EEZ can arise. As with humanitarian law, no derogation
from the Convention during armed conflict is permitted. See nn. III.948, IV.30, VI.84 and accompanying texL There
is no evidence of practices amounting to genocide during the Tanker War; Iraq has been condemned for violations,
e.g., during the 1990-91 war. See generally S.C. Res. 674 (1990), 677 (1990), 686 (1991), 687 (1991), in WELLENS 536, 539,
540-41; DOD Report, n. II.8, 609, 623; John Norton Moore, War Crimes and the Rule a/Law in the Gu/fCrisis, 31 VJIL
403 (1991); William V. O'Brien, The Nuremberg Precedent and the Gu/fWar, ill. 391 (1991). During the Gulf War the
Coalition used psychological tactics, perhaps beamed from the sea as well as the land and air. DOD Report 536-38.
These did not incite to genocide or otherwise violate the Convention; no one has suggested the Coalition committed,
or incited to, genocide. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996(1) ICJ 240, after reciting Genocide
Convention, art. 2 definitions, pointed out that the prohibition of genocide would be pertinent in a nuclear weapons
situation only if the element ofintent toward a group as such was present and declined to conclude on the issue absent
specific circumstances.
279. Convention for Protection of World Cultural & Natural Heritage, Nov. 15, 1972,27 UST 37, 1037 UNTS 151
(World Cultural & Natural Heritage Convention).
280. 1980 TIF 338-39, 342-43, 349.
281. Fourth Convention, arL 154, citing 1899 Hague II, Hague IV; see also 4 PICTET 613-21.

282. See Fourth Convention, arts. 4-6,11,35-37,47-78; 4 PICTET45-64, 99-113, 233-43,272-369, does not elucidate
the point.

283. See n. 261 and accompanying text; Part IV.B.4.
284. See Parts IV.B.I-IV.B.2.
285. See no. III.948, IV.30, VI.84 and accompanying texL
286. Fourth Convention, arts. 14-15; 4 PICTET 119-33 focuses on these areas for purposes stated in the Convention
and mentions Henry Dunant's hospital town proposals during the Franco-Prussian War and for refuges during the
1871 Paris Commune uprising. The ICRC administered neutralized zones in Madrid, Shanghai and Jerusalem before
and after World WarII. Argentina and the United Kingdom agreed on a zone in the Falkland Islands capital in 1982
and a Red Cross Box at sea, a concept not mentioned in the Second Convention, during the Falklands/Malvinas War.
See Part V.F.4. GrrrA SERENY, ALBERT SPEER: HIS BATTLE WITH TRUTH 487 (1995) reports Speer's attempt to have
Heidelberg declared a hospital city late in World War II. These cities are known for cultural artifacts and buildings. If
a hospital area or zone is established near cultural sites, a result is protection for cultural property and therefore the
urban environmenL
287. These lose protected status if used for acts harmful to the enemy, e.g., antiaircraft weapons on the roof,
sheltering troops, storing arms or ammunition, as observation posts or liaison centers. They may be attacked after
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warning about their illegal use. Fourth Convention, arts. 18-19. See also AFP 110-31115-5; NWP I-14M Annotated II
8.5.1.4; NWP 9A Annotated 118.5.1.4; 4 PIcmr 141-56; Pan V.F.4.
288. First Convention, arL 23. These hospitals lose protected status if used for acts harmful to the enemy. See n.
287. The same is true for hospital ships in the territorial sea or inland waters. Second Convention, arts. 22-35; see also 1
PICTET 206-18; 2 id. 154-98; Pan V.F.4.
289. Second Convention, arts. 38-40; see also 2 PICTET 212-25.
290. NWP I-14M Annotated 118.5.1.5; NWP 9A Annotated 118.5.1.5.
291. Fourth Convention, arts. 53, 147; see also 4 PICTEr 300-02 (arL 53 reinforces, broadens Hague IV, Regulations,
arts. 46, 56; id., Regulations, arL 23(g), more comprehensive in scope).
292. Lijnzaad & Tanja, n. 2, 178; Planr,LegaIAspects, n.17, 223; Roberts, EnvironmentalIssues, n. 2, 230-31; see nn.
231-42,252·54 and accompanying texL

293. Sec nn. 231-42, 252-55 and accompanying texL The 1949 Conventions, through their Martens clauses
continuing rules of humanity and the public conscience, incorporate and carry forward principles related to direct or
indirect environmental protection. First Convention,arL 63; Second Convention,arL 62; Third Convention, arL 142;
Fourth Convention, arL 158. Earlier treaties' Martens clauses, similarly carry forward earlier law. See 1 PICTEr413; 2
id. 282; 3 id. 648; 4id. 625-26; Morris, n.17, 780; n. 255 and accompanying text. Plant,Introduction, n.2, 17; Plant,Legaj
Aspects, n. 17,222, argue the Martens clause ofProtocol I could be interpreted to incorporate environmental concerns
as matters of humanity and the public conscience. See nn. 402, 450 and accompanying texL If this is so, the 1949
Convention clauses might apply too.
294. Michael BOTHE, Remarks, in Panel, Criminal ResponsibilitiesJor Environmental Damage, in PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 499,501; Ariane L. DeSaussure, The Role oJthe Law ojArmed Conflict During the Persian Gulf War: An
Overview, 37 AiR FORCE REviEW 41, 57 (1994); Edwards,n. 2, 130; McNeill, Protection, n. 2, 540-541; Okorodudu-Fubara,
n. II.210, 191; Roberts, Environmental Issues, n. 2, 250; Terry, n.17, 63. Planr,LegaIAspects, n.17, 224 says Fourth
Convention, arL 53 did not apply to some discharges, i.e., Iraqi-owned oil in the tankers and from the Mina al Bakr
terminal.lt did apply to discharge of Kuwaiti oil from the Sea Island Terminal.
295. Fourth Convention, arL 63; see also 4 PICTEr 333-34.
296. NWP I-14M Annotated 1111.3 & n.16; NWP 9A Annotated, n.33, 1111.3 & n.17; Matheson, Remarks 427.

297. Sec Part V.F.4.
298. Sce Part V.F.4; nn. VI.281-93 and accompanying te.XL
299. Sec Diederich, n.17, 159; Part V.F.4; nn. VI.281-93 and accompanying text. Part of World War II lore may be
that there was a tacit agreement between the United Kingdom and Germany that if Heidelberg and another German
university would be spared from attack, Oxford and Cambridge would be. What has been proposed would follow this
idea.
300. Immediate incentives were looting of art during the Nazi occupation, removal of important works from
private and public collections, and intentional destruction of culturally significant movables and immovables,
including cities. TOMAN 21-22; Prott, n. V.ll0, 582.
301. Cultural Property Convention, arL 36, citing Hague IV; Hague IX; 1899 Hague II; Roerich PacL The United
States is or has been party to the latter treaties and is a signatory but nota Convention party. Iran and Iraq ratified the
Convention; many if not all other States involved in the Tanker War were parties through ratification or treaty
succession. Sec SCHINDLER & TOMAN 769-75; TIF 350,441-42; TOMAN 318-20; Symposium, TrearySuccession;Walker,
Integration and Disintegration. Although the United States is nota Convention party, NWP I-14M Annotated 118.5.1.6
and NWP 9A Annotated 118.5.1.6 condemn the sort of destruction it denounces, unless property is used to further an
enemy war efforLId. publish orders from US higher commands that ordered preservation ofcultural property during
previous wars where the United States was a belligerenL The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), a UN specialized agency like IMO, sponsored the Convention. TOMAN 21-24. The United States
withdrew from UNESCO in 1984; Singapore and the United Kingdom followed in 1985.See 23 ILM 218 (1984); 24id.
489 (1985). Sec also BIRNIE & BOYLE 59·60. TOMAN 322-23 e.xplains why no Martens clause was included. The Second
Protocol to the Cultural Property Convention also has no Martens clause. The Protocol, opened for signature in 1999,
will come into force 3 months after 20 States ratify iL Second Protocol, arL 43. For Martens clause analysis, and
possible application to environmental concerns, see nn. 255, 293, 402, 450 and accompanying texL

302. Compare Cultural Property Convention, arL 18 with, e.g., Fourth Convention, arL 2; see also 4 Plcmr 17-25;
TOMAN 195-206; Theodor Meron, Comment: Protection of the Environment During Non-International Conflicts, in
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 353, 354; Prott,n. V.ll0,587-88. TheRoerich Pact applies at all times; see n. 275 and
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accompanying text. Second Protocol, arts. 2-4, states its supplementary status, declares its scope of operation and the
relationship between id., arts. 10-14, and other provisions of the Cultural Property Convention and the Second
Protoco!'
303. Cultural Property Convention, art. 1, states that cultural property, irrespective of origin or ownership,
includes:
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as
monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of
buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other
objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important
collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property described above;
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve ore."hibit the movable cultural property defined
in ... (a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges intended to shelter, in the
event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property defined in ... (a);
(c) centres containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in •.. (a) and (b), to be known as "centres
containing monuments."
This definition covers cultural resources, e.g., underwater sites of archaeological or historical importance, including
historic shipwrecks and buildings, etc., now under water. TOMAN 4546; Prott, n. V.ll0, 582-83. Port Royal off
Kingston, Jamaica, is a sunken town lost to earthquake. There are many sites in the Mediterranean Sea, e.g., ancient
Tyre off Lebanon. Id. 584-85. For comparative analysis between Convention art. 1 and Protocol II, art. 16, see Daniel

Smith,Protections for VICtims ofInternationalAnned Conflicts: The Proposed Ratification ofProtocol II ~ the United States,
120 Mu.. L. REv. 59, 72-75 (l988);seealso Diederich,n.l7, 147. SecondProtocol,arts.l(e), 10-14, declare an "enhanced
protection" regime for cultural property if the property is "cultural heritage ofthe greatest importance for hUI'lanity",
is protected by adequate domestic measures recognizing its exceptional cultural and historic value that insure the
highest level of protection, and is not used for military purposes or to shield military sites and a declaration has been
made by the State having control over the property, confirtning it will not be so used.
304. Cultural Property Convention, art. 2; see also TOMAN 57-58; Second Protocol,arts.l(e), 10-14, establishing an
enhanced protection regime; n. 303.
305. Parties pledge instructing their armed forces or publishing military regulations to insure Convention
observance and respect for all peoples' culture and cultural property. Armed forces must establish a service or
specialists to secure respect for cultural property and to cooperate with civil authorities responsible for safeguarding
it. The property must be marked pursuant to the Convention. Cultural Property Convention, arts. 3,7,10, 16; see also
Second Protocol, arts. 5-9; TOMAN 59·66, 91-96, 14142, 177-84.
306. Armed custodians assigned to guard property are considered police responsible for public order and are not
deemed part of a belligerent's artned forces because of their status as guards. Cultural Property Convention, arts. 8-9;
see also Second Protocol, arts. 5-9; TOMAN 96-112, 13840.
307. Cultural Property Convention, Regulations, art. 11; see also TOMAN 113-15. Diederich, n. 17, 159 suggests
similar environmental sanctuaries.
308. Cultural Property Convention, arts. 12-14; Regulations, arts. 17-19; see also TOMAN 151-72.

309. See generally Part V.B. The Convention's implications for submarine warfare and reconnaisance "need
discussion," according to Prott, n. V.ll0, 585; he offers no solutions.
310. Hague XI, art. 4; see also TOMAN 171; n. 248 and accompanying text.
311. The Cultural Property Convention also provides for dispute resolution, including arbitration. It!., art. 8;
Regulations, arts. 12-16; see also TOMAN 97-112, 116-37.
312. Protecting Powers are States not party to a conflict who safeguard interests of parties to the conflict. See n.
V.439; TOMAN 94, 222-27.
313. Cultural Property Convention, art. 21; Regulations, arts. 1-10; see also TOMAN 22249.
314. Cultural Property Convention, art. 4(1); see also Second Protocol, art. 6; TOMAN 68-69.
315. Cultural Property Convention, arts. 4(1)-4(2), 9; see also TOMAN 68-70, 72-79. This was included because of
UK and US delegations' strong advocacy; neither country has ratified the Convention, however. TOMAN 75-77; Prott,
n. V.ll0, 586. See also Second Protocol, art. 7.
316. Cultural Property Convention, arts. 4(3)-4(4); see also NWP 9A Annotated, Table ST6-1; TOMAN 70-71.
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317. Cultural Property Convention, art. 4(5), referring to id., art. 3; see also TOMAN 59·66,71-72; nn. 305-13 and
accompanying tc.xt.
318. A party whose government is considered its legitimate government by a resistance movement shall ifpossible
draw its anention to the obligation to comply with cultural property conventions. Cultural Property Convention, art.
5; sec also TOMAN 83-89.
319. Cultural Property Convention, art. 1; TOMAN 39-56 says coverage ofsites of great natural beauty was rejected;
they are covered by the Convention for Protection of World Cultural & Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972,27 UST 37,
1037 UNTS 151 (World Cultural & Natural Heritage Convention), analyzed nn. 339-48 and accompanying text. See
also Harlow & McGregor, n.111, 325-26, citing Bernard H. Oxman,Environmental Waifare (EII'Vironmental Terrorism
During Wartime and Rules o/War), 22 ODIL 433 (1991). McNeill,Protection, n. 2, 543-44 notes discussions to protect
nature preserves like demilitarized zones. The Second Protocol, arts. l(e), 10-14 would add a special category of
property subject to "enhanced protection;" see n. 303 and accompanying text. The Protocol also provides for criminal
responsibility and jurisdiction of these offenses, including international judicial assistance and extradition. Second
Protocol, arts. 15-21. /d., art. 22 declares the Protocol will apply to armed conflicts not of an international nature
within a party's territory but not to, e.g., riots.
320. Roberts, Environmenral Issues, n. 2, 231.

321. Cf, Prott, n. V.110, 583 (need to observe customary warfare rules, e.g., proportionality). Cultural Property
Convention, arts. 4(1)-4(2), 9, allow destroying cultural property if "military necessity imperatively requires" it; see
also n. 315 and accompanying text.
322. See n. 261 and accompanying tc.xt; Part IV.B.4.
323. Sec Parts IV.B.1-2.
324. Sec nn. III.948, IV.30, VI.84 and accompanying text.
325. SCHINDLER & TOMAN 769-73, 780-82.
326. DOD Report, n. II.B, 605-06; John H. McNeill, Remarks, in Panel Discussion, The Strategic Imperarive,
PROTECTION OFTHEENVIRONMENT 63, 80; Roberts,Environmenral Issues, n. 2, 240; cf. Harlow & McGregor, n. 111,325
(1990-91 war sources; assumption is that same practice applied for Tanker War).

327. See Part V.F.4; nn. 297-99, 319 and accompanying text; cf. McNeill,Prorecrion, n. 2, 543-44.
328. See generally TOMAN 25,258-59; see also n. 301 and accompanying text.
329. Convention on Means of Prohibiting & Preventing Illicit Import, Export & Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, - UST -,823 UNTS 231 (Illicit Import, Export & Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property Convention).
330. TOMAN 465-67. By 1998 90 States were parties. TIF 350.
331. TOMAN 25.
332. Illicit Import, Export & Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property Convention, n. 329, arts. 2-3,- UST - ,
823 UNTS 236; TOMAN 362.

333. Compare Cultural Property Convention, art. 1 wirh Illicit Import, Export & Transfer of Ownership ofCultural
Property Convention, n. 329, arL 1, - UST - , 823 UNTS 234; see also TOMAN 359·60.
334. Cultural Property Convention, art. 8; see also n. 311 and accompanying text.

335. Compare Illicit Import, E.xport & Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property Convention, n. 329, art. 11,UST - , 823 UNTS 242 wirh Cultural Property Convention, art. 4(3); see also TOMAN 361.
336. TOMAN 361; compare Illicit Import, E.xport & Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property Convention, n.329,
art. 3,- UST -,823 UNTS 236,wirhid., art. 11,- UST -,823 UNTS 242.
337. Illicit Import, E.xport & Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property Convention,!t. 329, art. 9,- UST - ,
823 UNTS 242.

338. leI., art. 10(a), - UST -,823 UNTS 242.
339. See TIF 350; treaty succession principles may push the total of States party to the Convention higher.
Symposium, Trea!y Succession; Walker, Inregration and Disinregrarion.
340. TOMAN 369.
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341. I.U.C.N./I.C.E.L., Protection ofCultural and Natural Heritage Sites in Times ofArmed Conflict, 23 ENVI"LPOL. &
L. 259 (1993) (Convention, although concluded for times of peace, also applies during war); see also TOMAN 369;
Verwey, n. 269, 563.
342. World Cultural & Natural Heritage Convention,n. 319,arts. 3-5,27 UST 41,1037 UNTS 154; TOMAN 369.

343. Cf. LOS Convention, art. 2; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 1; see also n. 261 and accompanying text; Part
IV.B.4.
344. World Cultural & Natural Heritage Convention, n. 319, arts. 1-2,27 UST 40-42,1037 UNTS 153-55.
345. TOMAN 53·55; see also Part B.3.a(III)(B).
346. Verwey, n. 269, 563. The 1954 and 1982 Conventions lists can be and are different. The World Cultural &
Natural Heritage Convention, n. 319, covers only ftxed objects; the Cultural Property Convention protects
immovable and movable property. TOMAN 54, 110, 117-18.
347. LeGrand, n. 2,30.

348. Compare TOMAN 373-75 with Cultural Property Convention, art. 20.
349. E.g., DOD Report, n. II.8, 605-07, does not cite World Cultural & Natural Heritage Convention, n. 319.
350. Cf. TOMAN 487-90.
351. TIF 468-69; treaty succession principles may push that total higher. Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker,

Integration and Disintegration.
352. BROWNUE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3).
353. Daniel Barstow Magraw & Sergei Vinogradov, Environmental Law, in BEYOND CONFRONTATION, n. 111.358,
193,199.
354. Reservation & Understanding of Kuwait, Jan. 2, 1980, in SCHINDLER & TOMAN 174: "This Convention
binds ... Kuwait only towards States Parties thereto. Its obligatory character shall ipso facto terminate with respect to
any hostile State which does not abide by the prohibition •.. therein .•.. "(emphasis in original). See also Vienna
Convention, arts. 19-23; n. 111.621, Vl.268, 278 and accompanying text. Another interpretation is that it restates
principles on the effect of fundamental change of circumstances, war and possibly impossibility of performance. Su
Vienna Convention, arts. 61-62; nn. 1II.928-29, IV.26-27, VI.80-81 and accompanying text.
355. Art. 1(2) bars any party from assisting, encouraging or inducing any State, group of States or international
organization from engaging in environmental modiftcation techniques the Convention condemns. ENMOD
Convention, art. 1 (emphases added).
356. "[This Understanding is] not incorporated into the Convention but [is] part of the negotiating record and
[was] included in the report ... by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the ••• General Assembly in
September 1976." SCHINDLER & TOMAN 168 & n.l (emphasis added), citingRepon ofthe Conference ofthe Committee on
Disarmament, 1 UN GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 27,91-92, UN Doc. N31/27 (1976) (Repon ofllle Conference). The
understanding interprets the Convention and is not a reservation excluding, limiting or modifying it. The
understanding binds the United States. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 313 cmt. g, 314 cmt. d; see also Vienna Convention,
arts. 19-23; nn.1II.621, Vl.268, 278 (multilateral treaty reservations).
357. ENMOD Convention, art. 2.
358. "[This Understanding is] not incorporated into the Convention but [is] part of the negotiating record and
[was] included in the report transmitted by the Conference .•• to the ... General Assembly •.••. " SCHINDLER & TOM.W
168 & n.l, citing Repon of the Conference, n. 356, 91-92 (emphasis added). The understanding interprets the
Convention and is not a reservation purporting to exclude, limit or modify it. The understanding binds the United
States. See n. 356 and accompanying text; see also Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; nn. 111.621, Vl.268, 278 and
accompanying text (multilateral treaty reservations).
359. ENMOD Convention, art. 3(1). The Committee appended an understanding: " ••. [T]his Convention does
not deal with ... whether ... a given use of environmental modiftcation techniques is in accordance with generally
recognized principles ofinternationallaw." "[This understanding is] not incorporated into the Convention but [is]
part of the negotiating record and [was] included in the report transmitted by the Conference ••• to the ...
Assembly .... " SCHINDLER & TOMAN 168 & n.l, citing Repon of the Conference, n. 369, 91-92. The understanding
interprets the Convention and is not a reservation purporting to exclude, limit or modify it. The understanding binds
the United States. See nn. III.621, VI.356, 358 and accompanying text.
360. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103;seealso nn. 111.10,47-630, 916-18, 968·84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; PartB.1.
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361. Vienna Convention, arts.190-23; see also nn. III.621, VI.268, 278 and accompanying text.
362. ENMOD Convention, art. 1(1); see also Okorodudu-Fubara, n. II.210, 182-83; nn. 354-56 and accompanying
text. Terry, n. 17, 64 makes this point but does not inquire whether it might restate custom; see n. 365 and
accompanying texL
363. TIF 364-65.
364. Vienna Convention, arL 18; SCHINDLER & TOMAN 170; Sharp, n. 2, 19; see also nn. IV.32, 60, IV.45 and
accompanying texL

365. E.g., SAN REAIO;\LwuAL 11 44,cmt.44.4(ENMOD Convention standards "the threshold indicated"); cf. Arkin,
n. 2, 121; Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2, 430; ef. Okorodudu-Fubara, n. II.21O, 171-72, 179; Ivan Shearer, The Debate to
Assess the Needfor New InternationalAccords, in PROTECfION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 546, 547; contra, Edwards, Il- 2, 129.
Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996(1) IC] 241-42, discussed ENMOD but appeared to take no
position:
.•. [T]he issue is not whether the treaties relating to the protection of the environment are or are not
applicable during an armed conflicl, but rather whether the obligations stemming from these treaties were
inJended to be obligations oftota! restraint during military conflicL
The Court does not consider that the treaties. _. [including ENMOD] could have intended to deprive a
State of the exercise of its right of self-defense ..• because of its obligations to protect the environment •...
State must take environmental considerations inJo accounJ when assessing what is necessary and
proportionale in [pursuing] legitimate military objectives. Respect for the environmenJ is one ... clemenJ ...
[in] assessing whether an action [conforms] .•• with necessity and proportionality.

See also UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; n. III.1O and accompanyingtexL Paul C. Szasz, reviewing the Convention, Protocol
I and the World Charter for Nature, said that "[I]t can be safely concluded that the principle expressed in all these
instrUmenJs-that nature is no longer fair game in mankind's conflicts-is weIl on its way to becoming an accepted
principle ••." Panel, The Gulf War: Environment as a Weapon, 1991 ASIL PROe. 215,216-17. World Charter for Nature,
G.A.Res. 37n (Annex), UN GAOR,37th Sess., Supp. No. 51,at 17, UNDoc.N37/511111 5,20(1982) (World Charter for
Nature), in 22 ILM 455, 457, 459 (1983), declared that "Nature shaIl be secured against degradation caused by warfare
or other hostile activities;" "Military activities damaging to nature shaIl be avoided."
Paul C. Szasz, Comment: The Existing Legal Framework, Protecting the EnvironmentDuring IntC77WtionalArmed Conflict, in
PROTECfION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 278, 279, characterized "these statements, . _ . merely declarations of leading
representative international bodies, ___ at best constitute inJemational 'soft law' [but] their adoption by the votes or
with the concurrence of representatives of a majority of countries lend some weight to the suggestion that they
represenl, ifnotyet weIl-established customary law, at least •• • legeferenda." See also G.A. Res. 35/8 (1980), discussed in
Howard S. Levie, Comment: Criminal Responsibilities for Environmental Damage, in PROTECfION OF THE ENvtRONMENT,
491,494-95.
366. ENMOD Convention, arL 2; see also Sharp, n. 2, 22.

367. See n. 358 and accompanying texL
368. ENMOD Convention, aIL 1(1) (emphasis added).

369. See n. 356 and accompanying texL
370. Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2, 432; Leslie C. Green, The Environment and the Law ofC01I1Jentional Waifare, 29
CYBIL 222, 226-27 (1991); Robens,ElI'Vironmental Destruction, n. 2, 544.
371. Low & Hodgkinson,n.2,432,citing Final Declaration of Second Review Conference ofParties to Convention
on Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, SepL 14-18, 1992,
arL 2, in U.N.I.D.R. Newsletter 60 (1993). Low & Hodgkinson say Convention preparatory works support this; they
accept this view. /d. 432-33.
372. ENMOD Convention, aIL 1(1).

373. Id., arL 2.
374. Cf., e.g., Space Treaty n. IIl.957, arL 1, 18 UST 2411, 610 UNTS 207; see also AFP 110-3111 2-3(a); BROWNuE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 267-71; NWP I-14M Annotated 11 1.9; NWP 9A Annotated 11 1.9.

375. See n. 357 and accompanying texL
376. LOS Convention, arL 87(1); High Seas Convention, arL 2; see also Part IV.B.1.
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377. See n. 356 and accompanying text.
378. See nn. 111.958, IV.16, VI.68 and accompanying text.
379. See n. 356 and accompanying text.
380. See Chapter IV for development of these LOS norms. Since the ENMOD Convention has no territorial
boundaries, historical analysis of norms that mayor may not apply to given treaties has no bearing. It is like the
Geneva Gas Protocol and the Genocide Convention, which also apply worldwide. See nn. 270, 278 and accompanying
text.
381. The World Meteorological Organization and UN Environmental Program Informal Meeting on Legal
Aspects of Weather ModificationDrajiPrinciples (Apr. 1978),in Aviation & Space Law: Meteorology, 1978 Digest § 7,
at 1204·05, declares States must take "all reasonable steps to ensure that weather modification activities under their
jurisdiction or control do not cause adverse environmental effects ... outside their national jurisdiction." See also
Agreement Relating to Exchange ofInformationon Weather Modification Activities, Mar. 26,1975, Can.-US,art. 7,
26 UST 540, 545.

382. See Parts IV.B.l-1V.B.3.
383. Vienna Convention, art. 18; see also nn. IV.32, 60, VI.45 and accompanying text.

384. See n. 365 and accompanying text.
385. See nn. 370-71 and accompanying text.
386. The record is not clear; presumably neutral ships diverted around the spill to avoid fouling engineering
plants; Gulf fishing grounds were damaged, however. See n. 4-5 and accompanying text.

387. See nn. 4-5 and accompanying text.
388. See n. 356 and accompanying text.
389. Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2, 434; Okorodudu-Fubara, n. 11.210, 179.

390. See nn. 367-68 and accompanying text.
391. See n. 6 and accompanying text.
392. See n. 8 and accompanying text.
393. See nn. 11.65, 215, 221, 519, VI.9 and accompanying text.
394. ENMOD Convention, art. 1; see also nn. 355-56 and accompanying text.
395. ENMOD Convention, art. 2; see also nn. 357-58 and accompanying text.

396. See generally Walker,State Practice 158-70; Parts V.C-V.D.
397. See n. 6 and accompanying text.
398. ENMOD Convention, arts. 1-2; see also nn. 355-58 and accompanying text.
399. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103;seealso nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84,IV.6-25 and accompanying text; PartB.I.

400. See ENMOD Convention, arts. 1-2; nn. 355-58 and accompanying text.
401. SCHINDLER & TOMAN 701-03 (1987 list). The United States has declared it will not ratify Protocol I; Protocol II
has been sent to the US Senate for advice and consent. See n. 111.622 and accompanying text.

402. Cf. DOD Report, n. 11.8, 606·07. The Martens clause, ProtocolI, art. 1(2) carried forward other humanitarian
law, and perhaps environmental concerns as a matter of humanity and public conscience. Plant, Legal Aspects, n. 17,
222. See also n. 450 and accompanying text.
403. ProtocolI, art.49(3); BOT/lEet al. 290; PlLLOUD, COMMENTARY 605·06; Michael Bothe, Commentary, in LAW OF
NAVAL WARFARE 760·62; Fenrick, Milizary Objectives, n. 11.202, 23-24; Fenrick, LegalAspects, n. I1.501, 264-65; Low &
Hodgkinson, n. 2, 441; van Hegelsom, n. III.623, 8·10 (noting, criticizing two commentators' opposing views); see also
nn. 427-31 and accompanying text.
404. Protocol II, art. 1. Confusion in applying the Protocols has crept into secondary literature. E.g., Edgerton, n. 2,
173 cites Protocol II, arL 14 instead of Protocol I, art. 54 in analyzing deliberate attempted destruction of Saudi
Arabia's desalination plants during the 1990-91 war. Whatever one might think ofIraq's arguments for its invasion
and trying to annex Kuwait as a long·lost province, rejected by the UN Security Council, see Walker, Crisis Over
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Kuu.'ait 34, its assault on Saudi Arabia was pan of an international armed conflict, covered by Protocol I and not
Protocol II.
405. The 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War belligerents agreed on a Red Cross Box on the high seas, analogous to
demilitarized zones protected by Protocol I, an. 60 for transfer of sick and wounded; see Part V.FA. The SAN REAIO
MANUAL analogizes Protocol I standards, particularly if they restate general customary norms, to the law of naval
warfare.
406. Philippe Antoine, International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of the Environment in Time of Armed
Conflict, 321NT'L REv. REo CROSS 517, 527 (1992).
407. Louise Doswald-Beck, The Principle ofHumanily in the Law ofSea Warfare: The Protection ofCivilians and the
HOTS de Combat, in Panel, NeulTalily, the Rights ofShipping and the Use ofForce in the Persian Gulf War (Parl II), 1988
ASIL PROe. 599, 600-01 (1990).

408. CJ. Edgerton, n. 2, 173; Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2, 441.
409. Protocol I, arL 35(1), restating the principle ofHague IV, Regulations, art. 22; 1899 Hague II, Regulations, art.
22; G.A. Res. 2444,23 UN GAORSupp. No. 18,50, UN Doc. A/7218,in SCliINDLER&ToMAN 263; see also AFP 110-3111
6-3(a); BOnllwal. 193-95; Final Protocol, Aug. 27, 1974, an. 12, in SCHINDLER & TOMAN 25, 29 (never ratified); NWP
I-14M Annotated 118.1 n.2(citinginteralia LieberCode,arL 30); NWP 9AAnnotated 118.1 n.l (same); OXFORDNAVAL
MANUAL, art. 14; 1880 OXFORD MANUAL, art. 4; PILLOUD, CoMMENTARY 390; SAN REMO MANUAL 1138 & cmts.; STONE
551; Fenrick,Military Objectives, n. IIol01, 1; LijnZ3ad & Tanja, n.2, 180; Matheson,Remarks424; Robertson,Modern
Tcchn%gy, n. V.173, 363, 370; William G. Schmidt, TheProtection of Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts: Protocoll
Additional/O the Geneva Conventions, 24 AIR FORCE L. REv. 189,213 (1984). Protocol I, an. 35(2) denounces weapons,
projectiles or means of warfare intended, or may be expected, to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
This customary rule, applicable to naval warfare, is analyzed at 442-52 and accompanying text.
410. Protocol I, art. 35(2), a customary norm; see also nn. 442-52 and accompanying texL
411. Protocol I, arL 35(3) (emphasis added).

412. See nn. 354-56 and accompanying texL
413. Repon of Committee Ill, Second Sess.,in 2 HOWARD S. LEVIE, PROTECTION OFWAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL I TOTHE
1949 GENEVA CoNVENTIONS 276 (1980); PILLOUD, COMMENTARY 416; Antoine, n. 406, 525; Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2,
429; Schmidt, TheProtection,n. III.623,215-16. Levie, The 1977 ProtocolI and the United States, 38 ST. LoUIS U.L.J. 469,
478 (1993), describes the ENMOD Convention distinctions and says "it would be extremely difficult for a ••. party to
the 1977 Protocol I to assen that the words so used had a different meaning in the Protocol •• _»
414. Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2, 429.
415. Antoine, n. 406, 526.

416. Compare ENMOD Convention, preamble with Protocol I, preamble; see also BOTHE et aL 33; PILLOUD,
CoMMENTARY 27-28.
417. BIRNII! & BOYLE210; Green 123 ("new 'basicrule'");JOHN NORTON MooRE, CRISISINTHE GULF: ENFORCINGTHE
RULI! OF LAW 81 (1992); cJ. SAN REAlo l\L\NuAL, 1144 & cmL; cJ. Arkin, n. 2, 121; cJ. Fleck, Protection, n. 17,530; cJ.
Gasser, The Debate, n.17, 523; Frits Kalshoven,Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use ofMethods and Means ofWarfare, in
DEKKER & POST 97, 100; Levie, The 1977 Protoeoll, n.413, 479 (United States has no valid reason to object to substance
ofarL 35[3]); Glen Plant, Comment, n. 2,440,441 (emergingnorm);cJ. Shearer, TheDebate, n.365,547; Solf,Proteetion,
n. IlI.623, 134 (1986); Terry, n. 17,65 (replication of Hague IV standards); contra, Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2,427;
Matheson,Rcmarks 424 (US view is that art. 35(3) does not state a customary norm); McNeill,Protection, n. 2, 540-41
(treaty norms); cJ. Bernard H. Oxman, Comment: Developing the InternationalLaw ofArmed Conflict, in PROTECfIONOF
THI!ENVIRONMENT 576, 577; L.R. Penna, Customary International Law and Protocoll: AnAna(ysis ofSome Provisions, in
STlJDll!SANOEsSAYSON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ANDREoCROSSPRlNCIPLI!S 200,210 (Christophe Swinarski
ed. 1984); cJ. Roberts, Environmen/Ol Issues, n. 2, 235; Robertson, Modern Technology, n.V.173, 363; Schmidt, The
Protection, n. III.623, 214-17; cJ. Verwey, n. 269, 560-61. Low & Hodgkinson 427-28 seem to miss the point in saying
that art. 35(3) "do[es] not apply to conventional warfare" and therefore would not apply to the Iraqi oil spills.
Authorities id. cites do not speak ofinapplicabiliry butlack ofsignificant limitations on belligerents,i.e., that art. 35(3)
would not be triggered by damage incidental or peripheral to conventional warfare. See, e.g., BOTHE et aL 348; George
H. Aldrich, Progressfve Development ofthe Laws of War: A Rep(y to Criticisms ofthe 1977 Geneva Protocoll, 26 VJIL 693,
711 (1986); Green, The Environment, n. 370, 228; Diederich, n. 17, 152; Report of Committee III, Second Sess.
(CDDH/215/Rev.l; XV, 263), in 2 LEVIE, PROTECTION, n. 413,276-77 (Protocol I preparatory works), cited by Low &
Hodgkinson 417-18, notes ArL 35(3) has been criticized as being insufficient, unworkable or unrealistic; Lijnzaad &
Tanja, n. 2,182; Guy B. Roberts, The NewRulesfor Waging War: The CaseAgainstRatijication ofAdditionalProtocoli, 26
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V]IL 109, 148 (1985); Christopher Greenwood, Customary IntemationalLaw and the First Geneva Protocol of1977 in the
GulfConjlict, in THE GULF WAR 1990-91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW 63, 86-87 (Peter Rowe ed_ 1993)(Art.
35(3)'s equivocal status.). The United States appears firm in opposing the arL 35(3) standard. A condition of its
ratifYing the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Fragments and Mine Protocols was: "The United States
considers that the fourth paragraph of the Preamble to the present Convention, which reproduces the subject of
provisions ofArticle 35 ... [3] and Article 55 ... [I] ofAdditional Protocol I, applies only to States which have accepted
those provisions[.]" Levie,Prohibilions, n. III.627, 666. LegaliryofThreat or Use ofNuclear Weapons, 1996(1) IC] 242,
may have agreed that Protocol I, arts. 35(3) and 55 do not restate custom:
... [T]hese provisions embody a general obligation to protect the natural environment against widespread,
long-term and severe environmental damage; the prohibition of methods and means of warfare which are
intended, or may be expected, to cause such damage; and the prohibition of attacks against the natural
environment by ... reprisals.
These are powerful constraints for all States having subscribed to these provisions.
One implication is that those countries that have not "subscribed" to these provisions by Protocol ratification or
acceptance of them as custom are not bound.
418. Commentators divide on this point; see n. 365 and accompanying text.

419. Compare Protocol I, art. 35(3) with ENMOD Convention, arL 1(1).
420. See n. 417 and accompanying text.
421. See nn. 413-16 and accompanying text.
422. See nn. 403, 427-31 accompanying text.
423. Compare Protocol I, arL 35(3)with id., arL 55. Most commentators lump the two provisions together in arguing
whether they restate customary international law. See n. 417 and accompanying text. See also Harlow & McGregor, n.
111,318 (Art. 55 does not restate custom); Verwey, n. 269, 561-63 (same).
424. Netherlands Declaration,]une 26, 1977,in SCHINDLER & TOMAN 713, 714; UK Declaration, Dec. 12, 1977, in

id.717.
425. Declarations have the same legal effect as understandings, as distinguished from reservations, which
introduce new terms for a treary.See Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; nn. III.621, VI.268,278 and accompanying text.

426. See nn. 413-14 and accompanying text; but see Lijnzaad & Tanja,n. 2,181. Second Protocol, art. I(t) echoes the
principles of the declarations. See n. 424 and accompanying text.
427. See van Hegelsom, n. III.623, 8-10, referring to two commentators.
428. See n. 403 and accompanying text.
429. Protocol I, arL 49, incorporating by referenceid., arts. 48-67 and Fourth Convention, arts. 13-26. "'[R]ules of
international law applicable in armed conflict' means the rules applicable in armed conflict set forth in international
agreements to which the Parties to the conflict are Parties and the generally recognized principles and rules of
international law which are applicable to armed conflict[.]" Protocol I, art. 2(b). This does not include, e.g., UN
General Assembly recommendations under UN Charter, arts. 10, 14, or the law ofjus ad bellum, e.g. Charter law under
id., arL 51. BOTHE et aL 54-55; l'ILLOUD, COMMENTARY 60-61.
430. Under the LOS the territorial sea and inland waters are part of sovereign territory. See Part IV.B.4. The
LONW and arms control law also make this distinction. See generally Seabed Arms Control Treaty, arL 4; Nyon
Arrangement, arL 4; Nyon Supplementary Agreement; London Declaration, art. 37; OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, arts. 1,
9,21,88; Robertson, New LOS 274-75; SAN REMo MANUAL ~~ 10(a), 14,20-21.

431. See Parts. IV.B.I-IV.B.2.
432. MooRE, CRISIS, n. 417, 81 says Iraq violated Protocol I, arts. 35(3), 55, without differentiating between the
1990-91 sea and land campaigns; see also Low & Hodgkinson, n. 2, 430 (same).

433. See nn. 411, 423 and accompanying text.
434. See nn. 413-15 and accompanying text.
435. See nn. 4-6 and accompanying text.
436. See nn. 353-91 and accompanying text.
437. See Parts V.B-V.D; nn. VI.8, 411-34 and accompanying text.
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438. See UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.1O, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part
B.l; n. 429 and accompanying text; Protocol I, preamble, arL 2(b); BOTHBet aL 32-33; PtLLOUO, COMMENTARY 25-29,
60-61.
439. See nn. VI.5, 8, 411-34 and accompanying texL

440. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 429,438 and accompanying texL
441. Protocol I, arL 49(3); see also nn. 430-31 and accompanying texL
442. Hague IV, Regulations, arL 23(e); 1899 Hague II, Regulations, arL 23(e); AFP 110-31 ~~ 6-2, 6-3(b); BOTHBet
al. 195; GREEN 131; Lieber Code, arL 16; NWP I-14M Annotated ~~ 9.1-9.1.1; NWP 9A Annotated ~~ 9.1-9.1.1;
OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, arL 16(2); PILLOUO,Co.IIMENTARy409; SANREMoMANuAL ~ 42(a) & cmt.42.2; STONE558; US
Department of Defense General Counsel letter, SepL 22, 1972, in 67 AJIL 122 (1973); Fenrick, Comment, New, n.
III.627, 233; Lijnzaad & Tanja, n. 2,180; Matheson,Remarks 424; Henri Meyrowitz, ThePrinciple o/Superfluous Injury
or UnnecessarySu/fering, 1994 INT'LREv.REoCRoss 98; Roach, Certain, n. III.627, 69-72; Robertson,Modern Technology,
n. V.173, 363; Schmidt, The COITIJentional, n. III.627, 308-12; Schmidt, The Protection, n. III.623, 213-14.
443. See nn. 268-71 and accompanying texL

444. Cf. Hague IV, Regulations, arL 23(e); n. 442 and accompanying texL
445. See nn. 4-5 and accompanying texL
446. Cf. Protocol I, preamble, arL 1; see also BOTHEet aL 33,37-45; PILLOUO, CoMMENTARY 27-28, 34-40.
447. See n. 4 and accompanying texL
448. See n. 446 and accompanying texL
449. See n. 8 and accompanying texL

450. See generally Walker, State Practice 164-66 and sources cited. It has been argued that the language invoking
"principles of humanity and the dictates ofpublic conscience," in the Martens clause includes a requirement to avoid
unjustifiable damage to the environmenL Plant, Introduction, n. 2, 17; Plant, Legal Aspects, n. 17, 222, referring to
Protocol I, arL 1(2). Be that as it may, this language supports culpability for States ordering attacks on innocent
merchantmen. However, ArL 1(2) commentaries do not mention environmental degradation. See BOTHE et al. 44;
PILLOUO, CoMMENTARY. 38-39.
451. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Protocol I, arL 2(b); see also nn. III.I0, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and
accompanying te.xt; Part B.l; n. VI.429 and accompanying texL
452. See nn. 6-8 and accompanying texL
453. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); see also Part B.1.
454. Protocol I, arL 49; see nn. 403, 429 and accompanying text.
455. See n. 402 and accompanying te.XL
456. BOTHE et al. 282.
457. Id. 282; NWP I-14M Annotated ~~ 8.1-8.1.2; NWP 9A Annotated ~~ 8.1-8.1.2; PtLLOUO, COMMENTARY 598;
SAN REMO MANUAL ~ 39 & cmts.; Kalshoven, Prohibitions, n. 417, 100; Roberts, ElTVironmental Issues, n. 2, 235;
Robertson, Modern Technology, n. V.173, 363, 370; Schmidt, The Protection, n. III.623, 221-25; Solf, Protection, n.
III.623, 129; see also G.A. Res. 2444, n. 409; see also Second Protocol, arL 1(f).
458. See generally NWP I-14M Annotated ~~ 8.2-8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated ~~ 8.2-8.4.1; SAN REMo MANUAL ~~
47-52,59-61,67-69 & cmts.

459. BOTHa et al. 324-25; NWP I-14M Annotated ~~ 8.1.1; NWP 9A Annotated ~ 8.1.1; PILLOUO, COMMENTARY
668-69; US DepartmentofDefense General Counsel letter, n. 442, 123-24; Burrus Carnahan,ProtectingCWilians Under
the Draft Geneva Protocol: A Preliminary Inquiry, 18 AIR FORCE L. REv. 32, 47-48 (No.4, 1976).
460. BOTHa et aL 309-11,359-67; NWP I-14M Annotated ~~ 8.1.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated ~ 8.1.2.1; Matheson,

Remarks 426.
461. See nn. 4-6 and accompanying teXt.

462. See Part V.G.2-V.G.3.
463. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51, 103; Protocol I, arL 2(b); see also nn. III.I0, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.l; n. VI.429 and accompanying texL
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464. Protocol I, an. 50 defmes "civilian" as anyone not belonging to categories in Third Convention, arts.
4{A)(l)-4{A)(3) or 4{A)(6), or Protocol I, an. 43, i.e., members of armed forces, militias, volunteer corps, an organized
resistance, inhabitants ofunoccupied territorY who spontaneously take up arms to resist invaders and not members of
regular armed units ifthey carrY arms openly and respect the laws and customs ofwar, and organized armed forces,elc.
under command of a pany whose government or authority is not recognized by an adverse party if these forces are
under an internal disciplinarY system enforcing compliance with the international law of armed conflicL If a party
incorporates paramilitarY or armed law enforcement agencies into its armed forces, it must notify other parties to a
conflict. In case ofdoubt, a person is considered a civilian. Protocol I, arL 50. Argentina filed declarations for Protocol
I, art. 43(1); Belgium filed them for art. 43(3). See Argentina Declaration, Oct. 6, 1986, in SCHINDLER & TOMAN 704-05;
Belgium Declaration, n.III.626, 706. Thus wounded, ill or shipwrecked mariners at sea and civil air crews downed at
sea remain subject to the Second Convention and become prisoners ofwar under the Third Convention, if they do not
benefit by more favorable treatment under other rules. Second Convention, art. 13(5); Third Convention. See also
BOTHE el al. 293-96; 2 PICTET 93-104; 3 id., n. 320, at 44-65,67-68; PILLOUD, CoMMENTARY 506-18, 610-12.
465. Protocol I, arL 51; see also BOTHEtt aL 299-318; PtLLOUD, CoMMENTARY 615-28.
466. Belgium Declaration, n.III.626, 707; Italy Declaration, n.III.626, 712; Netherlands Declaration, n.III.626,
714; UK Declaration, n.III.626, 717; for these declarations' impact,see n.III.621 and accompanying texL
467. Belgium Declaration, n.III.626, 707; Netherlands Declaration, n.1lI.626, 714; UK Declaration, n.1lI.626,
717. For these declarations' impact, see n.III.621 and accompanying texL
468. Protocol I, an. 52;seealso BOTHEetaL 320-27; PILLOUD, COMMENTARY 630-38; Second Protocol,arts.l(f), 5-9.
469. Belgium Declaration, n.III.626, 707; Italy Declaration, n. 111.626,712; Netherlands Declaration, n. III.626,
714; UK Declaration, n.III.626, 717. For these declarations' impact, see n. 111.621 and accompanying texL Second
Protocol, art. 1(f), is to the same effecL
470. Italy Declaration, n. 111.626,713; Netherlands Declaration, n.III.626, 714; UK Declaration, n. 111.626, 717.
For these declarations' impact, see n.III.621 and accompanying texL
471. Protocol I, an. 57(1); see also BOTHE et aL 359-62; PILLOUD, CoMMENTARY 678-80.
472. Protocol I, an. 57(2)(a); see also BOTHEet aL 362-65; PlLLOUD, COMMENTARY 680-85; Second Protocol, arts.l(f),
5-9.
473. Article 57 cannot be construed to authorize attacks against civilians, the civilian population or civilian
objects. Protocol I, arts. 57(2)(b)-57(5); see also BOTHE et aL 365-69; PILLOUD, CoMMENTARY 686-89; Second Protocol,
arts. 1(f), 5-9_
474. Austria Reservation, Aug. 13, 1982,in SCHtNDLER & TOMAN 705; Switzerland Declaration, Dec. 12, 1977,inid.
716. For these reservations' impact,see Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; nn. 111.621, VI.268, 278 and accompanying
text.
475. Belgium Declaration, n.III.626, 707; Italy Declaration, n. 111.626, 712; Netherlands Declaration, n.II1.626,
714; UK Declaration, n.III.626, 717. For these declarations' impact, see n. 111.621 and accompanying texL
476. AFP 110-31,ch.14; BOTHEelal. 299 &n. 3; NWP I-14M Annotated 1111 6.2.3.2 (protections also under Fourth
Convention, arL 33), 11.2 n.4, 11.3; NWP 9A Annotated 11116.2.3.2, 11.2 n.3, 11.3 (same); 4 PICTET 224-29; SAN REMo
MANUAL 1139; STONE 684-732; Mallison & Mallison, Nll1Jal Targeting, n.1lI.262, 260; Matheson,Remarks 423, 426;
Robertson, Modern Technology, n. V.173, 363; Schmidt, The Protection, n. 111.623, 225-32; Solf, Protection, n.III.623,
130-31.
477_ 1 LEVIE, PROTECTION, n. 413, 217-18; NWP I-14M Annotated'll1111.2 (noting protections also under Founh
Convention, arts. 28, 33), 11.3; NWP 9A Annotated 111111.2,11.3 (same); Hans-Peter Gasser,Prohibition ofTerrorist Acts
in International Humanitarian Law, 1985 INT'LREv. RED CROSS 200; Hague Air Rules, aIL 22; Matheson,Remarks 426;
Robertson, Modem Technology, n. V.173, 363; Schmidt, The Protection, n.III.623, 227_
478. See generally BOTHEetaL 320-27; COLOMBOS §§ 510-11,524-25,528-29; NWP I-14M Annotated 11' 6.23 &n.36,
6.2.3.2 (protections for some civilians from reprisals under Founh Convention, an. 33), 8.1.1 & n.9, 8.1.2 & n.12 (US
position that Protocol I, an. 52[1] creates new law); NWP 9A Annotated 11116.2.3 & n.33, 6.2.3.2, 8.1.1 & n.9, 8.1.2 &
n.12 (same); 2 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 1105-06; 4 PtCTET 227-29; PlLLOUD,CoMMENTARY 630-38; TOMAN 384-85;
Matheson,Remarks 426; cf. Roberts,Environmental Issues, n. 2, 235; SoIf,Protection,n.II1.623, 131. Russo, Targeting,n.
111.624,17 n. 36 rejects applying arL 52(2) to naval warfare..

479_ See generally BOTHE et al. 309-11,359-67; FRITS KALsHOVEN, CoNSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 99-100
(1987)(reviewingProtocoII declarations); McDoUGAL& FEUCtANo525; NWPl-14MAnnotated'll1l5.2&n.7,8.1.2.1;
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NWP 9A Annotated 11115.2 & n.6, 8.1.2.1; SAN REl.IOlriANUAL 111139-42 & cmts.; STONE 352-53; Fenrick, The Rule, n.
III.623, 125 (questioning whether proportionality accepted as custom); Matheson, Remarks 426; Results of the First
Meeting of the Madrid Plan ofAction Held in Bochum, F.R.G., N01Jember 1989, 7 BSFHV 170-71 (1991); Schmidt, The
Protection, n. III.623, 233-38; Solf,Protection, n. III.623, 131; van Hegelsom, n. III.623, 18-19.

480. See n. 8 and accompanying text.
481. See n. 8 and accompanying text.
482. See nn. 4-5 and accompanying text.
483. Iran's attacks on the UAE Abu al-Bakoush oil installations and Kuwaiti facilities, besides lacking in
discrimination, proportionality and necessity, also violated UN Charter, art. 2(4). Charter law governed these
situations. See also UN Charter, art. 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); Part B.l; n. 429 and accompanying text.
484. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); see also nn. III.lO, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.l; n. 429 and accompanying text.

485. See n. 8 and accompanying text.
486. See n. 8 and accompanying text.
487. See nn. 300·27 andaccompanyingtext.Presumably Protocoll's statement ofits being without prejudice to the
Cultural Property Convention includes the 1999 Second Protocol, when it is in force 3 months after 20 States ratify it.
The Second Protocol provides for relationships between it and the Convention but does not define relationships
between it and, e.g., Protocol!. See Second Protocol, arts. 2-4,43. Interesting law of treaties analysis problems may
ensue.
488. See nn. 272-76 and accompanying text.
489. Protocol I, art. 53; Protocol II, art. 16 repeats general Protocoll, arts. 53(a)-53(b) prohibitions against attacks
on historic monuments, works ofart orplaces ofworship constituting the cultural or spiritual heritage ofpeoples, and
prohibiting use of them to support the military effort, without prejudice to the Cultural Property Convention. There is
no saving clause for other relevant international instruments as in Protocol I,art. 53, a curious omission, because even
if there were no such treaties when the Protocols were negotiated, there may bein the future, and incorporation might
avoid interpretation problems. See generally Vienna Convention, art. 30; nn. IV.455, VI.47 and accompanying text.
490. See nn. 403, 429-30 and accompanying text.
491. Netherlands Declaration, n. III.626, 714-15; UK Declaration, n. III.626, 717; NWP I-14M Annotated 11
8.5.1.6; NWP 9A Annotated 118.5.1.6; 2 O'CoNNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA nos; TOMAN 385-97; Solf,Protection, n. III.623,
133 ("it is not yet clear whether customary international law is as broad as article 53 seems to be");seealso n. III.621 and
accompanying te.xt.
492. Cultural Property Convention, art. 4(2); see also n. 315 and accompanying text.
493. TOMAN 389; see also id. 394-95.

494. Compare Protocol I, art. 52 with iii., art. 53; see also nn. 468-70, 478-79 and accompanying text.
495. The Cultural Property Convention provides for transoceanic carriage of cultural property. See generally nn.
300-27 and accompanying text. The 1999 Second Protocol, arts.l(I), 5-9, also speaks to the military necessity issue.
496. Protocol II, art. 14 is similar in theme to Protocol I, art. 54.

497. See nn. 403, 429-30 and accompanying text.
498. See Part V.E.
499. See nn. 502-03 and accompanying text.
500. BOTHllCt aL 336-42; PILLOUD, CoMMENTARY 652-59 (arts. 54(1)-54(2) de legeferenda). The United States agrees
as to art. 54(1) but maintains art. 54(2) is lex lata but might in due course ripen into custom. NWP I-14M Annotated 11
8.1.2 & n.15; NWP 9A Annotated 118.1.2 & n.15, citing inter alia US Department of Defense General Counselletter, n.
442,1300; Matheson,Remarks 426; Solf,ProteClion, n. III.623, 133 (art. 54 establishes substantially new principle not
yet custom).

501. See nn. 4-6 and accompanying text.
502. See n. 6 and accompanying text.
503. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); see also Part B.1; n. 429 and accompanying text.
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504. Protocol I, arL 56(1). Protocol II, arL 15 repeats Protocol I, art. 56(1)'s fmt sentence.
505. Belligerents must avoid locating military objectives in these installations' vicinity. Weapons used solely to
defend them cannot be a basis ofattack. Civilians around these installations keep civilian protections. Protocol I, arts.
56(2)-56(3), 56(5).
506. Protocol I, arL 56(4). None of these qualifications appear in Protocol II.
507. Belgium Declaration, n. III.626, 707; Italy Declaration, n. III.626, 712; Netherlands Declaration, n. III.626,
714; UK Declaration, n. III.626, 717. For the effect of these dec1arations,see n. 621 and accompanying text.
508. BOTHE et a1. 353; Pilloud, Commentary 669.

509. BOTHEet al. 348-57; Green 149-50; NWP I-14M Annotated '11'118.1.2 & n.14 (provision would create new law
and is militarily unacceptable to the United States), 8.5.1.7 & n.124; NWP 9A Annotated '11'11 8.1.2 & n.14 8.5.1.7 &
n.l04 (same); PILLOUD, COMMENTARY 668-74; Matheson,Remarks 427; but see Solf,Protection, n. III.623, 134 (arL 56
"differs litde from customary ... law.")
510. AFP 110-31 'II 5-3(d); GREEN 149-50, 184; Bothe et a1. 355-56; NWP I-14M Annotated 'Ill 8.5.1.7; NWP 9A
Annotated '118.5.1.7; PILLOUD, COMMENTARY 672, citing inter alia Protocol I, arts. 51, 57-58; Solf,Protection,n. III.623,
134 (arL 56 differs litde from customary necessity, proportionality norms).
511. See nn. 403, 429 and accompanying text.

512. See nn. 430-31 and accompanying texL
513. See nn. 456-79 and accompanying text.
514. See n. 459 and accompanying text; see also Kalshoven,Prohibitions, n. 417,106-07.
515. See nn. 4-5 and accompanying attack.
516. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 103; Protocol I, arL 2(b); see also Pan B.l; n. 429 and accompanying texL
517. Neutralized and hospital zones are protected under the First and Founh Conventions. See Part V.F.4; nn.
281-99 and accompanying texL

518. See Part V.F.4; nn. 281-99 and accompanying text; cf. TOMAN 393.
519. Protocol I, arts. 59-60, 62-63,65; see also BOTHEet al. 375-78,380-85,387-92,400-03,405-06; 410-15; PILLOUD,
COMMENTARY 697-98, 700-06, 708-16, 738-58, 770-78.

520. See nn. 295-96 and accompanying texL
521. Compare Protocol I, arL 59 with Hague IV, Regulations, arL 25; Hague IX, arL 1; see also 1899 Hague II,
Regulations, arL 25; OXFORD NAVAL MANuAL, arL 27; Hague Air Rules, arL 24; Part V.G.l; nn. 231-42 and
accompanying texL
522. See nn. 238-42, 252 and accompanying text.
523. BOTHE et al. 382.
524. NWP I-14M Annotated'll 85.1.3; NWP 9A Annotated'll 8.5.1.3; Matheson, Remarks 427. This parallels
customary rules for hospital and neutralized zones. See nn. 517, 520 and accompanying text.
525. NWP I-14M Annotated '1111.3; NWP 9A Annotated '1111.3; Matheson, Remarks 427.

526. See n. 517 and accompanying text.
527. See Part V.F.4.
528. See nn. 297-99, 327 and accompanying text.
529. See nn. 468-69 and accompanying texL
530. UN Charter, arL 2(4), 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b).

531. ld., arts. 51, 103; Protocol I, an. 2(b).
532. Edgerton, n. 2,at 173; K.M. Kelly,Declaring Waron the Environment: The FailureoJlnternationalEnvironmental
Treaties During the Persian Gulf War, 7 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 921, 929 (1992).
533. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 103.

534. ld.
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535. Id., arts. 51, 103.
536. Conventional Weapons Convention, preamble; Fragments Protocol; Mine Protocol; Incendiary Weapons
Protocol. See TOMAN 24-30; BurrusM. Carnahan, TheLawo[Land Warfare: ProtoC()lIIlOthe UnitedNations ComJention
on Certain COTnlentional Weapons, 105 Mil.. L. REv. 73 (1984); Fenrick, Comment,Ncw, n. III.627; Levie,Prohibitions,
n. III.627; Roach, Certain, n. III.627; Schmidt, ComJentional, n. III.627. Conference of States Parties to Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects negotiated Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Mines,
Booby-Traps and other Devices (Protocol II) as Amended,May 3,1996,- UST - , in 35 lUi 1209 (1996) (Amended
Mine Protocol) and Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (protocol IV), Oct. 13, 1995, - UST - , in 35 ILM 1218
(1996) (Laser Protocol). For analysis of and comments on negotiations on Amended Mine Protocol and Laser
Protocol,see generally Panel,A Look at Current Action on the ComJentional Weapons COlI'Vention 0[1980, 1996 ASIL PRoc.
381.
537. SCHINDLER & TOMAN 191-92.

538. See Levie,Prohibitions, n. III.627, 666; ProtocolI,arL 35(3). The US Declaration, Apr. 8, 1982,in SCHINDLER &
TOMAN 196, says prohibitions and restrictions in the Convention and its Protocols were "new contractual rules"
except provisions stating existing international law, and that these new rules would bind States only upon ratification
or accession to the Convention and consent to be bound by the Protocols. The US Declaration also says in part:
The United States ••• welcomes the adoption of this Convention, and hopes that a!l States will give the most
serious consideration to ratification or accession. We believe that the Convention represents a positive step •••
in efforts to minimize injury or damage to the civilian population in time of armed conflict. Our signature ••.
reflects the general willingness of the United States to adopt practical and reasonable provisions
concerning ••• military operations, [to] ••• protect ••• noncombatants.
At the same time, we want to emphasize that formal adherence by States to agreements restricting the use of
weapons in armed conflict would be oflittle purpose if the parties were not firmly committed to taking every
appropriate step to ensure compliance with those restrictions after their entry into force. It would be the firm
intention of the United States and, we trust, all other parties to utilize the procedures and remedies provided
by this Convention, and by the general laws of war, to see to it that all parties to the Convention meet their
obligations under it. The United States strongly supponed proposals by other countries during the
[negotiating] Conference to include special procedures for dealing with compliance matters, and reserves the
right to propose at a later date additional procedures and remedies, should this prove necessary, to deal with
such problems .
•.• [T]he United States ••• reserves the right, at ••• ratification, to exercise the option provided by article4(3) of
the Convention, [which provides, 1342 UNTS 164-65, that ratifying countries may opt not to consent to be
bound by any Protocol, provided that the Depository, the UN Secretary-General pursuant to arL 10(1), id. at
167, is notified,] and to make statements of understanding andlor reservations, to the extent that it may
deem ••• necessary to ensure that the Convention and its Protocols conform to humanitarian and military
requirements ••••
SeealsoNWPI-14MAnnotated~9.7n.44;NWP9AAnnotated~9.6n.33;ViennaConvention,ans.19-23,nn.III.621,

VI.268, 278 and accompanying text (reservations principles). China Declaration, Dec. 13, 1981; Romania Declaration,
Apr. 8, 1982, SCHINDLER & TOMAN 192, 195, may imply a view that the Convention and Protocols do not state
customary norms.
539. By 1998 there were 70 Convention parties, most of which had ratified all Protocols. TIF 464.
540. Conventional Weapons Convention, arL 8; see also Roach, Certain, n. III.627, 38--44; Schmidt, COTnJentional, n.
III.627, 312. The Conference produced Amended Mine Protocol and Laser Protocol, n. 536, now being ratified.
541. Conventional Weapons Convention, arL 1, noting applicability to situations in common article 2 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, i.e., First Convention, art. 2; Second Convention, arL 2; Third Convention, arL 2; Founh
Convention, art. 2, and situations in Protocol I, arL 1(4) (armed conflict involving peoples' fights for
self-determination against colonial domination, alien occupation or racist regimes). See also Conventional Weapons
Convention, art. 7; Roach, Certain, n. III.627, 18-30; Schmidt, COTnlentional, n. III.627, 298-304. Fenrick, Comment,
New, n. III.627, 230, says the Convention does not apply to nuclear weapons or "weapons used exclusively against
targets at sea or in the air ••• "It is not clear from the Convention or its Protocols how his interpretation was derived;
arLI refers to all 1949 Geneva Conventions,and, as seen nn. 54345, the Protocols to the Convention state limitations
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in application, e.g., for mine warfare; that aside, the Convention and Protocols seem to apply across the board. For
common article 2 analysis, see 1 PICfET 27-37; 2 id. 26-31; 3 id. 19-27; 4id. 17-25. For Protocol I, arL 1(4) analysis,see
BOTHE et al. 45-46; PILLOUD, COMMENTARY 41-56.
542. Fragments Protocolis a single sentence: "It is prohibited to use any weapon the primary effect ofwhieh is to
injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-rays." It does not codify custom but develops
basic rules. Roach, Certain, n. 111.627, 69. When the Protocol was drafted, it was accepted unanimously because no
negotiating State had such weapons or foresaw future use for them. Fenrick, Comment, New, n. 111.627,242; Levie,
Prohibitions, n.III.627, 654. These weapons were not used during the Tanker War. Laser Protocol, n. 536, arts. 1, 3, 35
ILM 1218, prohibits laser weapons specifically designed to blind permanently unenhanced vision; the prohibition
does not cover blinding as incidental or collateral effect oflegitimate military use oflaser systems.
543. Protecting civilians and UN, ICRC or other humanitarian missions or peacekeepers is its primary goal. Mine
Protocol, arts. 1, 8; Amended Mine Protocol, n. 536, arts. 1(1), 12,- UST -,35 ILM 1209, 1213-15. See also TOMAN
28-29; Carnahan, 17ze Law, n. 536, 76-77; Fenrick, Comment, New, n.1I1.627, 244-46; Schmidt, The Conventwnal, n.
III.627, 313.

544. See DOD Report, n.II.8, 213-21.
545. Mine Protocol, arL 2(1); Amended Mine Protocol, n. 536, arL 2(1), - UST - , 3S ILM 1209.
546. Carnahan, 17zeLaw, n. 536,77-79; Fenrick, Comment,New,n. 111.627,244-45; Schmidt, 17ze Conventional,n.
111.627,315; see also Pan V.G.1; nn. 456·69 and accompanying texL

547. Compare, e.g., Mine Protocol, arts. 2(4)-2(5), 3-4 (applying to mines, booby traps, "other devices"), with
Protocol I, arts 51(2),51(4)-51(6),52. See also Levie,ProhibitWns, n. III. 627,656-57. Mines are defined as
any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be detonated or
exploded by the presence, proximiry or contact of a person or vehicle, and "remotely delivered mine" means
any mine so defined delivered by artillery, rocket, monar or similar means or dropped from an aircrafL
Mine Protocol, arL 2(1). Booby traps are defined as
any device or material ... designed, constructed or adapted to kill orinjureand which functions unexpectedly
when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe aCL

ld., arL 2(2). "Other devices" are defined as
manually-emplaced munitions and devices designed to kill, injure or damage and ... actuated by remote
control or automatically after a lapse of time.

ld., arL 2(3). Fenrick, Comment, New, n.lII.627, 246, viewed the Mine Protocol as a "modest advance in the law;"
accord, Schmidt, 17ze Conventional, n. 111.627, 338.
548. Compare Amended Mine Protocol, n. 536, arts. 3(8)-3(9), - UST -,35 ILM 1210, with Mine Protocol, arts.
2(4)-2(5), 3-4; Protocol I, art. 52(3). The definitions list has been expanded; see Amended Mine Protocol, arL 2,
- UST -,35 ILM 1209-10.
549. Incendiary Weapons Protocol, art. 2, which does not restate customary law with respect to reprisals or
military objectives within a concentration of civilians. Fenrick, Comment, New, n. 111.627, 249; Schmidt, The
ConventiDnal, n. 111.672, 342-44. Founh Convention, arL 33 forbids using any weapons reprisals against enemy
civilians in occupied territory. Schmidt 342. The Founh Convention commentary does not speak specifically of
incendiary reprisals, either. 4 PICfET 227-29.
550. NWP I-14M Annotated 1l9.7 n.44; NWP 9A Annotated'll 9.6 n.33; cf. Harlow & McGregor, n. 111,318;
Schmidt, 17ze Conventional, n. 111.627, 341. Some oppose using incendiaries against combatants; there was support for
this at the Incendiary Weapons Protocol negotiations. See Fenrick, Comment, New, n. 111.627, 248.
551. Israel's attack on U.S.S.Libert;y is a rare example. See JAMES ENNES,AssAULTON THE LtBERTY 67-68, 70, 81, 92,
152 (1980); Walter L. Jacobsen,A.JuridicaIExaminatWn ofthelsraeliAllack on the USS Libeny, 36 NAv. L. REv. 1 (1986).
Since Libert;y was a warship, the Incendiary Weapons Protocol did not apply; it deals with attacks on civilians.
Neutrality, military objective, necessiry and proportionality principles did, and Libert;y, ifnotso disabled that it could
not return fire, could have exercised the right of self-defense. Other US forces also could have responded. Moreover,
the Protocol addresses LOAC situations, andLibert;y's case was covered by the law ofself-defense. UN Chaner, arts. 51,
103; Protocol I, arL 2(b); see also no. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part B.1; 0. 429
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and accompanying te.xt; Mallison & Mallison, No:val Targeling, n.III.262, 267. Israel agreed to pay for deaths and
injuries on Liberty and damage to the ship without admitting liability. See 58 Bulletin 799 (1968); 59 id. 473 (1969);
Agreement Concerning Claims Arising from Damage to United States Ship "Liberty," Dec. 17, 1980, Israel-US, 32
UST 4434,1268 UNTS 33.

552. Compare Incendiary Weapons Protocol, arts. 1(2)-2(3) wilh Mine Protocol, arts. 2(4)-2(5), 3(2)-3(4),4(2) and
Protocol I, arts. 51(2), 51(4)-51(6), 52, 57(2). See also TOMAN 29; Fenrick, Comment, New, n. III.627, 249; Levie,
Prohibizions, n. III.627, 664-65, criticizing arts. 2(2), 2(3); Schmidt, The Corwenzional, n. III.627, 341-421; Part V.G.1;
nn. 464-83 and accompanying text. Harlow & McGregor, n. 111, 318 probably refer to the Incendiary Weapons
Protocol's substantive provisions in saying it is not accepted as customary law.
553. Incendiary Weapons Protocol, art. 2(4). Id., arts. 1(3)-1(4) define "military objective" and "objective" in the
same language as Protocol I, art. 48. See nn. 456-63 and accompanying text.
554. Fenrick, Comment, New, n. III.627, 250; Schmidt, The Corwenlional, n. III.627, 345. Harlow & McGregor, n.
111,318 say the forests provision does not represent customary law_
555. The low-water line is recognized as the mark from which the territorial sea is measured unless otherwise
provided. LOS Convention, art. 5; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 3. Traditional warships (e.g., destroyers, frigates)
cannot navigate thatc10se to shore, e.xceptareas like the Bay of Fundy where tidal differences are great, but hovercraft
and small boats use only a few inches of water. Moreover, the Protocol protects forest cover from air, missile or shore
bombardment by vessels well outside these waters.

556. Compare Incendiary Weapons Protocol, art. 2(4)wizh ProtocolI, art. 56; see also nn. 505-16 and accompanying
text.

557. Compare Incendiary Weapons Protocol, art. 2(4)wizh Protocol I, art. 35(3); ENMOD Convention,art l(l).See
also Protocol I, art. 55; nn. 411-37, 504-16 and accompanying text.
558. See, e.g., n. 532 and accompanying text (protocol I, art. 54).
559. SCHINDLER & TOMAN 191-92, reporting that 28 countries ratifying the Convention had ratified the three
Protocols by 1987. The United States has ratified the Convention, and its Fragments and Mine Protocols but not the
Incendiary Weapons Protocol, maybe the only State in this status. See TIF 464.
560. The Convention cannot derogate from other principles ofinternational humanitarian law, i.e., norms stated
in custom. Conventional Weapons Convention, preamble, arts. 1-2,7_
561. UN Charter, arts. 51, lO3; Protocol I, art. 2(b); see also nn. III.lO, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and
accompanying te.xt; Part B.l; n. 429 and accompanying te.xt.

562. See n. 31 and accompanying text.
563. World Charter for Nature, n. 365, 'iI'i1 5, 20 in 22 ILM 455,457,459 (1983), declaring that "Nature shall be
secured against degradation caused by warfare or other hostile activities"; "Military activities damaging to nature
shall be avoided," another "soft law" source. See n. 365.
564. The Summit c10sedJune 14, 1992 and resulted in some nonbinding documents, imeraliaAgenda 21, UN Doc.
NCONF.151/6IRev.1 (1992) (Agenda 21), in 31 IU.i 876(1992), an action plan for sustainable development to guide
national policies for this and the ne.xt century. See Edith Brown Weiss,lnzroducloryNole, id. 814-15 (1992). Agenda 21
repeated points in the Stockholm Declaration, n. 53. Agenda 21's Principle 24, 31 ILM 880, said: "Warfare is
inherently destructive of SUStainable development. States shall therefore respect international law providing
protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary."
Principle 26, id. 880, admonishes "States [to) resolve their environmental disputes peacefully and by appropriate
means in accordance with the Charter ____" Two treaties were signed: Framework Convention on Climate Change,
May 9, 1992, - UST - , in id. 849 (1992); Convention on Biological Diversity,June 5,1992,- UST - , in id. 822
(1992). BIRNIE & BOYLE 545 say the Summit Declaration on Environment and Development "can best be seen in part
as a codification of the subject," and as having gone "significantly beyond what could be achieved at Stockholm in
1972," where a similar conference produced, inzer alia, the Stockholm Declaration. See nn. II.62, VI.53 and
accompanying text.
565. Kuwait Regional Convention & Protocol, n. II.63; Red Sea Convention, n. VI.55; see also nn. VI.169-70,
185-206 and accompanying text.
566. Security Council resolutions bind UN Members if stated as a "decision" under UN Charter, arts. 25,48, lO3;
the Council may also pass non-binding resolutions, and all General Assembly resolutions are non-binding. These
resolutions may reinforce preexisting customary or treaty law, however. See n. IV.57 and accompanying text; see also
Chapter III.
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567. See generally Walker, State Practice 122-23, 125-26, 128, 133-37, 141-44, 153-54, 158·67, describing impact, or
lack ofit, of Council and Assembly actions for wars and confrontations at sea, 1945-90.
568. S.C. Res. 540 (1983); S.C. Res. 552 (1984), S.C. Res. 598 (1987), in WELLENS 451, 454, 473.
569. See nn. 4-5 and accompanying text.
570. S.C. Res. 660-62, 664-67, 669-70, 674, 677-78 (1990), 686-87 (1991) in WELLENS 527-42, referring inter alia to
the Fourth Convention, Geneva Gas Protocol, and, in S.C. Res. 687 to Iraq's liability for environmental damage.
Michael Bothe, Remarks, in PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 17, 18, viewed Resolution 687 as dealing with
aggression,cj. UN Charter, art. 2(4), and not the laws ofwar. See also SANREMoMANUAL ~~ 116-19, 121-24, 135, 138-40,
146·49, 151-52.
571. S.C. Res. 678 (1990),incorporating by reference S.C. Res. 664-67, 670, 674(1990),in WELLENS530-31,534, 540.
572. Cj. DOD Report, n. 11.8, Appendix O.
573. S.C. Res. 687, in WELLENS 542.
574. See n. 570 and accompanying text.
575. E.g., S.C. Res. 665, in WELLENS 530.
576. S.C. Res. 687, in id. 542.
577. See DO. 300-52 and accompanying text.
578. ICI Statute, arts. 38, 59; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102-03; see also n. III.lO and accompanying text.
579. UN Charter, arts. 25, 48,103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text.
580. Other Council actions, e.g., calls for action or recommendations, do not bind Members unless construed as a
decision under id. arts. 25, 48, 103. Nearly all General Assembly resolutions are non-binding, although they can
strengthen norms stated in them. See n. IV.57 and accompanying text.
581. See n. III.lO and accompanying text.
582. See n. IV.57 and accompanying text.
583. See DO. 1-16 and accompanying text.
584. See n. 17 and accompanying text.
585. Accord, Fleck, Comments, n. 17,532; Gasser, The Debate, n. 17,524; Conrad Harper, Opening Address, in
PROTECTION OFTHEENVIRONMENT 8,13; LeGrand, n. 12,30; McNeill, Protection, n. 2,544; Moore, Concluding Remarks,
in PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 630-32; Morris, n. 17,780; Roberts, Environmental Issues, n. 2, 258-59; Szasz,
Comment, n. 365, 280; conlTa, Verwey, n. 269, 572. Shearer, The Debate, n. 365, 554-55, suggests a REsTATEMENT
approach; DE GUTTRY & RONZITTI, n. 11.210, 14, advocate "codification."
586. See n. IV.3.
587. Cj. Robertson, Modern Technology, n. V.173, 7.
588. Walker, State Practice 190-91.
589. See Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
590. See Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; nn. 111.621, VI.268 and accompanying text.
591. UN Charter, art. 2(2); Vienna Convention, art. 26; nn. 111.934, IV.31, VI.85 and accompanying text.
592. Cj. lCJ Statute, arts. 38,59; REsTATEMENT (THlRO) §§ 102-03; n. III.I0 and accompanying text.
593. Exceptions may be treaties classified for security reasons. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 312 r.n.5; see also id. r.n.3,
referring to UN Charter, art. 1O~, which requires treaty registration before an agteement can be cited before a UN
organ.
594. See generally Walker, State Practice 190. ROACH & SMITH is a rare example of a government's position in one
source. The last complete digest of US practice, WHITEMAN, appeared over 25 years ago. The annual digest ofpractice
following WHITEMAN ends with 1979, with partial publication of the 1980-88 series since then.
595. SAN REAIO MANuAL, Introduction to the Cmts. 62.
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596. Robertson submitted this as a paper to the International Institute of Humanitarian Law Round Table
considering the relationship between the LOS and the law of naval warfare; it was later published as a Newport Paper
and in Moore & Turner; the last version is cited. See Robertson, New LOS 302-03 & n.!.
597. SAN RaIO MANUAL 11 34.
598. LOS Convention, art. 87; High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also Pan IV.B.l; n.110 and accompanying text.
599. Robertson, New LOS 302 & n.207.

600. Compare iii. with SAN REMo MANUAL '11'11 12 (where neutrals have sovereign rights, jurisdiction, other rights
under general international law, belligerents must have due regard for those neutrals' legitimate rights and duties
when carrying out operations; no qualification as Robertson, New LOS 302 recommended), 34 (requiring
belligerents' due regard for neutral coastal States' EEZ, continental shelf rights, duties, including those States'
obligations toward the marine environment, and particularly due regard for artificial islands, etc., established by
neutrals; qualified by other rules of LOAC), 36 (due regard for neutrals' exploring, exploiting seabed, ocean floor
resources beyond national jurisdiction; no qualification as Robertson 302 recommended), 88 (minelaying
belligerents must pay due regard to legitimate high seas uses by inter alia providing safe alternate routes for neutral
shipping; no qualification as Robertson 302 recommended), 106(c) (in declaring exclusion zones, belligerents must
e.xercise due regard for neutrals' rights to legitimate ocean uses; no qualification as Robertson 302 recommended). See
also id. 11 37 (belligerents must "take caren to avoid damaging cables, pipelines on the seabed that do not exclusively
serve other belligerents; no qualification as Robertson 302 recommended). The IIHL group rejected "respect" for the
environment and others' LOS rights; "respect" is often used in humanitarian law treaties; the MANUAL wished to
preserve this distinction. SAN RaIO MANUAL 11 44, cmts. 44.6-44.10; Fleck, Comment, n. 17, 530.
601. See, e.g., SAN RaIO MANUAL 11 3 & cmts., noting the MANUAL is primarily concerned with jus in bello, the
LOAC, and not jus ad bellum, with which, e.g., UN Charter, arts. 51, 103 is concerned.
602. SAN RE.IIO MANUAL 111134 & cmts., 34.2, 34.4; 35 & cmts. 35.2-35.4; 44 & cmts. 44.6-44.10.

603. /d. 1111 (italics in original); this accords with the first alternative proposed by Diederich, n. 17, 156.
604. SAN RaIO MANUAL 1111, cmts. 11.1-11.7, citing inreralia LOS Convention, arts. 192, 194.
605. SAN RaIO MANUAL 1144; accord, Diederich, n. 17,158; compare similar provisions in Protocol I, arts. 35(1),
35(2),51(4),51(5),57.
606. SAN RE.IIO MANUAL 111147(a), 48-50.

607. See Geneva Gas Protocol; using chemical and biological weapons, subject to a no-first-use rule, also violates
customary law. Depending on agents employed, chemical and biological weapons can degrade many aspects of the
environmenL See nn. 268-71 and accompanying te.xt.
608. SAN RE.I\O MANUAL 11 35, in iii., Part II, Regions of Operations.

609. /d. 1111, cmL 11.1; see also iii. 1144, cmL 44.4.
610. See id. 1111, cmL 11.1; 1144, cmL 44.4, citing the LOS Convention; ENMOD Convention; Protocol I, arts.
35(3),55.
611. SAN RE.IIOMANUAL 1110 preserves the distinction while recognizing the place of the continental shelf and the

EEZ;seealso Robertson,New LOS 274 (three divisions, internal waters, territorial waters [territorial sea],highseas).
612. For LOS and LOAC rights and obligations in these areas at stake in the Tanker War,seegenerally Chapters IV
andV.

613. See generally LOS Convention, Part XI as modified by the Boat Agreement, declaring the Area, the deep
seabed beyond the continental shelf, as part of the common heritage of humankind; see also n.IV.3 and accompanying
texL
614. SAN RaIO MANUAL 1136.Seealsoid.1112.Id.1112,cmL 12.1 says:
Although it was recognized that the most crucial areas where [the interface of belligerent operations and
neutrals' rights] might occur would be in the [EEZ] or the continental shelf, a consensus [of IIHL
participants] developed that the principle should be stated in general terms and for all areas, regardless of
whether neutral rights were based on jurisdictional claims (for example, [EEZ], continental shelf) or
universal rights flowing from the general law of the sea (for example, the high seas). Such rights also included
those involving activities in the "Area" [as defined by LOS Convention, Pan XI] .•..[S]ome States had not
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formally claimed [EEZs] but may have established exclusive fishery zones or the like. [SAN REMoMANUALJ 'II
12 reflects this consensus.
Thus the MANUAL does cover these areas, perhaps obliquely, as in the case of contiguous zones, presumably if they are
"like" exclusive fishery zones. The relationship with the Area Authority is not clear. Presumably reference to the
Convention, Part XI would include subsequent protocols such as the BoatAgreement, n. IV.3. However, the MANUAL
intends that the due regard formula apply across the board for the relationship between the law of naval warfare and all
ocean areas recognized by the law of the sea, whether in the LOS Convention, the 1958 LOS conventions or customary
law. Therefore, in situations theMANuALdoes not cover, those following itshould accord due regard to environmental
concerns wherever occurring on the ocean, unless there is specific law to the contrary.
615. SAN REMo MANUAL, IntroduClion to the Commentaries 64; see also Part V.G.1.
616. This kind ofomission was a shortcoming ofthe OXFORDNAVALMANuAL. Verri,Commentary, n. IV.71,339-40.
617. SAN R!:.\\O MANUAL, Introduction to the Commentaries 67-68, referring to id.
accompanying text.

~~

3-9; see also n. 589 and

618. SAN REMOMANUAL,Introduction to the Commentaries 68, referring to id. ~ 13(d) & cmts.13.11-13.14; sec also
Walker, Maritime Neutrality 142-48.
619. SAN REMo MANUAL, Introduction to the Commentaries 68, referring to id. ~~ 38-111; see also Part V.G.1.
620. SAN REz.\O M.ANUAL, Introduction to the Commentaries 69, referring to id.

~1I105-08;

see also Pan V.F.2.

621. SAN REz.\O MANUAL, Introduction to the Commentaries 69, referring to id. ~1I14-37.

622. Id., Introduction to the Commentaries 69, referring to, e.g., ~~ 53-58, 62-66, 70-77, 112-13, 115-18, 125-34,
141-45,153-68,174-80. TheMANuALdoes not address air operations and land targets, except for general principles and
rules of humanitarian law, e.g., targeting. See also Part V.G.1.
623. ENMOD Convention, art. 1, cited in SAN R!:.\\O MANUAL
accompanying text.

~

44, cmt. 44.4; see also nn. 353-400 and

624. UN Charter, art. 103; see also Part B.l; no. IV.I0, 57 and accompanying text.

625. See Part B.1.
626. International Committee of the Red Cross, Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the
Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict (1994) (ICRC Guidelines), in NWP I-14M Annotated,
Annex8A-1.

627. Id. ~~ 8-20, in NWP I-14M Annotated ~, 8-21-33, citing these agreements related to international armed
conflict; Hague IV, Regulations, arts. 1, 23(g); Hague VIII; ENMOD Convention, arts. 1-2; Fourth Convention, arts.
1,53,63(2),144,146-47; Cultural Property Convention; Protocol I, arts. 1(1), 35(3)-36, 51(4)-51(5), 52, 54-56, 61-67,
83, 86-87; Mine Protocol; Incendiary Weapons Protocol. Chapters V-VI passim have discussed all of these treaties and
others, e.g., Roerich Pact. Some treaties are not in force for some countries, e.g., Protocol I for the United States, and
some provisions the Guidelines cite are not recognized as customary law by some countries.
628. ICRC Guidelines, n. 626, ~ 4, at 8-30.

629. Id.

~

5, at 8-30.

630. Id. ~ 7, at 8-31, reflecting language in humanitarian law treaties' Martens clauses; see also, e.g., First
Convention, art. 63; Second Convention, art. 64; Third Convention, art. 142; Fourth Convention, art. 158; ProtocolI,
art. 1(2); nn. 255,293,402,450 and accompanying text.
631. See no. III.938-51, IV.29-30, VI.83-84 and accompanying text.
632. E.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also no. III.953-67, 10-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.2.b.
633. LOS Convention, arts. 237, 311; see also Parts IV.A.2, VI.B.2.a.
634. ICRC Guidelines, n. 626, ~ 1, at8-30 refers to armed conflict, and all cited treaties deal withjus in bella, i.e., the
LOAC. Unlike SAN REMo MANUAL 11113-9, which recognize the possibility of applying different rules forjus ad beUum,
see n. 647 and accompanying text, the Guidelines are only concerned with protection of the environment and the
LOAC.

635. Compare ICRC Guidelines, n. 626with NWP I-14M Annotated ~ 8.1.3,citinginteralia UN General Assembly
Resolutions N47/37 (1992), N49/50 (1994). NWP 9A Annotated has no comparable provision.
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636. Sec NWP 1·14M Annotated 1l1l4.3.2-4.3.2.1; compare NWP 9A Annotated 11114.3.2-4.3.2.1.
637. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); see also nn. llI.lO, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-2S and
accompanying te.,t; Part B.l; n. 429 and accompanying te.,t.
638. UN Charter, arts. 25, 48,103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text.

639. Jus cogens overrides treaties and custom, two primary sources of international law. See n. 111.10 and
accompanying te.,t.

640. Scc nn. 231-42, 268-71 and accompanying te.,t.

641. Sec nn. 340-47 and accompanying te.,t.
642. Impossibility ofperformance, fundamental change of circumstances or armed conflict are among reasons for
claiming suspension during war. Vienna Convention, arts. 61-62; see also nn. III.928-29, 938-51; IV.26-28, 29;
V1.80·81 and accompanying te.,t.
643. Waters landward of baselines establishing the territorial sea are subject to coastal State sovereignty; the LOS
does not govern for internal waters pollution e.,cept ship pollution. See generally LOS Convention, arts. 2(1), 7(3),
8(2)·9,10(4),18(1),25(2),27(2),27(5),28(3), 35(a), 50,111(1),211(3),218; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1,5, 7(4),8,
13, 14(2), 16(2), 19(2),20(3); Part IV.B.4.

644. Sec Part B.2.a.
645. Sec n. IV.3 and accompanying text.
646. Sec Part B.2.c(II).
647. Sec nn. 596-600 and accompanying te.,t.
648. E.g., Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol, n. 11.63, a product of the UN Environmental Programme; see
also Part B.2.c(III).
649. Sec, c.g., FrankM. Snyder,Inlroduction, in SOUNDMILlTARVDECISION (1992); George K. Walker, Sea Power and
the Law olthe Sea: The Needlor a ContextualApproach, 7 ODIL 299 (1979), 83 MIL. L. REv.Bl (1979), 30 NWC REv. 88
(No.4, 1978).

650. Sec, e.g., Part V.A.3.
651. REsrATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971 & 1995 Supp.) (REsrATEMENT (SECOND), CON~"L.ICTS).
652. Olher categories of jurisdiction recognized by REsrATEMENT (THIRD) besides prescriptive jurisdiction (also
known as legislative or regulatory jurisdiction or jurisdiction to prescribe), are jurisdiction to adjudicate (also known
as judicial jurisdiction) and defined as a State's authority to subject particular persons or things to its judicial process,
and jurisdiction to enforce (occasionally stated as e.,ecutive jurisdiction), or a State's authority to use governmental
resources to induce or compel compliance with that State's law. REsrATEMENT(THIRD) § 401 &Introductory Note to Part
IV, 231. RE:,'ATE.IIENT (SECOND), CoNFLICTS, n. 657, § 6 is an analogous approach to the problem of prescriptive
jurisdiction for conflict of laws, i.e., private international law, among the 50 states of the United States.ld. chs. 3-4
offers a more elaborate analysis of judicial jurisdiction than does REsrATEMENT (THIRD) § 421.
653. REsrATEMENT(THlRD) § 402 enumerates these bases of jurisdiction to prescribe:
Subject to [REsrATEMENT(THlRD)] § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(I) (a) conduct thai, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its
territory;

(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory;
and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the
security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.
This recitation of bases of prescriptive jurisdiction is similar to that ofREsrATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 7, 17-18,40 and
concerned with transnational assertions of the right to prescribe national standards of conduct outside a prescribing
State's borders. These jurisdictional bases have also been labeled as territorial jurisdiction, events occurring within
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the territory of the prescribing State; sometimes "floating territorial jurisdiction" with respect to jurisdiction over
events aboard ships, aircraft and spacecraft registered by the prescribing State; objective territorial jurisdiction (the
"effects" doctrine), concerned with acts outside the territory of the prescribing State that have impact within that
State; jurisdiction based on nationals of a prescribing State; jurisdiction based on nationality of the victim (passive
personality); the protective principle, i.e., prescribing norms of conduct related to a prescribing State's vital interests.
See generally REsTATEMENT(THlRD) §§ 402,cmts. a-h; 502(2) & cmL d. The ensuing analysis is more concerned with the
rule of reasonableness to which these bases are subject; see RESTATEMENT(THIRD) § 402. I d. § 403(1) declares these rules
of reasonableness as limitations on jurisdiction to prescribe:
... Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to
prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the e.-..:ercise of
such jurisdiction is unreasonable.

Id. § 403(2) supplies examples of factors of reasonableness:
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is determined by evaluating all
relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the activity
takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the
territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state
and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those
whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state,
the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of
such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Analogous reasonableness factors are the hean of the proposed analysis to expand on the "due regard" rubric in the
LOS Convention and the SAN REMo MANuAL. REsTATEMENT (THlRD) § 403(3) adds that when it would not be
unreasonable for each of two States to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction, but the prescriptions are in conflict, "each
state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as theotherstate's interest in exercising jurisdiction,in light ofall the
relevant factors, including those setout in Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other state if that state's interest is
clearly greater." This principle of deference also has utility in the ensuing analysis.

654. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909, 948-53 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Reinsurance Co. ofAmerica v. AdministrataAsigurariior de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1283-84 (7th Cir.1990HEasterbrook,
J., concurring); Robert H. Bork,Introduction, 18 STAN.J. INT'L L. 241, 244 (1982); Stephen B. Burbank, The World in
Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1456, 1463-64 (1991); Eleanor J. Fox,Extraterritoriality,Antitrust, and the New Restatement:
Is Reasonableness the Answer?, 19 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 565, 592-93 (1987); David I. Gerber, Beyond Balancing:
International Law Restraints on the Reach ofNational Laws, 10 YALE J. INT'L L.185, 208 (1984); James M. Grippando,
Declining to Exercise Extraterritorial AntitrustJurisdiction on Grounds ofInternational Comity: An Illegitimate Extension of
theJudicialAbstentionDoctrine, 23 VJIL 395,400 n.22 (1983); Steven A. Kadish, Comity and the InternationalApplication
ofthe Sherman Act: Encouraging Courts to Enter the Political Arena, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 130, 156-66 (1982); Larry
Kramer, ExtraterritorialApplication ofAmerican LawAfter the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply 10 Professon Lowenfeld
and Trimble, 89 AJIL 750, 755 (1995); Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, 31 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 579 (1983); KarlM. Meessen, ConjlictsofJurisdiction Under the New ReslOtement, 50 L. & CONTEMP.PROBS.47,
53-69 (No.3, 1987); James A. Rahl,InternationalApplication ofAmerican Antitrust Laws: Issues and Proposals, 2 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 336, 362-64 (1980); Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of
Restatement Section 403, 89 AJIL 53 (1995); Michael G. McKinnon, Comment, Federal Judicial and Ltgislatn>e
Jurisdiction Ouer Entities Abroad: The Lang-Arm of US Antitrust Law and Viable Solutions Beyond the
TimberlanelRestatement Comity Approach, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 1219, 1300-11 (1994); Note, Beyond the Rhetonc of
Comparative Interest Balancing: An AlternativeApproach to Extraterritorial Discovery Conjlicts, 50 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
95, 101 (No.3, 1987).

655. E.g., Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849, 853-56 (N.C. 1988); EUGENE F. SCOLES & P",.ER HAY, CoNFLICT
OF LAWS § 2.14 (2d ed. 1992).
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656. Sec REsTATEMENT(THIRO) § 403 r.n.6, citing inter alia Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d
597, 614 (9th Cir.1976),opin. afierremand, 747 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.1984); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,
595 F.2d 1287, 1297-99 (3d Cir.1979). The REsTATEMENT (SECOND) had espoused a simiiarapproach.Seeid. § 40 r.n.l,
citing inter alia United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.Supp. 835, 878 (D.N.J. 1953). A difference between the
RE!.'ATEMENT (THIRD) § 403 and REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 40 is that the former "is understood ... not as a basis for
requiring states to modify their enforcement oflaws that they are authorized to prescribe [essentially the position of
RE!.'ATEMENT(SECONO) § 40), but as an essential element in determining whether, as a matter ofinternationallaw, the
state may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe." REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403 r.n.l0. The ensuing analysis is closer to the
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) and its intellectual debt to REsTATEMENT(SECONO), Conflicts, n. 651 than to the REsTATEMENT
(THIRD), although the latter's more elaborate articulation offactors is more helpful.
The Supreme Court of the United States has never passed on the REsTATEMENT (THIRD) analysis. In re Insurance
Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 933-34 (9th Cir.1991) applied Timberlane factors, but the Supreme Court of the United
States found no conflict between US antitrust law and UK law and therefore no need to pronounce whether a factorial
test was appropriate for resolving conflicts of prescriptive jurisdiction. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 US
764,797-99 (1993); compare similar analysis in British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, Ltd., 1985 A.C. 58, 78-86, 95-96
(H.L.). ForHartford Fire analysis, see, e.g., Roger P. Alford, The ExtraterritorialApplication ofAntitrustLaws: A Postscript
on Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 34 VJIL 213 (1993); Case Two: ExtraterritorialApplication ofUnited States
LawAgainst United States and Alien Defendants, in Symposium, Conference onJurisdiction,Justice, and Choice ofLaw for
the T'lJ.'cnty-Fint Century, 29 NEW ENG. L. REv. 517, 577 (1995); Kramer, n. 654; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict,
Balancing ofInterests, and the Exercise ofJurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 AJIL 42
(1995); Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Questfor Reasonableness, 245 RCADI 9, 49-58 (1994); Trimble, n.
654; McKinnon, n. 654.
657. E.g., Oil Shipping (Bunkering) B.V_ v. Sonmez Denizcilik VE Ticaret A.S., 10 F.3d 1015, 1019-20 (3d Cir.
1993), citing REsTATEMENT(SECONO), Conflicts, n. 651; Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 US 571 (1953). This is not surprising,
because REsTATEMENT (SECOND), Conflicts drafters relied on inter alia Lauritzen and Romero v. International Term.
Op. Co., 358 US 354(1959) for choice oflaw principles for torts. REsTATEMENT(SECONO), CONFLICTS § 145 & cmts. bod,
r.n., referring to id. § 6. Neely v. Club Med Mgt. Serv., Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 186-98 (3d Cir. 1995) (en bane) applied
REsTATE.IIENT(THIRD) factors in a Jones Act and general maritime law context, also citing inter alia Lauritzen. Federal
courts,sitting in admiralty under 28 USC. § 1333(1), must apply federal choiceoflaw rules. SCHOENBAUM § 18-11. The
federal common law of conflictoflaws governs unless supplanted by federal legislation or a treaty ofthe United States.
The Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 USC § 2370(e)(2) is an e.xample of the former, pardy superseding Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 US 398 (1964). Convention for Unification ofCertain Rules Relating to Salvage of
Vessels at Sea, Sept.. 23, 1910, art-15, 37 Stat.. 1658, 1672 is an e.xample of treaty-dictated choiceoflawprinciples. This
illustrates the point of REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICTS § 6(1), that statutes, and by extension treaties establishing
choice of law principles, displace common law factorial analysis in US conflicts analysis involving federal law. US
Const., art.. VI requires the courts of the states of the Union to apply federal conflicts principles, including treaties,
when adjudicating federal law issues.
658. LEABRIt..MAYER,CoNFLlCTOFLAWS § 2.2.3,74-75 (2d ed. 1995); Gregory E. Smith, Choice ofLaw in the United

States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1169-79 (1987).
659. E.g., British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v_ Imperial Chem. Indus., [1953)1 Ch.19,finaljudgment, [1955)1 Ch. 37;
Otto Kahn-Freund, English Contracts and American Anti-Trust Law - The Nylan Patent Case, 18 Moo. L. REv. 65
(1955); Meessen, n. 654.
660. This is particularly true in the European Union. Wood Pulp Case, Case 89/85, [1988) E.C.R. 5193; see also
REsTATE.IIENT(THIRD) § 415, r.n.9. Nevertheless, these countries' and others' blocking or clawback statutes and others
represent contrary policy in recognizing extraterritorial effect of US multiple damages awards, particularly in
antitrust cases, and reach of US discovery requests abroad. See generally British Airways, n. 656 (Lord Diplock,J .); Rio
Timo Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978) A.C. 547; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 442, r.n.4; A.V. Lowe,
Blocking Extratem'toriaIJurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 75 AJIL 257 (1981).

661. See nn. 654-46 and accompanying te.xt..
662. This is the approach required in the US military planning process, which has been in operation over a
century. Undoubtedly other States use similar decisionmaking. Diederich, n. 17, 160, argues for environmental
planning in the context of military operations planning. NWP I-14M Annotated ~~ 8.1.3 directs this; see also n. 649
and accompanying text..

663. See n. III and accompanying text..
664. US Deparunent of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations 20-22 (Apr. 1995), in 34 lUi 1080, 1102-04 (1995).
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665. /d. 10-11,34 ILM 1092-93, citing inter alia NAFfA, n. III.949 and treaties with the European Union and other
major US trading partners; see also nn. III. 949, IV.22, VI.76 and accompanying text.
666. Practice under multilateral and bilateral treaties with the same or similar terms can lead to custom. BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; I OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3).

667. See nn. 654-55 and accompanying text.
668. LOS Convention, art. 91(1); High Seas Convention, art. 5(1), declaring in identical terms that there must be a
genuine link between a flag State and a ship. See also Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, n. 11.61; Part
V.C.3. Since the LOS Convention's navigational articles and the High Seas Convention are generally thought to be
declaratory of customary international law, this provision, implicating use of a factorial analysis not unlike that of
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 US 571 (1953) and similar cases, argues forits use in other maritime conte....ts.SCe n. IV.3 and
accompanying texts. On the other hand, it might be submitted that the holdingofS.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No.
10, at 12-32 argues against it, i.e., that the law of the flag is the only concern. See LOS Convention, art. 97; High Seas
Convention, art. 11; see also Convention for Codification of Certain Rules Relating to Penal Matters in Matters of
Collision or Other Incidents of Navigation, May 10, 1952, arts. 1-2,439 UNTS 233, 235-37.
and these treaties
dealt with States' applying municipal law to conduct aboard ships flying other flags on the high seas in the absence of
an international norm; what is at stake here is a technique of analysis, not extraterritorial reach of laws. LOAC
customary rules, e.g., the flag a neutral merchantman flies isprimafacie indication ofa ship's nationality, or that a ship
flying an enemy flag is conclusive ofits enemy character, are also of no consequence in this context. See generally Part
V.D.l. As with the LOS and rules governing collisions at sea, these principles concern rights ofvi sit, search, diversion
and capture and destrUction of merchant ships and do not reject a factorial approach. See Part V.B.

utus

669. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS, n. 651 § 6(1),requiringa COUrt, subject to constitutional restrictions, to
follow its own state's statUtory directive on choice oflaw; see also Robertson, New LOS 302-03. Uniform Commercial
Code § 1-105 is a typical, and commonplace, example in the United States; all but one of the states have enacted it.
Judge Weis' Mannington Mills opinion, 595 F.2d 1297-99, lists a relevant treaty as a faclor to be considered, but it is not
clear whether the treaty would govern over all factors if the treaty prescribed choice oflaw.
670. UN Charter, art. 103, declares that if there is conflict between Members' Charter obligations and obligations
under other international agreements, Charter obligations prevail. This applies to Member obligations under
Security Council decisions pursuant to id., arts. 25, 48. Art. 103's rule is analogous to US Const., art. VI. The
Constitution, US treaties and federallegislation prevail over laws of the states ofthe United States. The same is true in
conflict oflaws, or private international law; states' conflicts principles, whether in statute or case law, are subject to
the Constitution. See generally Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 US 717 (1988); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 US 797
(1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,449 US 302 (1981). REsTATEMENT(SECOND), CONFLICTS, n. 651 § 6(1) recognizes the
Constitution's primacy; this heirarchy is proposed by analogy for public international law issues, i.e., first applying
the Charter andjus cogens, and secondarily treaties or custom, with a factorial approach used only ifnone ofthese recite
rules.

671. See n. 111.10 and accompanying text.
672. UN Charter, arts. 51, I03;seealso nn. III.IO,47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; PartB.l.
673. Analysis proceeds under the simplest model, i.e., two States in bilateral confrontation; if it is a multilateral
situation, analysis might proceed by analogy to treaty reservation rules. See Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; nn.
111.621, VI.268 and accompanying text.
674. LOS Convention, arts. 21(1)(f), 21(2)-21(4); see also Part IV.B.4.

675. Cf. LOS Convention, art. 197; see also Part B.2.c(III).
676. ICJ Statute, arts. 38,59; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102-03; see also n. 111.10. Treaties might be subject to
analysis under impossibility of performance or fundamental change ofcircumstances,e.g., if there is a natural disaster
affecting the environment. Vienna Convention, arts. 61-62; see also nn. 111.928-29, IV.26-27, VI.80-81 and
accompanying text.
677. UN Charter, art. 103; n. 111.10 and accompanying text.

678. See, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. 111.932-67, IV.IO-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.2b. As in the LOS-law of the maritime environment contexts, treaty interpretation and
application principles, e.g., impossibility, fundamental change of circumstances and war, may affect analysis.
Although war may suspend or end many agreements' operation, it cannot affect humanitarian law treaties. Vienna
Convention, arts. 61-62; see also nn. III.928-29, 938-51; IV.26-27, 29-30; VI.80-81, 83-84 and accompanying text.
679. ICJ Statute, arts. 38, 59; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102-03; see also n. III.IO and accompanying text.

Maritime Environment

601

680. ENMOD Convention; see also Pan B.3.a(lV)(A).
681. The SAN REl.IO MANUAL and Robertson, New LOS 302 advocate this approach. See nn. 583-655 and
accompanying texL
682. UN Charter, arL 103; nn. IlUO and accompanying texL

683. See n. 588 and accompanying texL
684. See n. 111.874 and accompanying texL
685. This sort of quadrilateral confrontation might occur where two belligerents are engaged in armed conflict in
waters that are part of the EEZ of a State not party to the conflict, through which pass other States' vessels exercising
high seas navigational rights in theEEZ, or are engaged in fishing with coastal State authorization in that State's EEZ.
In the former situation, passing vessels would exercise LOS due regard for coastal State EEZ operations but would be
obliged to Stay clear ofthe immediate area of belligerents' naval operations. The fishing boats, ifcoastal craft, would be
immune from capture even if flagged under an opposing belligerent if pursuing usual occupations, but would be
obliged to depart an immediate area of naval operations if a belligerent required it. Fishermen and passing vessels
e.xercising navigational rights would observe due regard for each other while in their normal occupations. However, if
a belligerent warship legitimately suspected that the fisherman or the navigating vessel were engaged in unneutral
service, LONW principles would apply, and the belligerent would observe these as well as the LOS and the marine
environmenL

686. Sea no. 678-82 and accompanying texL
687. Multilateral treaty reservation principles may be helpful. See Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; nn. III.621,
VI.268 and accompanying te.XL
688. UN Charter, arL 103; see also n. IlUO and accompanying te.xt.
689. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51, 103;seealso nn. IlI.l0,47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Part
B.1.
690. UN Charter, arts. 25,48,103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying texL
691. See n. IlI.IO and accompanying te.XL
692. E.g., LOS Convention, aIL 87(2); High Seas Convention, arL 2; see also n. IV.75 and accompanying texL
693. IC] Statute, arts. 38, 59; REsrATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102-03; see also n. III.lO and accompanying texL
694. SAN REl.IO MANUAL 5.
695. See nn. 580·653 and accompanying texL
696. Compare REsrATEMENT (THIRD) § 403(2); see also, e.g., REsrATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLlcrS, n. 651, § 6(2);
Romero v. International Termin. Op. Co., 358 US 354, 382-83 (1959); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 US 571 (1953); no.
651-68 and accompanying te.XL
697. Compare anticipatory action permitted under, e.g., LOS Convention, arL 221; 1969 Intervention Convention,
and regional treaties, e.g., Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol, n. II.63 with the doctrine of anticipatory
self-defense as part of an inherent right ofindividual and collective self-defense; see UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also
nn. III.10,47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; Parts B.l,B.2.c(III); n.163 and accompanying texL
A right of anticipatory self-defense to major environmental threats tends to confirm a right of anticipatory
self-defense to threats to a State's right to territorial integrity and political independence, confirmed by arL 2(4), in
that if affirmative action against a major environmental threat has received such widespread acceptance, anticipatory
action is proper if a State protects much more than the environment, i.e., political existence and freedom under aIL
2(4), that Nicaragua Case, 1986 IC] 100, held customary law approaching the character ofjus ,ogens. See also n. HI.lO
and accompanying te.XL
698. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10,47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; PartB.l;
and accompanying te.XL
699. Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23; see also no. III.621, VI.268 and accompanying te.XL

700. Sec nn. III.617-27 and accompanyint text; Part V.A.2.
701. Protocol I, arts. 51, 52(2), 57(2), dealing with planning attacks during land warfare. States appended
declarations to the Protocol, stating their interpretation that arts. 51-52 and 57(2) standards could only apply to
information available to planners at the time of decision. See nn. HI.620-26, V.42-43 and accompanying text.
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702. Mine Protocol art. 3(4); Amended Aline Protocol, n. 536, art. 3(10), - UST - , in 35 ILM 1210; Incendiary
Weapons Protocol, art. 2(3); Second Protocol, art. 1(f); see also nn. III.620-26, V.4243 and accompanying text.
703. SAN REMo MANUAL '11'1140 & cmts. 40.10-40.11, 46 & cmt. 46.3.

704. See nn. I11.617-27 and accompanying text.
705. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); see also nn. !IUO, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.l; n. 429 and accompanying te.XL

706. See nn. 695-704 and accompanying text.
707. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Protocol I, art. 2(b); see also nn. !IUO, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and
accompanying text; Part B.l; n. 429 and accompanying text.

708. See generaliY Parts I1.B-ILC.
709. This very scenario could have occurred in connection with maritime interdiction operations against the
former Yugoslavia. See James R. Stark, Welcoming Remarks, in PROTECTION OFTHEENVIRONMENT 6-7; see also Arkin, n.
2,120, for similar situations in the 1990-91 Gulf War that resulted in some spillage.
710. The Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol, n. I1.63, were invoked after Iraq's attack on Iran's offshore
Nowruz oil facility. See nn. 185-206 and accompanying te.xt.
711. See generaliY Part V.D.

712. See generaliY Part IV.C.2.
713. See 11n. I1.239·40 and accompanying text.
714. See generaliY Parts I1.B-I1.C.
715. See nn. I1.250-59, 376-78 and accompanying text.
716. See nD. I1.210-15 and accompanying text.
717. See nn. 185-206 and accompanying text.
718. Vienna Convention, arts. 61-62; see also nn. III.928-29, 938-51; IV.26-27, 29; VI.80-81, 83 and accompanying
text.
719. BROWNUE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEtM § 10,28; REsTATEAIENT(THIRD) § 102(3).

720. Cf. NWP I-14M Annotated '11'11 8.5.1; see also ICRC Guidelines, n. 626, '11'114, 7 at 8-30 - 8-31.
721. Cf. NWP I-14M Annotated '11'118.5.1.

722. Cf. J.H. Doyle, Jr., Comments on James Service's Paper: Targeting Realities: Platforms, Weapons Systems and
Capabilities, in Grunawalt 242, 245.
723. Vienna Convention, arts. 61-62; see also nD. 111.928-29, 938-51; IV.26-27, 29-30; VL80-84.

724. See Chapter IV; Parts A-B.
725. See generaliY Chapter V; Part B.2.a.
726. See Parts B.3.a(IV)(A)-B.3.a(IV)(B), BA.
727. See Part C.
728. See, e.g., Special Issue: Iraqi Symposium, 15 SOU. ILL. U. L.J. 411 (1991); Symposium on International Law
and the Rules of War: The Crisis Over Kuwait, 1991 DUKEJ. CoMP. &INT'LL.l; Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law
in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AJIL 452 (1991).
729. See, e.g., Mark Weller, The InternationalResponse to theDissolution ofthe Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslavia,
86 AJIL 569 (1992).
730. See, e.g., Lori F. Damrosch et al.,Agora: The 1994 US Action in Haiti, 89 id. 58 (1995).
731. Cf. COUN L. PowEu,My AMERICAN JOURNEY 528-29 (1995); Ralph Bergleiter, Media and InternationalAffairs
in the SateUiteAge, in Panel, The Impact ofthe Media on International Law and Relations, 1995 ASIL PROe. 119.
732. Other values may be invoked as well. See Diederich, n.17, 153-54.

733. See Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
734. See nn. 583-94 and accompanying text.
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735. See generally UN Charter, arts. 1(3), 55-56; Civil & Political Rights Covenant; Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights Covenant, which together with Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, UN Doc. N810, at 71
(1948), are the core of this body oflaw. Cf. REsTATEMENT (THIRD), InlTOductory Note to Part VII. The United States is
party to the Civil & Political Rights Covenant and to treaties protective of human rights, e.g., the Genocide
Convention. TIF 377-78,382-83.
736. E.g., European Convention for Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
UNTS 221; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 id. 123; African Charter on Human &
Peoples' Rights, June 27,1981, in 21 ILM 58 (1982) (Banjul Charter).
737. See, e.g., A.A. Cancdo Trinidade, The Contribution of International Human Rights Law to Environmental
Protection, with Special Reference to Global Environmental Change, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
NEW CHALLBNGES AND DIMENSIONS ch. 9 (Edith Brown Weiss ed. 1992); Richard Desgagne, Integrating Environmental
Values into the European Convention on Human Rights, 89 AJIL 263 (1995); Cynthia Giagnocavo & Howard Goldstein,
Law Reform or World Re-form: The Problem ofEnvironmental Rights, 35 MCGILL L.J. 345 (1990); W. Paul Gormley, The
Legal Obligation ofthe International Community to Guorantee a Pure and Decent Environment: The Expansions ofHuman
Rights Norms, 3 GEORGI!TOWN INT'LENVT'L L. REv. 85 (1990); Alexandre Kiss,An Introductory Note on a Human Right to
Environment, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE ch. 1; Magraw & Vinogradov, n. 353,210-12; RS. Pathak, The Human Rights
System as a Conceptual Frameworkfor Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE ch. 8; Dinah Sheiton,Human
Rights, Environmental Rights and the Right to Environment, 28 STAN.J. INT'L L. 103 (1991); William Andrew Shutkin,
Note, International Human Rights Law and the Earth: The Protection ofIndigenous Peoples and the Environment, 31 VJIL
479 (1991); Melissa Thorme,Establishing Environment as a Human Right, 19 DEN.J. INT'LL. & Pol. 301 (1991). A recent
commentary on UN Charter, arts. 1(3), 55-56, does not list the environment as a human rights norm. The
environment, i.e., the UN Environment Programme, and areas peripheral to the environment, e.g., permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, food shortages, population, natural disasters, have been subjects of UN
resolutions. SUIMA 55-56, 770-75.

738. National constitutions may grant protection of environmental rights. EDITH BROWN WEISS, FAIRNESS TO
FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, CoMMON PATRIMONY AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY, app. B (1989)
compiles these, which can be indicative of custom, which can also be derived from common patterns of national
legislation, e.g., NEPA. BROWNUE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEU\ § 10,26. The list for which a State is culpable
for violating international human rights is short but includes "consistent patterns of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights." REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 702.
739. E.g., Convention Concerning Liability of Shipowner in Case of Sickness, Injury or Death of Seamen (ILO
Convention No. 55), OCL 24, 1936,54 StaL 1693,40 UNTS 169, held by Warren v. United States,340 US 523 (1951)as
coinciding with US admiralty law maintenance, cure and wages standards. The United States has been a member of
ILO, another UN specialized agency, for all but three years. TIF 394; Note, U.S. Assaults ILO, 65 AJIL 136 (1977). See
also BIRNIE & BOYLE 56-57.
740. Defrenne v. SABENA, 1976 E. Comm.J. Rep. 455, 473-76; Symposium, The Emerging European Constitution,
1978 ASIL PROe. 166, 169 (Eric Stein remarks).

741. See nn. III.948, IV.30, VI.84 and accompanying texL
742. E.g., Civil & Political Rights Covenant, arL 4, limiting applicability to circumstances stated in id., arts. 6-7,
8(1)-8(2),11, 15-16, 18; European Convention for Protection ofHuman Rights & Fundamental Freedoms,n. 736, art.
15,213 UNTS 232-34, e.xcluding application "during war or public emergency" except arts. 3, 4(1), 7, id. 227; see also
SUBATRA Roy CHOWDHURY, RULB OF LAW IN ASTATEOFEJ.IERGENCY 12-13,22-29,59,121-25,210-11(1989) (analyzing
International Law Association Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency [1984]); Joan
Fitzpatrick, Protection Against Abuse of rhe Concept of "Emergency," in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT
CENTURY 203 (AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. STUD. IN TRANSNAT'L POL., Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove cds. 1994);
Henkin,InternationalHumanRights as "Rights," 1 CARDOZO L. REv. 446-47 (1979). Legaliry ofThreat or Use ofNuclear
Weapons, 1996(1) ICJ 239-40, observed
that the protection of the [Civil & Political Covenant] ••• does not cease in times ofwar, except by operation of
Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency.
Respect for the rightto life is not •• such a provision.••• [T]he right not arbitrarily to be deprived ofone's life
applies also in hostilities •••• [W]hat is an arbitrary deprivation of life ••• then falls to be determined by the
applicable lex specialis, ••• the [LOAC] ••• [,] designed to regnlate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a
particular loss oflife, through use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation
oflife contrary to ••• the Covenant, can only be decided by .•. the [LOAC] and not ••• from the terms of the
Covenant ••••
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This analysis would seem to apply if a right to a clean environment is considered a human right, an issue the case did
not address in the majority opinion.

743. E.g., Banjul Charter, n. 736. The Genocide Convention does not have a derogation clause; its background
emphasizes that it, like the humanitarian law treaties, applies in all places andat all times. See nn. III.948,IV.30, Vl.84,
278 and accompanying text.
744. See UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Protocol 1, art. 2(b); Vienna Convention, arts. 61-62; see also nn.1Il.10, 47-630,
916-18,928-29,938-51,968-84, IV.6-27,29-30 and accompanying text; Part B.1; nn. 80-84,429 and accompanying text.
745. Some have already begun to advocate animal rights. See BIRNIE & BOYLE 422-24.

746. See generally Part B.3.a.(lll)(B).
747. See nn. 16-18 and accompanying text.

